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When interacting, people imitate each other. This tendency is truly ubiquitous and occurs in 
many different situations and behaviours. But what causes it? Several mechanisms have been 
proposed to contribute to imitation. In this thesis, I focus on three candidate mechanisms: 
simulation, temporal adaptation, and the goal to affiliate with others. I start by discussing 
different imitative behaviours, and reviewing the evidence that imitation might at times 
emerge spontaneously. I also review the evidence suggesting that the three candidate 
mechanisms might be involved in such emergent imitation. Then, I present three sets of 
experiments. 
In the first set, I investigate the role of simulation in language processing. In three experiments, 
I test the hypothesis that comprehenders use their language production system to simulate their 
interlocutor, which in turn facilitates their ability to predict the next word they will see or hear. 
I manipulate whether participants read the sentences silently or aloud and measure their ability 
to predict the final word of a sentence. My results demonstrate that prediction is enhanced 
when people use their production system during reading aloud. This gives some credence to 
the idea that simulation is routinely engaged in language processing, which in turn opens up a 
possibility that it may contribute to linguistic imitation. 
In the second set of experiments, I investigate whether temporal adaptation leads agents to 
imitate features of their partner’s actions. In three experiments, I test this by manipulating the 
partner’s response speed and the information about the partner’s actions. I show that agents 
imitate response speed when they are able to observe the partner. Moreover, they adapt to the 
specific temporal pattern of their partner’s actions. These findings provide evidence for the 
engagement of the temporal adaptation mechanism during motor interactions, and for its 
involvement in imitation. 
In the third set of experiments, I turn to the hypothesis that people engage in linguistic imitation 
because they want to harness the social benefits it brings. I investigate a key assumption of 
this hypothesis: that imitation has positive consequences for the social interaction. In three 
experiments, I manipulate whether participants’ word choice is imitated or counter-imitated 






interaction and the partner, and their willingness to cooperate with the partner. I find evidence 
that linguistic imitation has positive social consequences. These results are consonant with the 
claim that imitation is motivated by the goal to affiliate and foster social relations. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that imitation might occur both in motor actions and 
language, and that it might have diverse causes. My work on language suggests that the 
tendency to linguistically imitate others could both result from the simulation mechanism, and 
be motivated by the goal to affiliate. My work on motor actions shows that automatic temporal 
adaptation contributes to emergent imitation during interactions. This research is conducive to 
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Introduction 
“It should be kept in mind that an imitative act might be performed quite unthinkingly,  
as when a man in the mob shouts what the other shout or clap when others clap.”  
(Thorndike, 1911, p. 79) 
 
People imitate each other. Once noticed, this fascinating tendency is impossible to miss. 
People copy a wide variety of behaviours, including actions and words, gestures and accents, 
mannerisms and sayings. Moreover, they engage in imitation in many different situations, 
from a face-to-face interaction to a phone conversation, and from merely observing others to 
being engaged in a joint action with a whole crowd. But why do they do it? The answer to this 
question has proved to be elusive. Despite over a century of continuous research efforts, 
arguably none of the existing theoretical accounts is able to explain why people engage in 
imitation in all its different forms, and in all the different contexts. This might be because 
imitation does not lend itself to our usual explanation of human behaviour, i.e. the conscious 
will to carry out an action. Indeed, imitation often occurs unintentionally, and independent of 
the conscious goals an individual might have. 
So if not an act of will, then what pushes people to imitate each other? Several candidate 
mechanisms have been proposed to account for spontaneous imitation. In this thesis, I focus 
on three such mechanisms, i.e. simulation, temporal adaptation, and the unconscious goal to 
affiliate with others. However, each of them is associated with a distinct theoretical approach. 
Moreover, evidence for each mechanism tends to focus on a single instance of spontaneous 
imitation, and generally does not extend to its other forms. This led to a situation where 
psychological research on imitation, despite its long history, is unable to tell us whether the 
different forms of imitation can be accounted for by a single or multiple mechanisms.  
In this thesis, I argue that our understanding of imitation could be advanced by a systematic 
cross-examination of the existing candidate mechanisms. Specifically, each mechanism should 
be tested with regard to a type of imitation that has not been previously considered by the 
research that has been used to investigate this mechanism. This would allow to identify the 






better models of imitation. In the following empirical chapters of this thesis, I present three 
sets of experiments that contribute to such cross-examination. 
The first set of experiments asks whether the simulation mechanism could be responsible for 
the instances of imitation in language. Simulation has been widely evidenced in relation to 
motor action, and the existing research suggests that it might be involved in the automatic 
tendency to imitate the observed movements. However, the idea that people engage in 
simulation also when perceiving language is relatively new and unexplored. Should simulation 
be routinely activated in language processing, it would make it a likely candidate for 
explaining the linguistic imitation that naturally occurs in dialogue. 
The second set of studies investigates the possibility that some instances of imitation result 
from an automatic tendency to temporally adapt to others. People have been shown to readily 
adjust the rhythm of their own actions to the rhythm of the actions around them. However, 
most of the evidence for this mechanism comes from studies looking at continuous rhythmic 
actions. In the second set of studies, I ask whether temporal adaptation could occur also for 
discrete non-rhythmic actions, and whether it could contribute to imitation in interactions 
involving such actions. 
In the third, and last, set of experiments presented in this thesis, I ask whether spontaneous 
imitation of language could be motivated by an unconscious goal to affiliate with others. 
Research on behavioural mimicry have demonstrated that imitation has various positive 
consequences, and suggested that people use as an unconscious tool for creating affiliation 
between people. But crucially, evidence for this does not extend to language. To bridge this 
gap, the third set of experiments investigates whether linguistic imitation could also bring 
about positive social consequences. 
I would like to close this brief introduction by suggesting some reasons for why we need 
psychological research on imitation. Many excellent thinkers committed their time to 
researching imitation, including Adam Smith (1759), Edward Thorndike (1911), Gordon 
Allport (1968), Margaret Mead (1968), and Charles Darwin (1871). This is because imitation 
is much more than just another peculiarity of human behaviour. In fact, it is intimately related 






one of the most impressive feats of our species, i.e. social learning. The ability to imitate the 
actions performed by others allows individuals to acquire numerous complex skills without 
the need to reinvent them (e.g., writing, driving), and as such is likely to be one of the key 
factors in our evolutionary success. Moreover, imitation is also an important part of our social 
lives. Research in social psychology suggests that imitating others makes us more likable and 
encourages the people around us to act in a more cooperative way. Thus, imitation might be 
one of the behaviours that brings us together and helps to maintain positive relations with 
others. 
Finally, imitation results from certain cognitive mechanisms. Crucially, these mechanisms are 
likely to be routinely engaged across different contexts and situations, and therefore might 
influence our thoughts and actions more generally. Thus, uncovering the mechanisms 
responsible for imitation promises to also uncover the inner workings of the mind. Perhaps it 
was this promise that lured so many to investigating imitation. 
Chapter 1 
The Cognitive Mechanisms and Social 
Consequences of Imitation: A Review 
1 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In the first part of this chapter, I review the research on imitation. I start by presenting evidence 
that people coordinate their behaviour with each other, and that this can lead to imitation. I 
then review different types of imitative behaviour, and discuss the theoretical accounts that 
attempted to capture and describe the diversity of imitation. Next, I propose a definition of 
imitation that can help to avoid some of the obscurities that currently exist in the literature, 
and that I will use throughout this thesis. I then specify the imitative behaviours that will be 
considered in this thesis, i.e. linguistic imitation and imitation of motor actions.  
In the second part of this chapter, I present three mechanisms that may promote these 
behaviours: simulation, temporal adaptation, and the unconscious goal to affiliate. I review the 
existing evidence for their role in shaping social behaviour. I further argue that psychological 
research on imitation can be advanced by testing each of these mechanisms with regards to 
behaviours that have previously been attributed to other mechanisms. Specifically, simulation 
has been widely tested with respect the motor action domain, but could be extended to 
language. Temporal adaptation has been investigated with respect to continuous rhythmic 
actions, but could be extended to discrete non-rhythmic actions. The unconscious goal to 
affiliate has been used to explain behavioural mimicry, but could also be applied to imitation 
of language. In the following empirical chapters, I present experiments that contribute to a 
cross-examination of these mechanisms. Thus, the aim of this review is to establish a 
theoretical context for these experiments. 
2 PLANNED AND EMERGENT COORDINATION IN SOCIAL INTERACTIONS  
Many things we do, we do with others. Whether it’s a quick chat with a friend, a game of 






coordinate our actions with those of other people. And because we spend most of our lives in 
proximity of others, social coordination is reflected in a rich repertoire of behaviours. 
Two general types of social coordination have been proposed in the literature. First, 
coordination can be planned and involve some form of conscious, intentional goal pursuit 
(Knoblich, Butterfill, & Sebanz, 2011). In such cases, each of the interacting agents forms a 
mental representation of their own actions, and of the actions of the other. Critically, this task 
representation is shared by both agents (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). What exactly 
is being represented differs between the particular instances of coordination (see Vesper, 
Butterfill, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2010). Typically agents share an action plan specifying various 
features of the action (e.g., spatial, temporal) and its outcome, but may also share perceptions, 
knowledge, goals and intentions (Knoblich et al., 2011). For example, to play a match of tennis 
two friends must share a goal to engage in the game, both know the rules, intend to follow 
them and assume that the other shares this intention. Moreover, while playing the game, each 
of them must plan their moves in relation to what they expect their partner to do.  
Strikingly, coordination can also emerge independently of conscious goals, plans and 
intentions (Knoblich et al., 2011). In many social settings, agents find themselves closely 
coordinating their actions, despite the fact they have no intention to do so. For instance, 
audiences in theatres fall into the same clapping rhythm (Neda, Ravasz, Brechte, Vicsek, & 
Barabasi, 2000), people walking next to each other synchronise their footsteps (Van Ulzen, 
Lamoth, Daffertshofer, Semin, & Beek, 2008), and speakers engaged in a conversation adopt 
each other’s body sway (Shockley, Santana, & Fowler, 2003). Language use also provides 
examples of such emergent coordination. In conversation, speakers align on the use of 
particular words (Brennan & Clark, 1996) and syntax (Branigan, Pickering, & Cleland, 2000), 
or adopt partner’s speech rate (Webb, 1969) and accent (Giles, Coupland, & Coupland 1991). 
Arguably, they often do so with no explicit goal that would necessitate it. Emergent 
coordination is assumed to result from a number of automatic mechanisms that promote 
spontaneous self-organisation of agents’ behaviours, i.e. entrainment, common affordances, 
perception–action matching, and simulation (Knoblich et al., 2011). In this view, the tendency 
to coordinate resembles the gravitational pull, bringing the agents into a common orbit of a 






2.1 The Link between Coordination and Imitating Others 
In the process of coordination, the behaviours of the interacting agents become non-random, 
patterned, or synchronised in both timing and form (Bernieri & Rosenthal, 1991). Most 
importantly, this might lead them to effectively imitate each other’s behaviour. For example, 
an audience who is coordinated to the point of clapping in unison consists of multiple 
individuals who imitate each other’s clapping rhythm. Similarly, conversational partners who 
coordinate on their word use need to continuously imitate each other’s lexical choices. 
Given that many well-coordinated social interactions involve imitation, I propose that 
imitative behaviours may arise from the same mechanisms that contribute to coordination. 
Specifically, I consider two cognitive mechanisms that have been argued to result in emergent 
coordination, i.e. simulation and temporal adaptation (Knoblich et al., 2011). I argue that these 
mechanisms are routinely and involuntarily engaged in social interactions, and therefore may 
lead agents to spontaneously imitate each other. Moreover, imitative behaviours can also be 
motivated by the unconscious goal to affiliate with others, which has been shown to play an 
important role in promoting social coordination (Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003). 
I argue that agents are driven by a desire to maintain positive relations with others, and that 
they may automatically engage in imitation because of its positive consequences for the 
interaction with another. These mechanisms are discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
But first, in the next sections I review the evidence that people engage in a diverse range of 
imitative behaviours, i.e., synchrony, emotional contagion, imitative learning, overimitation, 
mimicry, linguistic imitation, and automatic imitation. 
3 DIFFERENT TYPES OF IMITATIVE BEHAVIOUR 
It seems easy to recognise imitation when we see it, and yet there is no consensus in the 
literature on what exactly is imitation. In fact, prevailing inconsistency in defining imitation 
frustrated researchers already over a century ago (e.g., Morgan, 1900). Despite over a century 
of efforts, imitation continues to be defined in different ways, investigated under different 
theoretical banners, using different methodologies, and described with sometimes conflicting 
terminology (Heyes, 1996). This might be because imitation is not a single behaviour, but 






has been recognised at least since Darwin, and inspired numerous accounts that vastly differed 
from one author to another (for reviews, see Bavelas, Black, Lemery, & Mullett, 1987; Galef, 
2013; Zentall, 2006). The following sections review the wide range of behaviours that have 
been studied and interpreted in the imitation literature. Note, that although these behaviours 
have often been investigated within different theoretical frameworks, they are not always 
entirely discrete. 
3.1 Synchrony 
Close coordination of behaviours can sometimes manifest itself in a phenomenon known as 
synchrony. To synchronise actions means to engage in them at the same time, simultaneously. 
For example, musicians performing a piece might play different parts in synchrony in order to 
create a beautiful harmony, or rowing crews might aim to stroke at once to achieve better 
movement efficiency. Such cases of synchrony are a manifestation of planned coordination. 
Deliberate synchronisation of actions is in itself a fascinating phenomenon and has attracted 
considerable attention from researchers studying musical performance and those investigating 
human interactions from the dynamic systems perspective (for reviews, see Repp, 2005; Repp 
& Su, 2013; Schmidt & Richardson, 2008). Perhaps even more interesting is the fact that 
people can fall into synchrony without any intention to do so. For example, a person listening 
in a conversation may unintentionally synchronise their body movements with the speaker’s 
rhythm of speech (Condon & Ogston, 1966; Hadar, Steiner, & Rose, 1985). Similarly, both 
the listener and the speaker might align on a common pattern of body sway (Fowler, 
Richardson, Marsh, & Shockley, 2008). Other types of actions have also been shown to lend 
themselves to spontaneous synchrony, including walking (van Ulzen, Lamoth, Daffertshafer, 
Semin, & Beek, 2008), rocking in rocking chairs (Richardson, Marsh, Isenhower, Goodman, 
& Schmidt, 2007), and swinging legs (Schmidt, Carello, & Turvey, 1990) or pendulums 
(Schmidt & O’Brien, 1997). Note that synchrony can bind different actions, such as in the case 
of musicians synchronising their parts, or same actions, as in the example with the rowing 
crew. Crucially, to identify such coordination as synchrony, actions must be temporally 
overlapping. Despite the rich literature documenting synchrony, relatively few studies 






phase correction response) has been most often evoked to explain spontaneous synchrony. 
This mechanism will be discussed later in this thesis. 
3.2 Emotional Contagion 
Anyone who has ever travelled on a plane most likely recognises this fact: babies start crying 
once they hear others babies cry. This is an example of a fascinating phenomenon known as 
emotional contagion. People of all ages show a tendency to reflect the feelings of the 
individuals around them. Emotional contagion occurs with many different emotions, both 
positive and negative (for a review, see Hatfield, Carpenter, & Rapson, 2014). For instance, 
interacting with somebody who is sad might lead to an increased feeling of sadness (Howes, 
Hokanson, & Lowenstein, 1985). In one study, participants spoke over the phone with a person 
who was, unbeknownst to them, either depressed or non-depressed. Those who interacted with 
a depressed person reported feeling more depressed after the conversation, as compared to 
those interacting with a non-depressed person (Coyne, 1976). Other research has found that 
other emotions like loneliness (Cacioppo, Fowler, & Christakis, 2009; Cristakis & Fowler, 
2011) or happiness (Christakis & Fowler, 2011; Hill, Rand, Nowak, & Christakis, 2010) are 
also subject to contagion. Interestingly, emotional contagion can also occur beyond the dyad. 
Historical, anthropological and sociological accounts suggest that individuals immersed in 
groups or crowds can fall into the same emotional state of joy, anger, or fear (for a review, see 
Hatfield et al., 2014). According to a psychological account of emotional contagion, 
converging on an emotional state is a consequence of physically imitating others (Hatfield, 
Rapson, & Le, 2009). When interacting, people copy the behavioural expression of emotions 
experienced by another (i.e., facial, vocal, and postural expression). The perceptual feedback 
from the imitated behaviours is then automatically decoded to identify the underlying 
emotions, which in turn induces a matching emotional state in the imitator (see also Hatfield, 
Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1993). 
3.3 Linguistic Imitation 
Having a conversation seems effortless, but in fact talking with another person requires 






them to spontaneously imitate each other’s language. Research in psychology and 
sociolinguistics has found evidence for such imitation with regards to different aspects of 
language. For example, Pardo (2006) showed that speakers in a conversation imitate their 
partner’s pronunciation. Speakers’ pronunciation of several target words was recorded before, 
during, and after they performed a conversational task with a partner. Interestingly, speakers’ 
pronunciation during the task was found to be more similar to their partner’s than to their own 
pronunciation before or after the task, suggesting that they imitated their partner during the 
conversation. People imitate also other vocal characteristics, including accent (Giles et al., 
1991), voice pitch (Gregory & Webster, 1996), and tone of voice (Smith-Genthôs, Reich, 
Lakin, & de Calvo, 2015), and copy temporal features like speech rate (Webb, 1969), and 
timing and duration of pauses (Cappella & Planalp, 1981). In addition, studies found that 
speakers sometimes imitate sentence structure (Bock, 1987; Branigan, Pickering, & Cleland, 
2000; Levelt & Kelter 1982; Weatherholtz, Campbell-Kibler, & Jaeger, 2014), linguistic style 
(Ireland & Pennebaker, 2010; Niederhoffer & Pennebaker, 2002), and word choice (Brennan 
& Clark, 1996; Branigan, Pickering, Pearson, & Mclean, 2010). For example, Branigan, 
Pickering, Pearson, McLean, and Brown (2011) demonstrated that people spontaneously 
imitate the word choice of their conversational partner, and they do so even if their partner 
uses an unusual, disfavoured word. This fascinating effect has been shown both for spoken 
and text-based conversations, in children as well as adults (Branigan, Tosi, & Gillespie-Smith, 
2016; Garrod & Clark, 1993). In psychology of language, these findings have been explained 
by automatic priming mechanisms, which affect the accessibility of linguistic representations 
in the language processing system and result in a tendency to repeat previously encountered 
linguistic material (e.g., Pickering & Garrod, 2004). Alternatively, a more social account posits 
that accommodation in speech may be motivated by a desire to be liked by the conversational 
partner (Giles & Coupland, 1991). Later in this thesis, I will discuss a similar possibility, i.e. 








When two people interact, they may imitate each other’s behaviour. But interestingly, they do 
not always do it by choice – in some cases imitation is engaged unintentionally, and performed 
so discreetly it slips the conscious attention of both the imitating and the imitated person. For 
example, people tend to copy the mannerisms of the ones they interact with, and when they 
are talking with someone who occasionally rubs their face or shakes their foot, they tend to 
mimic this behaviour (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). This phenomenon, knows as mimicry, has 
been greatly explored in the last three decades of social psychological research. The list of 
mimicked behaviours has been found to be surprisingly long - people copy body posture 
(LaFrance, 1982; Tia, Saimpont, Paizis, Mourey, & Fadiga, 2011), handshake angle and speed 
(Bailenson & Yee, 2007), various mannerisms (Karremans & Verwijmeren, 2008; Lakin & 
Chartrand, 2003; Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008; Stel et al., 2010; Yabar, Johnston, Miles, 
& Peace, 2006), and facial expressions of their interactional partners (Bavelas, Black, Lemery, 
& Mullett, 1986; Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000). The ubiquity and power of this type 
of imitation inspired the investigations of its possible causal mechanisms (for reviews, see 
Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009; Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Duffy & Chartrand, 2015; 
Kavanagh & Winkielman, 2016). It has been suggested that mimicry is socially adaptive, and 
that people imitate because it has positive consequences for their social interactions (e.g., 
Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). However, if mimicry is not a strategic act and it is engaged 
unconsciously, then how do people know it will benefit them? One prominent possibility is 
that people engage in mimicry as a result of an active unconscious goal to affiliate with others 
(Lakin et al., 2003). I will discuss the role of unconscious goals later in this review. 
3.5 Automatic Imitation 
In their laboratories, cognitive psychologists found an effect in many ways similar to mimicry. 
They discovered that people tend to imitate actions even when these actions are irrelevant or 
conflict with what they are doing at the moment, suggesting that this tendency is unintentional. 
For example, in one study participants were asked to open or close their hands in response to 
a colour cue superimposed on a video of an opening or closing hand (Stürmer, Aschersleben, 






the same action (e.g., participants opening hand when the video showed an opening hand), as 
compared to the video showing another action (e.g., participants opening hand when the video 
showed a closing hand). Importantly, the videos were irrelevant to the task and participants 
were not asked to pay any attention to them. Thus, faster action initiation in the presence of a 
video showing a matching action can be interpreted as evidence for an automatic tendency to 
imitate the observed actions. This finding, dubbed automatic imitation, have been replicated 
for a range of finger, hand, arm, foot, and mouth actions (e.g., Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschlager, 
& Prinz, 2000; Craighero, Fadiga, Rizzolatti, & Umilta, 1998; for review, see Heyes, 2011). 
The tendency to imitate motor actions is commonly attributed to an automatic perception-
action matching mechanism, i.e. an ability to instantaneously translate the perceptual 
representation of the observed action onto a motor plan for one’s own action (Heyes, 2001, 
2011). I will discuss this mechanism further in the subsequent sections of this review. 
3.6 Imitative Learning 
A very effective way to learn is to observe somebody demonstrate a novel action, and then 
imitate what they did. Different behaviours can be learnt this way, including languages (e.g., 
correct pronunciation), sports (e.g., skiing), playing musical instruments (e.g., learning to play 
staccato on piano), and many others. At least since Charles Darwin’s (1871) work on 
evolution, imitative learning has intrigued researchers from different fields of psychology who 
ascribed it a crucial role in the acquisition and transmission of cultural knowledge (e.g., 
Hewlett et al., 2011; Shea, 2009; Vygotsky, 1978). And now, more than a century later, there 
is a great deal of evidence that both children and adults engage in imitation in order to learn 
(e.g., Bandura, 1962, 1977; Hewlett, Fouts, Boyette, & Hewlett, 2011; Morgan, Rendell, Ehn, 
Hoppitt, & Laland, 2012). Interestingly, the ability to learn through imitation appears 
extremely early in ontogeny and precedes language acquisition. Numerous studies showed that 
from the first year onwards, children imitate to learn new behaviours (for reviews, see Barr, 
2010; Elsner, 2007; Nadel & Butterworth, 1999). For example, Shimpi, Akhtar and Moore 
(2013) found that toddlers readily copy a novel action performed on an object (e.g., pressing 
a button with an elbow to activate a sound) after it was demonstrated by a model. Moreover, 






Although it is debated how people acquire the ability to learn by imitating (e.g., Ray & Heyes, 
2011), a widely held belief is that imitative learning (at least in its mature form) is an act of 
will, i.e. agents intentionally copy the observed action in an attempt to master it. 
3.7 Overimitation 
In their attempts to learn a new action, people often prove to be surprisingly indiscriminate 
imitators. When attempting to reproduce a novel behaviour, people do not only imitate, but 
overimitate: they sometimes copy all demonstrated actions, including ones that are 
unnecessary or incorrect (e.g., Flynn, 2008; Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011). For 
example, Horner and Whiten (2005) found that children who observed a model demonstrate 
how to open a novel box copied both the necessary (e.g., removing a bolt holding the door) 
and redundant actions (e.g., tapping on the surface of a box with a stick). The tendency to 
indiscriminately reproduce goal-relevant along with goal-irrelevant actions has been dubbed 
overimitation (Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007). Importantly, much research in social and 
developmental psychology showed that such high-fidelity copying is not limited to young 
children, but is also found in older children and adults (McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 
2007; McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2010), who engage in overimitation even under time 
pressure (Flynn & Smith, 2012). Moreover, it appears that overimitation is not confined to the 
artifact domain, i.e. occurs also with behaviours that do that involve object manipulation. In a 
recent study, Subiaul, Winters, Krumpak, and Core (2016) showed that pre-school children 
imitated the model’s incorrect pronunciation regardless whether the word was familiar or not, 
and even if they had previously correctly named the word. It is currently debated whether 
overimitation occurs across different communities and cultures (Nielsen, Mushin, Tomaselli, 
& Whiten, 2014; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010; for a discussion, see Berl & Hewlett, 2015). To 
distinguish overimitation from imitative learning, some researchers stress it involves copying 
the irrelevant actions despite knowing the actions that are conventional, necessary, or correct 
in a given context (Subiaul et al., 2016). So defined, overimitation might appear to be driven 
by some automatic mechanism that is outside intentional control. Although several such 






overimitation might be in fact a rational, and intentional act (Keupp, Behne, Zachow, 
Kasbohm, & Rakoczy, 2015; Keupp, Bancken, Schillmöller, Rakoczy, & Behne, 2016). 
4 WHERE DO IMITATIVE BEHAVIOURS COME FROM? 
The ubiquity of imitative behaviour resonated in a vigorous debate about the origins of 
imitation. And as psychology has seen many times before, it is a debate between nature and 
nurture (or at least it closely resembles the nature vs nurture debate; for reviews, see Cook, 
Bird, Catmur, Press, & Heyes, 2014; Decety & Meltzoff, 2011; Heyes, 2010).  
One view in this discussion assumes that imitative behaviours result from an innate, 
genetically encoded ability to match an observed action with a representation of this action in 
one’s mind (e.g., Meltzoff & Moore, 1997). According to a strong version of this view, motor 
and sensory experience gained throughout the development plays a minor role in this ability 
(see Cook et al., 2014). On a neural level, this ability is warranted by a discovery of specialised 
neural cells, dubbed mirror neurons. These neurons fire both when the action is performed by 
an agent and when the agent observes it being performed by another (e.g., di Pellegrino, 
Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; 
Iacoboni, Woods, Brass, Bekkering, Mazziotta, & Rizzolatti, 1999; Mukamel, Ekstrom, 
Kaplan, Iacoboni, & Fried, 2010; for reviews, see Kilner & Lemon, 2013; Ferrari & Rizzolatti, 
2014; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). The proponents of the innate view argue that mirror 
neurons are present already at birth, and that this shows they are genetically encoded (e.g., 
Casile, Caggiano, & Ferrari, 2011; Gallese, Rochat, Cossu, & Sinigaglia, 2009).  
However, the other side of the debate claims that the ability to elicit imitative behaviours (and 
the neural basis for this ability, i.e. mirror neurons) is acquired at the postnatal stages of the 
development (e.g., Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2009). In this view, the ability to imitate is a 
product of associative learning that creates connections between sensory and motor neurons. 
As a result of this learning, brain areas responsible for observing and executing actions are 
linked into one network of mirror neurons (Cook et al., 2014; Heyes & Ray, 2000). Both the 
nativist and the associative account rely heavily on evidence from developmental studies. 






4.1 Imitative Behaviours across Development 
Most of the evidence suggests that people engage in imitative behaviours from the very first 
hours of their lives. For example, new-born babies cry when they hear other babies cry (for a 
review, see Geangu, Benga, Stahl, & Striano, 2010). In the first study to test this effect using 
a controlled experimental paradigm, Simner (1971) found that the number of infants who 
engaged in crying was greater in the group that heard a recording of another baby’s cry, as 
compared to the group that heard a recording of white noise of similar intensity, or the group 
that was not exposed to any sounds. Moreover, there exists a large body of evidence suggesting 
that new-born infants also show a tendency to copy other types of behaviour, including tongue 
protrusion, head movements and facial expressions (e.g., Jacobson, 1979; Meltzoff & Moore, 
1983; Meltzoff, 2002; Termine & Izard, 1988). However, these findings are currently under 
scrutiny due to concerns that they do not in fact demonstrate imitation (Jones, 1996, 2006) and 
that the evidence for some of the imitative behaviours is indecisive (for reviews, see Anisfeld, 
1996; Ray & Heyes, 2011). Crucially, there is a consensus that the tendency to imitate is 
observable at early developmental stages, whether it is the first hours or months after birth. 
Furthermore, the repertoire of imitative behaviours expands throughout childhood (for 
reviews, see Jones, 2007, 2009; Meltzoff & Williamson, 2013) and persists in adulthood (for 
reviews, see Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Heyes, 2001, 2011). 
5 IMITATIVE BEHAVIOURS: INSTANCES OF THE SAME OR DIFFERENT PHENOMENA? 
As shown in the previous sections, social coordination can manifest itself in many behaviours 
that involve copying other people. Agents might engage in synchrony, emotional contagion, 
imitative learning, linguistic imitation, overimitation, mimicry, and automatic imitation. 
Importantly, these behaviours differ from each other in some aspects, but bear a resemblance 
to each other in others. This creates a tension between an intuition that they might be instances 
of the same phenomenon, and the observation of apparent differences that could suggest that 
imitative behaviours may be caused by multiple mechanisms. In an attempt to illustrate this 







5.1 Similarities and Differences between Imitative Behaviours 
All of the imitative behaviours reviewed in the previous sections occur in a presence of another 
agent and involve copying of some features of the behaviour exhibited by this agent. However, 
they might differ in other aspects and several distinctions can be made to reflect these 
differences. 
First, the imitative behaviours reviewed here differ with regards to the features of the other 
agent’s behaviour that are being imitated. For instance, in synchrony agents copy the entire 
temporal structure of behaviour, but it is not essential for them to copy its other features (e.g., 
type of action involved). Conversely, imitative behaviours other than synchrony occur with a 
delay, i.e., agents engage in imitation after the onset of the action performed by the other agent. 
Thus, they might involve copying some (e.g., sequential order of actions constituting the 
behaviour, action duration), but not all temporal features. Instead, agents focus on imitating 
other features (e.g., spatial trajectory, velocity). 
Second, imitative behaviours might be associated with different modalities. More specifically, 
linguistic imitation is concerned with copying various (sometimes abstract) aspects of 
language (e.g., lexical, syntactic, prosodic), emotional contagion with copying emotional 
states and their physiological correlates (e.g., facial expression, visceral correlates of emotion, 
mental states), whereas the remaining imitative behaviours primarily involve copying motor 
movements. 
Third, some imitative behaviours appear to require conscious intention, whereas others seem 
to be performed unintentionally. In other words, some can be linked to planned coordination 
(imitative learning), whereas others arise from the mechanisms of emergent coordination 
(emotional contagion, mimicry, automatic imitation). However, note that some imitative 
behaviours can be either planned or emergent (synchrony, linguistic imitation). 
Finally, an imitative behaviour might involve actions that are novel or familiar to the agent. 
This distinction allows us to differ between behaviours that involve learning (imitative 
learning, overimitation) and those that typically do not (synchrony, emotional contagion, 






5.2 Modern Classifications of Imitative Behaviours 
In modern psychology, several classifications have been proposed to capture and meaningfully 
describe the diversity of imitative behaviours. Notably, some researchers distinguished 
between instances when agents imitate in order to learn a new behaviour and those when they 
imitate for other purposes. For example, Uzgiris (1981) proposed discerning between imitation 
to learn and imitation to be social (see also Byrne & Russon, 1998). 
Others included the distinction between imitative learning and other types of imitation, while 
attempting to also accommodate for the fact that people can imitate different types of 
behaviour. In his classic model, Piaget (1929, 1951) distinguished between simple imitation, 
that involved copying single, familiar actions, and complex imitation, that involved copying 
multiple or novel actions. Moreover, he also suggested that it is important whether the agent 
can observe themselves producing the imitative behaviour (e.g., copying an action involving 
an object), or not (e.g., copying a facial expression). More recently, Subiaul (2010) proposed 
a similar classification that makes a distinction between the behaviours that involve copying 
of familiar versus novel actions, and between the vocal, motor, and cognitive modality of the 
imitated behaviour. 
Another distinction is that of intentionality, and it has been particularly important for the 
accounts that focus on the social character of imitation. Researchers investigating the 
phenomenon of social mimicry assume it to be always unconscious, i.e. to occur without the 
conscious awareness of either of the agents involved (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). These 
accounts contrast unconscious and conscious imitation, and may also include an additional 
distinction between the different behaviours that are imitated, e.g., facial, emotional, verbal, 
and behavioural (Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009). 
Lastly, the timing of occurrence of the imitative behaviour has also been considered by some 
classifications. For example, Bandura (1969) distinguished between imitation that occurs 
simultaneously with the imitated behaviour (or immediately thereafter) and imitation that 
occurs with a delay. Importantly, the proponents of this distinction have argued that immediate 






5.3 Single- versus Multiple-Mechanism Theories of Imitation 
In response to the diversity of imitative behaviours, two general types of theories have been 
proposed. The first type posits that different imitative behaviours are manifestations of the 
same phenomenon, and that a single mechanism or a single system of mechanisms is 
responsible for imitation. The second type refers to imitation in a generic sense and proposes 
that it is an umbrella term for multiple distinct phenomena. Consequently, these theories argue 
that there are multiple mechanisms capable of eliciting imitative behaviours. 
Single-mechanism theories have been considered in psychology since Romanes, who 
suggested that simple forms of imitation are homologous antecedents of complex imitation 
(Galef, 2013). Many other researchers adopted this view ever since (e.g., Buller, 2006; Byrne, 
2005; Iacobini, 2005). Perhaps the most prominent modern single-mechanism theory is the 
Associative Sequence Learning account (ASL) (Catmur et al., 2009; Cook et al., 2014; Heyes, 
2001, 2005, 2011). The ASL proposes that imitation relies on the ability to translate the 
observed action onto a motor plan that can then be used to produce the same action. For 
instance, to imitate an adult who is waving good-bye, a child needs to translate the perceptual 
representation of the action performed by the adult onto a motor representation that the child 
would typically engage to perform the same action. This translation is achieved by an 
automatic perception-action matching mechanism, which on a neural level is warranted by a 
bidirectional activation link between the sensory and motor areas in the brain (i.e., mirror 
neurons). The perception-action matching mechanism develops through associative learning 
and once it is in place, it leads to an automatic activation of the action plan whenever this 
action is observed. Importantly, it has been suggested that this mechanism is responsible for 
generating both simple (i.e., automatic imitation and mimicry) and complex types of imitation 
(i.e., imitative learning) (Catmur et al., 2009; Heyes, 2001, 2011).1 
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The multiple-mechanism approach dates back to Morgan (1900), who distinguished between 
imitation produced by an instinct, or resulting from a conscious reflection. He noted that 
superficially identical behaviours may in fact be caused by these two distinct mechanisms. 
This core idea has been echoed in the work of other prominent thinkers (e.g., Piaget, 1951; 
Nadel, 2006; Meltzoff & Moore, 1997; Subiaul, 2010; Subiaul, Anderson, Brandt, & Elkins, 
2012). For example, Piaget (1951) proposed that imitation requires a whole set of cognitive 
skills, which are acquired at different developmental stages. The development of a skill 
precedes the ability to engage in an imitative behaviour that relies on it. Similarly, Jones (2007, 
2009) reviewed the existing developmental evidence and argued that different types of 
imitation appear at different ages, indicating there is no single imitative mechanism or system 
underlying all of them. Instead, she proposed a multi-component model in which imitation is 
a product of the coming together of motor and cognitive skills, and social knowledge and 
motivation. For example, to the child who wants to imitate an adult waving good-bye needs to 
have developed the cognitive and motor skills required for observing and identifying the 
action, be able to perform the action, and know the social norms that dictate who (and when) 
can be imitated (e.g., imitating a family member is accepted, but imitating strangers might not 
be). 
6 THE TYPE OF IMITATION CONSIDERED IN THIS THESIS 
As I demonstrated in the previous sections of this review, imitation continues to be 
investigated under different theoretical banners, with different methodologies, and sometimes 
using conflicting terminology (see Heyes, 1996). Given these conflicting approaches, it is 
important to clarify how the term imitation will be used in this thesis. 
6.1 A Broad Definition of Imitation 
In this thesis, I adopt a broad definition of imitation. Although the term imitation has been 
sometimes used to refer to an ability or faculty (e.g., Meltzoff & Moore, 1997; Subiaul, 2010), 
I propose to use it as a description of a behavioural phenomenon. Here, I define imitation as a 
non-random act of copying some or all aspects of a behaviour observed in another agent. 






features with a behaviour that was earlier produced by another agent. Moreover, it must occur 
with an above-chance probability and as a result of observing another agent (cf. Morgan, 
1900). 
Note, that this definition does not include imitation of mental phenomena, i.e., psychological 
emotional states (e.g., Moody, McIntosh, Mann, & Weisser, 2007), abstract rules (e.g., Subiaul 
et al., 2007), and goals (e.g., Carpenter & Call, 2002). Crucially, I do not wish to claim that 
agents do not adopt these mental constructs. For example, there is considerable evidence that 
agents engaged in imitation and other types of social coordination may at times purse a shared 
goal (e.g., Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005; Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002). 
However, as I will argue later, adopting a common mental construct could be one of the 
mechanisms responsible for imitation, and not an imitative behaviour itself. 
There are several advantages of adopting this definition. First, a behavioural definition 
capitalises on the strong evidence supporting imitation of observable behaviour in animals and 
humans, and aids experimenters in their attempts to operationalise imitation. Second, so 
defined imitation is a broad class of behaviours that contains all of the different types of 
imitative behaviour currently discussed in the literature.2 Third, this definition is theoretically 
neutral and as such welcomes the investigations of competing accounts of imitation.  
This creates a space both for researchers who wish to test the hypothesis that imitation results 
from a single domain-general mechanism (e.g., Buller, 2006; Catmur et al., 2009), and for 
those who suggest that different types of imitative behaviour arise from multiple different 
domain-specific mechanisms (e.g., Subiaul, 2010). A broad definition could also encourage 
investigations that test the scope of the existing accounts of imitation by applying them to 
different imitative behaviours. For example, in social psychology imitation has been explained 
by the pursuit of unconscious social goals (Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003). 
However, the evidence for it relies heavily on research in one domain, i.e. unconscious 
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behavioural mimicry. To prove that social goals might cause also other types of imitation, one 
would need to test the predictions derived from this account with regard to other imitative 
behaviours, e.g. language. Such cross-examination of the existing accounts could greatly 
benefit the research on imitation. 
6.2 Planned versus Emergent Imitation 
There is one more distinction that I would like to mention here. For more than a century, 
researchers have distinguished between the instances of imitation that seem automatic and 
those that appear to involve deliberation (e.g., Morgan, 1900; for reviews, see Bavelas et al., 
1987; Galef, 2013). Recently, Hale and Hamilton (2016) divided social coordination into 
behaviours that involve engaging in the same versus different action than the other agent, and 
into those that occur simultaneously with the action of the other agent versus after a delay. 
Moreover, consistently with the century-old tradition, they distinguished between behaviours 
that are “deliberate and goal-directed” and “unconscious and spontaneous”. Behaviours that 
occur after a delay and involve engaging in the same action are termed imitation, if they are 
goal-directed, or mimicry if they are spontaneous. However, for the needs of this thesis I 
propose an alternative to the authors’ distinction between imitation and mimicry. Instead, I 
distinguish between imitative behaviours that result from the mechanisms of planned versus 
emergent coordination (henceforth: planned vs. emergent imitation).  
Agents engage in planned imitation as a result of a shared goal which specifies the imitative 
behaviour as a part of a joint action. Importantly, I assume that this shared goal is pursued 
intentionally. For example, the string section in an orchestra might play in unison, because the 
musicians in this group share a goal to jointly perform a musical piece. Note that in this case, 
the goal is not specifically about imitating others, but it elicits the imitative behaviour as a part 
of a more complex sequence of behaviours involved in the joint action. On other occasions, 
however, the shared goal might specifically require one or more agents to imitate. Imitative 
learning could serve as an example here. When an agent imitates to learn, the goal is to take a 
role of an observer who watches the other agent demonstrate an action, and then attempts to 






Conversely, emergent imitation arises spontaneously, due to the automatic mechanisms of 
coordination. For example, a speaker in a conversation might imitate the speech rate of the 
other speaker. Apart from the rare cases when such adaptation could arguably serve the goal 
to communicate (e.g., speaking at a noisy dinner table), emergent imitation is not motivated 
by an intentional pursuit of a shared goal. Instead, it is caused by some of the automatic 
mechanisms that govern social coordination (e.g., temporal adaptation). As I demonstrated in 
the previous sections of this review, it remains somewhat unclear which imitative behaviours 
occur spontaneously and thus could be categorised as emergent. However, drawing on the 
current literature, I propose that emergent imitation includes mimicry, emotional contagion, 
automatic imitation, and at least some forms of imitation in language. 
Importantly, the distinction between emergent and planned imitation is different from the 
conscious-unconscious distinction prominently featured in the mimicry literature (see 
Chartrand & Lakin, 2013). According to the latter, a behaviour is either considered to be 
consciously engaged and executed or entirely unconscious. Moreover, a strong version of this 
distinction suggests that unconscious behaviour remains unnoticed by both of the interacting 
agents (Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009). However, it is plausible to assume that the imitative 
behaviour might be noticed by either of the conscious agents at some point of its duration. For 
example, a speaker interacting with a partner who is imitating their speech rate might spot this 
emergent similarity, especially if the scale of adaptation is big (e.g., changing from very fast 
to very slow). The same could be true for the imitator who might initiate the behaviour 
unconsciously, but become conscious of it at some later stage. Furthermore, the conscious-
unconscious distinction proposed in the mimicry literature confounds conscious awareness 
with automaticity, and assumes that only the behaviours that are unconscious are automatic 
(e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Unfortunately, this led many researchers interested in the 
automatic mechanisms of imitation to limit their investigations to behavioural mimicry, while 
largely ignoring other imitative behaviours (e.g., automatic imitation).  
I argue that the emergent-planned distinction could ultimately help to discern the imitative 
behaviours that result from the automatic mechanisms and those driven by an intentional goal 
pursuit. This is because it does not make any assumptions about conscious awareness and 






body of literature on social coordination, rather than being inspired by a particular approach 
in imitation research (which could be potentially limiting). 
6.3 Investigating Emergent Imitation in Motor Action and Language 
In the following parts of this thesis, I will focus on emergent imitation – imitation that is 
brought about as a result of automatic, involuntary mechanisms, rather than the intentional 
pursuit of a shared goal. Moreover, I assume that emergent imitation is brought about by 
multiple causal mechanisms, i.e. an agent may engage in different imitative behaviours as a 
result of distinct mechanisms. However, I do not make any assumptions about the 
correspondence between these mechanisms and imitative behaviours. Although in most cases 
different behaviours result from distinct mechanisms (e.g., imitation of rhythm results from 
temporal adaptation, and automatic imitation of motor action results from perception-action 
matching), it is possible that sometimes different behaviours might result from the same 
mechanism (e.g., behavioural mimicry and linguistic imitation might both result from an active 
goal to affiliate). Furthermore, from my definition of imitation it follows that I consider only 
imitation of directly observable behaviours, and not mental constructs. Specifically, in this 
thesis I focus on imitation of familiar behaviours (as opposed to novel), and in the following 
sections I discuss the mechanisms that lead to emergent imitation in motor action and 
language. 
6.4 Automatic Mechanisms of Emergent Imitation 
Agents may engage in emergent imitation due to the automatic mechanisms that contribute to 
social coordination. In the following sections, I discuss three such mechanisms: simulation, 
temporal adaptation, and the unconscious goal to affiliate. Consistent with the multiple-
mechanism approach, I assume that all three might play a causal role. As I will demonstrate, 
each of these mechanisms could potentially explain one or more of the existing imitative 
behaviours. In the next section, I start by reviewing the evidence for the simulation mechanism 







The recent discovery of mirror neurons and further advances made by studies employing 
neurophysiological methods confirmed the existence of a direct link between perception and 
action. Perceiving a movement performed by someone else automatically elicits an activation 
in the observer’s motor system. But what is the purpose of this activation? An important 
movement in cognitive sciences argues that agents use their own motor system to simulate the 
actions they observe. This way, they can predict what will happen next.  
Importantly, the engagement of the motor system during action simulation has been linked to 
imitation. More specifically, it has been proposed that agents simulate by covertly imitating 
the observed action. In the following section, I suggest that this covert imitation subserves the 
ability to overtly imitate by pre-activating the specific parts of motor system that are needed 
to imitate the observed action. I further argue that the simulation mechanism is also active in 
language processing, and therefore covert imitation of the comprehended utterances could 
explain some instances of linguistic imitation. 
7.1 Evidence for Perception-Action Matching 
A large number of studies demonstrates that observing an action elicits a corresponding motor 
representation in the brain. More specifically, perception of body movements is associated 
with an increased activation in the areas responsible for motor planning and execution. This 
effect, known as perception-action matching, is believed to be achieved by a network of brain 
areas involving mirror neurons (e.g., Cook et al., 2014; Heyes, 2011). There is rich 
neurophysiological evidence confirming that perception-action matching commonly occurs 
during action observation. Function magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies found that 
the cortical areas related to motor action are activated when observing foot, finger, hand, arm, 
or mouth movements (e.g., Aziz-Zadeh, Koski, Zaidel, Mazziotta, & Iacoboni, 2006; Buccino 
et al., 2001, 2004; Grezes, Armony, Rowe, & Passingham, 2003; Iacobini et al., 1999; Lahav, 
Saltzman, & Schlaug, 2007; Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Stevens, Fonlupt, Shiffrar, & Decety, 
2000). Similarly, the sensorimotor mu rhythm in the electroencephalogram (EEG), which is 
normally present during the resting state of the brain, has been shown to disappear both when 






see Rizzolatti, Craighero, & Fadiga, 2002; Perry & Bentin, 2009; Pineda, 2005). Furthermore, 
motor evoked potentials (MEP) studies showed that hand muscles are facilitated in response 
to watching an action performed by a hand (e.g., Catmur, Mars, Rushworth, & Heyes, 2011; 
Clark, Tremblay, & Ste-Marie, 2003; Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995). For 
example, observing index and thumb movements selectively facilitates the potentiality of the 
specific finger muscles involved in producing the same movement (Maeda, Kleiner-Fisman, 
& Pascual-Leone, 2002). 
7.2 Simulating Others through Covert Imitation 
These dramatic findings have reignited the interest in a long-standing hypothesis that observers 
use their minds and bodies to simulate the actions they perceive (e.g., Carpenter, 1874/1984; 
James 1890; Smith, 1759/1976). Drawing on the evidence for the involvement of the motor 
system during action observation, several modern accounts proposed that agents simulate the 
observed actions through an automatic and covert process similar to overt motor imitation 
(e.g., Fadiga, Craighero, & Olivier, 2005; Jeannerod, 2001; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007; 
Springer, Parkinson, & Prinz, 2012; for reviews, see Decety & Grèzes, 2006; Prinz, 2006). 
Importantly, many of these accounts incorporate perception-action matching into the 
simulation mechanism. 
For example, Wilson and Knoblich (2005) suggested that action simulation engages the parts 
of the motor system that would normally be used to produce this action. Crucially, the purpose 
of this covert motor imitation is to generate predictions about the future states of the perceptual 
system. Observers can then use these predictions to fill in for missing or ambiguous sensory 
information, and to ready themselves for the upcoming perceptual input. An ability to predict 
perceptual input could greatly benefit the agent, e.g., allow to bypass the delay of sensory 
transmission, support the interpretation of ambiguous input, and help to prepare a response. 
But how exactly are these perceptual predictions generated? One possibility is that the 
perceptual system employs an internal forward model (Wilson & Knoblich, 2005; cf. Gazzola 
& Keysers, 2009; Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato, 2003). In this view, the perceptual representation 
of the observed action is translated into a motor command that would normally lead to 






mechanism. The motor command is subsequently fed into the forward model, which engages 
the motor system to simulate the unfolding of the action. The forward generates the predicted 
states of the motor system using the principles and regularities of a given action that are 
internalised by the system (e.g., typical trajectory, typical sequence of movements). The 
simulated states of the motor system are then translated into perceptual representations 
equivalent to those that would be produced if the action was perceived. Such simulation 
mechanism is a form of covert motor imitation. Just like overt imitation, it requires an 
activation of the motor plan for the action. Moreover, it involves a sub-threshold engagement 
of the motor system which closely resembles the engagement that would result from overtly 
imitating the action (cf. Fadiga et al., 2005). 
To give an example of an application of the simulation mechanism, let’s consider an 
interaction where one agent (the observer) sees another (the actor) extending her right hand 
towards a coffee mug. To predict what is the actor about to do, the observer engages in 
simulation. First, the visual representation of the action in the observer’s mind is translated 
(using the perception-action link) into a command for extending the right hand. This command 
is then fed into the forward model which engages the brain motor areas and muscles normally 
responsible for performing this movement with the observer’s right hand. The model generates 
a series of predicted states of the motor system, e.g., extending the hand, moving it closer to 
the mug, and grasping the mug. Each of these states produces proprioceptive feedback from 
the muscles involved, which is matched with a motor command that is typically associated 
with this feedback. The commands generated at this stage allow the observer to predict the 
unfolding of the action, and can be translated into visual representations to prepare the visual 
system for the upcoming input. Thus, the simulation of the actor’s action involved engaging 
the same motor areas and muscles, and in the same order, as would be engaged if the observer 
would overtly imitate the action. 
7.3 Evidence for Action Simulation 
There are several sources of evidence supporting the claim that agents use their motor system 
to simulate the actions of others beyond the immediate perception-action matching mechanism 






motor areas occurring during action perception is due to predictive processing. In support of 
this, it has been found that areas responsible for planning are active during action observation 
(Caspers, Zilles, Laird, & Eickhoff, 2010). Moreover, motor control areas specific to the 
observed action are active before the predicted action (Haueisen & Knösche, 2001). Second, 
motor simulation requires the observers to engage their own motor system as they would if 
they were overtly imitating the action. Thus, action familiarity should modulate the motor 
system activation. In agreement with this prediction, areas responsible for planning are 
activated more strongly when the observed (or expected) action is within the observer’s 
repertoire (Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, & Urgesi, 2008; Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, Glaser, 
Passingham, & Haggard, 2006; Lahav et al., 2007; cf. Vogt et al., 2007). Action imitability is 
another factor that should modulate the neural response, i.e. the motor system should be unable 
to simulate an action that is difficult or impossible to imitate. Indeed, it has been shown that 
inimitable actions (e.g., impossible rotation of an arm) do not elicit the typical representational 
response (Stevens et al., 2000), and there is some (although mixed) evidence that the motor 
activation effects are attenuated or absent when observing an action performed by a non-
human agent (see Hofree, Urgen, Winkielman, & Saygin, 2015; Liepelt, Prinz, & Brass, 2010).  
7.4 How Can Simulation Lead to Imitation?  
Overall, recent findings support the claim that agents simulate the actions of others. Critically, 
the motor simulation mechanism involves an activation of the motor system that closely 
resembles the activation otherwise elicited by overt imitation of actions (Wilson & Knoblich, 
2005). This similarity led some researchers to suggest that covert motor imitation might serve 
as basis for overt imitative behaviours (e.g., Iacobini et al., 1999; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & 
Gallese, 2001). There has been a debate whether simulation and imitation share a neural 
network, with mirror neurons being the main candidate for such network (see Heyes, 2001; 
Brass & Heyes, 2005; Turella, Erb, Grodd, & Castiello, 2009). Recently, several meta-
analyses of neurophysiological studies confirmed that mirror neurons are involved in imitation 
(Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2009, 2012), and that the motor areas that are active 
during action observation are also active during overt imitation (Caspers et al., 2010). This 






parts of the motor system. On the level of mental representations, it is likely that the simulation 
mechanism might activate the same motor plan that is used in overt imitation. As a result of 
the neural and representational overlap between simulation and imitation, watching another 
person engage in a particular behaviour might prime this behaviour in the observer, therefore 
increasing the chance of imitating it (cf. Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 
2001; Byrne & Russon, 1998). This way, the automatic and largely unconscious motor 
simulation (Decety & Grèzes, 2006) could encourage the interacting agents to spontaneously 
imitate each other. 
7.5 Why Don’t People Imitate All the Time? 
However, a theoretical conundrum arises here: if simulation involves the motor plan that is 
also used to produce overt imitative behaviour, then agents should automatically imitate 
whenever they observe the other perform an action. Yet, they obviously do not do that. In fact, 
social coordination sometimes requires complementary, rather than imitative actions (e.g., 
Sartori, Cavallo, Bucchioni, & Castiello, 2012; Sebanz et al., 2006).  
Experimental studies confirmed that the activation of the motor plan is malleable (for a review, 
see Bardi, Bundt, Notebaert, & Brass, 2015). For example, Catmur, Walsh, and Heyes (2007) 
demonstrated that the imitative activation during action observation can be reversed. They 
trained participants to make an index finger movement while observing a little finger 
movement, and vice versa. After training, the MEPs measurement indicated an activation 
pattern that was opposite to what is typically observed: the activation in the little finger muscle 
was greater when observing the index finger movements than the little finger movements. 
Further studies found that imitative activation can be suppressed in the context of 
complementary actions (e.g., Newman-Norlund, van Schie, van Zuijlen, & Bekkering, 2007; 
Barchiesi & Cattaneo, 2013; Sartori, Betti, & Castiello, 2013) or simply by instruction to 
perform a non-imitative action (Bardi et al., 2015). 
Together, these findings suggest that motor simulation must be complemented by an inhibition 
mechanism, which contains the activation of the motor system at a sub-threshold level, thus 
preventing overt imitation (cf. Fadiga et al., 2005; Jeannerod, 2001). A system comprising 






about the upcoming external events, while allowing selective, rather than indiscriminate 
imitation of the observed actions. The existence of an inhibition mechanism has been 
convincingly demonstrated at the behavioural level using the Stroop task and go/no-go 
paradigms (for reviews, see Logan & Cowan, 1984; MacLeod, 1991). However, on the neural 
level, the hunt continues. For example, clinical studies show that patients with frontal lobe 
damage may exhibit an uncontrollable tendency to imitate, suggesting this area is responsible 
for inhibiting overt imitation (e.g., De Renzi, Cavalleri, & Facchini, 1996; Lhermitte, Pillon, 
& Serdaru, 1986). Other studies point towards the structures in the spinal cord (e.g., Baldissera, 
Cavallari, Craighero, & Fadiga, 2001), frontal lobe (Brass, Derrfuss, & von Cramon, 2005) 
and prefrontal cortex (Brass, Zysset, & von Cramon, 2001; for a review, see Brass, Ruby, & 
Spengler, 2009). 
Recent accounts posit that the brain system for imitation includes both the perception-action 
link used for simulation and the areas responsible for imitation inhibition. For example, Wang 
and Hamilton’s (2012) social top-down response modulation (STORM) model proposes that 
covert activation of the motor system provides agents with a basic tendency to imitate the 
observed actions. However, a control mechanism is also in place to ensure that agents do not 
unnecessarily engage in overt imitation. The control mechanism reacts selectively to certain 
environmental cues (e.g., social context, evaluation of the interaction partner) and at times 
allows the agents to engage in imitative behaviour.  
In sum, covert activation of the motor system plays an important role both in motor simulation 
and overt motor imitation. Importantly, it is unlikely to be dedicated to imitation alone 
(Hamilton, 2015). Rather, it serves the mechanism of motor simulation (e.g., Wilson & 
Knoblich, 2005) and may subserve imitation (Prinz, 2006) by pre-activating the parts of the 
motor system that are needed to engage in imitative behaviour. 
8 SIMULATING OTHERS IN LANGUAGE 
As it can be seen in the previous sections of this review, most of the evidence for the simulation 
mechanism comes from research into the motor domain, and the mechanism itself is believed 
to rely on the covert activation of the brain areas normally involved in executing motor 






necessarily. According to some recent accounts in psychology of language, people engage the 
simulation mechanism also when they perceive language (e.g., Dell & Chang, 2014; Pickering 
& Garrod, 2007, 2013; cf. Hickok, 2012). With regard to dialogue, Pickering and Garrod 
(2013) proposed that listeners covertly use aspects of their language production system in 
order to predict what the speaker is about to say.3 
According to this account, a listener first uses his comprehension implementer to form a 
percept of the speaker’s utterance at a given time. This percept is an abstract linguistic 
representation comprising semantic, syntactic and phonological information about the 
utterance, and it is formed in response to the perceptual input (e.g., auditory signal). Next, the 
listener translates the percept into a production command that he would send to produce this 
utterance if he was speaking himself. This is done by a special type of a mental computational 
process, called an inverse model, which engages aspects of the language production system to 
covertly imitate the perceived utterance. Using prior experience of language production, the 
inverse model determines the production command that typically results in the given percept. 
Moreover, the model also needs to accommodate for the fact that it is the listener’s production 
command that has to be derived from the percept of the speaker’s utterance. To achieve this, 
the model uses the available information about the context in which the utterance occurs (e.g., 
information about the differences in pronunciation between the listener and the speaker). 
Once the production command for the perceived utterance has been determined, it is fed into 
a forward model. The forward model is a computational process that engages the listener’s 
production system to predict the utterance that the speaker is most likely to say next. However, 
only some aspects of the production system are engaged, and consequently the output from 
the model is typically an impoverished representation of the predicted utterance (comprising 
                                                   
 
3 Pickering and Garrod (2013) proposed that simulation is crucial both for comprehension and 
production of language, and that it is likely to be used whenever processing language. 
However, in this thesis I focus on the case of comprehending language while engaged in 






some elements of semantic, syntactic and phonological information). Finally, this 
representation is translated into a predicted percept of the upcoming utterance by a forward 
comprehension model. This percept represents the perceptual features of the predicted 
utterance, and can be used to help the listener in several ways. 
Specifically, when the speaker will actually produce the predicted utterance, the listener will 
be able to use the predicted percept to aid the comprehension of this utterance. Moreover, the 
listener will be able to compare the predicted percept with the actual percept of the utterance 
(again formed using the comprehension implementer) and assess the accuracy of his 
prediction. In case of a discrepancy between the prediction and the utterance, corrections will 
be implemented into the forward model so that it is capable of generating more accurate 
predictions in the future. This is a very important step, because it allows the listener to adapt 
his forward model to the particular speaker.  
Crucially, Pickering and Garrod assume a parity between language comprehension and 
production: they propose that the same forward model is used to simulate the utterances of the 
other people during comprehension and to simulate one’s own utterances during production. 
Thus, any corrections made to the forward model while comprehending the speaker will 
prevail in the model when it will be used to produce an utterance later in the conversation. 
To illustrate the use of the simulation mechanism in comprehension, let’s consider a situation 
where a listener hears the speaker say: The tray is really hot, so don’t grab it without a mitten. 
As the sentence unfolds, the listener continuously uses the simulation mechanism to generate 
predictions about the word that he is most likely to hear next. For the sake of brevity, let’s 
focus on a single iteration of the simulation mechanism, i.e. at the time when the speaker have 
produced the sentence up to the penultimate word. At this point, the listener first forms a 
percept of the speaker’s utterance thus far (The tray is really hot, so don’t grab it without a). 
He then translates the percept into a production command he would use to produce this 
utterance, and derives a further command for a word he would typically say next (mitten). 
Subsequently, the command for the next word is used to generate a linguistic representation 
of the predicted utterance, which is then translated into a percept of the predicted utterance. At 
this stage, the listener can use this prediction to prepare his perceptual system for the upcoming 






engage in another type of action ahead of the end of the speaker’s turn (e.g., start looking for 
a mitten). 
8.1 Can Language Simulation Contribute to Linguistic Imitation? 
I propose there are at least three reasons why the mechanism described by Pickering and 
Garrod could result in a tendency to imitate various aspects of one’s conversational partner.  
First, engaging aspects of the production system to simulate the partner’s utterance during 
comprehension is likely to facilitate overt production of this utterance. The logic of this 
argument is similar to the one in case of motor simulation: the inverse model automatically 
translates the perceived utterance into a production command which becomes pre-activated in 
the comprehender’s language system. This makes it easier to overtly produce the perceived 
utterance, as opposed to some other utterance that was not perceived and therefore did not 
receive such pre-activation.4 
Second, a given utterance should receive activation both from a production command derived 
by a current inverse model and from the prediction generated by a previous forward model. 
Given that simulation is likely to be used continuously during comprehension, an utterance 
that occurs at a given point in time previously was a target for the forward model which already 
generated a prediction for it. This prediction should have increased the availability of the 
utterance in the comprehender’s language system even before it can be actually perceived. 
                                                   
 
4 Note that this argument faces a similar problem as its motor counterpart, i.e. it has to address 
the question of why people do not always imitate the language of their conversational partners. 
Pickering and Garrod do not provide an explicit answer to this question, and their account does 
not include an inhibitory mechanism. However, they suggest that a production act is initiated 
by intention. It is therefore possible that although the simulation mechanism facilitates 






Thus, previous (correct) predictions could provide a second source of activation for the 
utterances produced by one’s conversational partner.5 
Third, the ability to train the forward model to correct for the prediction error should result in 
a tendency to adapt to the conversational partner. Since comprehension and production both 
utilise the forward model, any changes made to it in comprehension will prevail in production, 
which in turn will affect one’s subsequent production acts. For example, listening to a speaker 
who has a strong accent should leave a mark on one’s subsequent production, such that one’s 
own pronunciation should resemble certain phonetic characteristics of this accent. Other 
aspects of language like prosody or speech rate could also be imitated as a result of adapting 
one’s forward model to the partner (see Gambi & Pickering, 2013). 
For the reasons outlined above, language simulation mechanism might promote automatic 
imitation of various aspects of language between the conversational partners. Interestingly, 
linguistic imitation might in fact be something more than a by-product of simulation. Pickering 
and Garrod suggest that imitation might play an important role in dialogue: imitating makes 
one more similar to the conversational partner, which is a way of making oneself more 
predictable. For instance, adapting to the partner’s accent should increase the chances that his 
inverse model will derive correct production commands and that his forward model will 
generate accurate predictions of one’s speech. Thus, imitation between conversational partners 
should aid comprehension, and lead to smooth and efficient dialogue. 
                                                   
 
5 This suggests that utterances that elicited strong predictions during comprehension should be 
more likely to be subsequently produced by the listener. To my knowledge, this possibility has 






8.2 Evidence for Language Simulation 
Engaging the production system to simulate others is likely to result in a tendency to overtly 
imitate various aspects of the language used by one’s conversational partner. Here, I briefly 
review the evidence for the involvement of simulation in language.  
Given that the primary function of simulation is to allow prediction, findings demonstrating 
that people engage in linguistic prediction would provide some support for the involvement of 
simulation in language. Indeed, a large body of research shows that when reading or hearing 
language speakers generate expectations about what they will see or hear next (for reviews 
see, Dikker & Pylkkänen, 2013; Federmeier, 2007; Kutas & Federmeier, 2011; Pickering & 
Garrod, 2007). Numerous studies have demonstrated that people are able to predict 
phonological (e.g., DeLong, Urbach, & Kutas, 2005), syntactic (e.g., Van Berkum et al., 2005), 
and sematic features of the upcoming utterances (e.g., Altmann & Kamide, 1999).  
For example, Federmeier, McLennan, De Ochoa, and Kutas (2002) asked adult participants to 
listen to sentences that allowed them to make semantic predictions about the sentence-final 
words (e.g., They wanted to make the hotel look more like a tropical resort. So, along the 
driveway, they planted rows of…). At the end of each sentence, participants heard either an 
expected (e.g., palms) or an unexpected word (e.g., pines), and their Event Related Potentials 
(ERPs) were recorded. Hearing an unexpected word evoked a strong positive potential, which 
is typically interpreted to indicate surprise. Hearing an expected word did not have such effect. 
This suggests that participants generated predictions about the semantic features of the 
upcoming words, and showed a clear surprise effect when these predictions were violated 
(similar results have been found for reading; Federmeier & Kutas, 1999). 
Furthermore, there is evidence that prediction is also used by developing speakers (e.g., 
Borovsky, Elman, & Fernald, 2012; Nation, Marshall, & Altmann, 2003). Mani and Huettig 
(2012) used eye-tracking to investigate whether toddlers engage in predictive processing 
during comprehension. On each trial, participants were presented with two images of familiar 
objects, and heard a sentence that was either neutral or predictive of the sentence-final word. 
Importantly, one of the images was a target image that depicted the sentence-final word, and 






measured, i.e. fixations in the time window prior to hearing the sentence-final word. The study 
found that participants made more predictive fixations when hearing predictive than neutral 
sentences, indicating that toddlers readily engage in linguistic prediction. 
Further evidence for the use of the simulation mechanism in language comes from research 
showing that aspects of the production system are activated during speech perception (for a 
review, see Pickering & Garrod, 2013). Behavioural studies have found that perceiving 
language facilitates imitative production: participants are faster to pronounce a syllable after 
hearing the same syllable than after a tone. Interestingly, such imitative production can be 
almost just as fast as production of a pre-prepared syllable (Fowler, Brown, Sabadini, & 
Weihing, 2003; Porter & Castellanos, 1980; Porter & Lubker, 1980). Moreover, there is 
evidence from neurophysiological paradigms. In one study, Transcranial Magnetic 
Stimulation (TMS) was used to induce motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) in participants’ lip 
muscles, while they were subjected to the following conditions: listening to speech, listening 
to non-speech sounds, observing lip movements, and observing eye and brow movements. 
MEPs were compared between these conditions, and it was found that listening to speech and 
observing lip movements were associated with an increase in lip muscles’ potentiality, as 
compared to listening to non-speech sounds and observing face movements (Watkins, 
Strafella, & Paus, 2003). This suggests that speech articulators are activated when perceiving 
speech, but not when perceiving other auditory stimuli (see also Fadiga, Craighero, Buccino, 
& Rizzolatti, 2002). Other studies showed that perceiving speech elicits activation also in the 
cortical areas that are otherwise responsible for speech production (Pulvermüller et al., 2006; 
Wilson, Saygin, Sereno, & Iacoboni, 2004). 
8.3 Investigating the Role of Production System in Simulation 
These findings give some credence to the idea that a production-based simulation mechanism 
is routinely involved in language comprehension: they suggest that people engage in linguistic 
prediction, and that the language production system is active while perceiving language. 
However, before simulation can be considered a candidate mechanism for promoting 
automatic linguistic imitation, one important assumption of the language simulation account 






do not demonstrate a causal relationship between engaging the production system and the 
ability to generate predictions. This is a critical assumption of the language simulation account, 
and yet it remains largely unexplored.  
There is some evidence that production skills are positively associated with linguistic 
prediction (Federmeier, Kutas, & Schul, 2010; Mani & Huettig, 2012), but due to the 
correlational nature of these studies they do not allow inferences about causality. To this date, 
only one study showed that production is engaged specifically in prediction. D’Ausilio, 
Jarmolowska, Busan, Bufalari, and Craighero (2011) found that the motor-evoked potentiality 
in tongue muscles was increased when participants expected to hear a tongue-produced 
phoneme as compared to a lip-produced phoneme. However, this shows that the production 
system is involved in prediction of low-level speech sounds, and does not provide any insight 
into whether this is the case with more complex language units. Moreover, it does not 
demonstrate that the activation of production is essential for successful comprehension (as it 
should be because of its use in inverse and forward models). 
In an attempt to bridge this gap, in Chapter 2 of this thesis I present three experiments testing 
the assumption that the language production system is used for generating predictions. In these 
experiments, participants read sentence contexts that either were or were not predictive of the 
sentence-final word, and made a judgment about this word. To manipulate the engagement of 
the production system, we asked participants to read the contexts either silently our aloud. We 
expected that engaging production by reading the contexts aloud should enhance the effects of 
prediction on participants’ word judgments, i.e. participants should generate stronger 
predictions about the sentence-final word in highly predictive contexts (as compared to non-
predictive contexts), but crucially, this effect should be enhanced by reading aloud. This would 
provide evidence that engaging the production system affects the ability to predict the 
upcoming utterances, therefore lending some support to the idea that the simulation 
mechanism is routinely involved in language comprehension. 
9 TEMPORAL ADAPTATION 
People are able to time their actions to the rhythms around them. Interestingly, these rhythms 






patterns that are hidden within the actions performed by others. This ability is obviously 
critical for strictly rhythmic joint actions like musical performance, dance, or some group 
sports. But interestingly, some of the non-rhythmic actions might also be governed by the 
automatic mechanisms of rhythmic organisation.  
In the following sections, I focus on one such mechanism, i.e. temporal adaptation, which is 
an ability to adopt features of an external rhythmic pattern. I review evidence that temporal 
adaptation might lead agents to spontaneously imitate temporal aspects of each other’s 
behaviour. Finally, I argue that although this mechanism has been evidenced mostly with 
regards to continuous rhythmic actions, it is likely to affect also other types of actions, and it 
might be responsible for some instances of imitation observed in discrete non-rhythmic 
actions. 
9.1 Sensorimotor Synchronisation 
When perceiving a rhythmic sequence in their environment, people often attempt to 
synchronise with it various features of their behaviour. This ability has been studied under the 
name of sensorimotor synchronisation, and it has been shown to prevail across various 
contexts (for reviews, see Pressing, 1999; Repp, 2005, Repp & Su, 2013). 
To begin, people are able to unilaterally adjust their actions to an unresponsive external 
rhythm. This type of sensorimotor synchronisation has been typically studied in laboratory 
set-ups where a participant is instructed to synchronise her motor movements with an 
externally-controlled pacing sequence. Success at the task is estimated using several indices, 
including the variability of the intervals between consecutive movements, the variability of 
the intervals between the movements and the units of the sequence, the mean length of these 
intervals. Importantly, the degree to which the participant is able to synchronise might range 
from perfect synchrony (where the movements and the sequence are aligned in all aspects), to 
no synchrony at all (where the movements and the sequence are temporally unrelated). In most 
cases, some imperfect synchronisation is achieved. For example, a participant might fail to 
execute her movements in synchrony with the sequence, but adjust the average pace of her 






In this type of sensorimotor synchronisation studies, participants perform their movements as 
a part of a rhythmic action, i.e. an action where the temporal organisation is of primary 
importance to the action goal. For example, consider finger tapping, which is a commonly 
used task in this type of research (Repp, 2005). In a typical finger tapping study, a participant 
is asked to tap her index finger in synchrony with a metronome, and the response speed and 
duration of the taps are measured. Thus, finger tapping is performed as a strictly rhythmic 
action: the only purpose of tapping is to produce a certain rhythmic sequence, and the temporal 
structure of this sequence is critical to the success at the task. Some other tasks used to 
investigate unilateral synchronisation also involved motor movements, e.g., swinging a 
pendulum (Lagarde & Kelso, 2006), bending a knee (Ohtsuki & Kanehisa, 2011), rocking in 
a rocking chair (Demos, Chaffin, & Marsh, 2010), and drumming (Kirschner & Tomasello, 
2009). But crucially, these movements were performed as rhythmic actions. Across these 
different tasks, sensorimotor synchronisation studies have found that people are able to 
unilaterally adjust various aspects of their actions to the external rhythm, and that they are 
largely successful at doing so even if the pacing sequence is irregular or perturbed (Repp, 
2005). 
However, sensorimotor synchronisation can also be a bilateral process. This type of 
synchronisation can be observed in social interactions, where both agents are able to adjust to 
their partner. For instance, musicians playing a duet are likely to monitor each other’s actions 
and to mutually adjust various temporal aspects of their performance to achieve the desired 
level of synchrony (e.g., when one of them falls behind the tempo, the other slows down). 
Some studies attempted to investigate bilateral synchronisation using set-ups involving a 
human participant and a responsive virtual agent. For example, Repp and Keller (2008) asked 
participants to synchronise their finger tapping with a sequence produced by a virtual agent 
programmed to respond to participants’ tapping in a certain way. The agent’s behaviour varied 
between conditions, ranging from adaptive (i.e. modelled on typical human behaviour) to 
counter-adaptive responses (i.e. modelled to be opposite to the typical human behaviour). The 
study found that participants were able to maintain synchrony in all conditions, even when the 
virtual agent was behaving in a counter-adaptive manner (see also Kelso, de Guzman, Reveley, 






Other studies looked at interactions between two human participants. Konvalinka, Vuust, 
Roepstorff, and Frith (2010) asked pairs of participants to maintain a beat while hearing 
different types of auditory feedback. There were four within-participants conditions: in 
computer condition, the auditory feedback heard by both participants was a computer-
generated beat; in uncoupled condition, both participants heard the sounds generated by their 
own tapping; in unidirectional condition, both heard the sounds generated by one of them; and 
in bidirectional coupling, both heard sounds generated by each other. The study found that 
when participants were able to hear each other’s taps, they achieved some degree of 
synchronisation by mutually adjusting the length of the intervals between consecutive taps. 
Strikingly, they were similarly successful at synchronising with the stable and predictable 
computer-generated beat and with the more irregular and less predictable human partner (see 
also Demos, Chaffin, Begosh, Daniels, & Marsh, 2012). This suggests that participants used 
the ability to adjust their actions to each other to make up for the fact that the signal produced 
by a human partner was more noisy. The finding that interacting partners are capable of 
bilateral sensorimotor synchronisation was subsequently replicated (e.g., Nowicki, Prinz, 
Grosjean, Repp, & Keller, 2013; Pecenka & Keller, 2011).  
9.2 Unintentional Synchronisation in Social Interactions 
Although in many natural settings synchronisation is directed by an explicit goal to coordinate 
with others (e.g., Keller & Appel, 2010; Schmidt at al., 1990; Wing & Woodburn, 1995), 
people may also adjust aspects of each other’s rhythmic actions without intentional control. 
Indeed, in some social situations it is difficult not to fall into the perceived rhythm (e.g., 
consider an audience trying to sit still at a jazz concert), and multiple studies have shown that 
unintentional sensorimotor synchronisation occurs commonly during interactions. In what is 
now a classic study, Schmidt and O’Brien (1997) asked pairs of participants to swing 
pendulums while sitting side by side. Participants could not see one another, except the last 12 
seconds of each trial. The analysis found that during these periods their movements were more 
often performed in-phase or antiphase, as compared to when they could not see each other. 
Crucially, this occurred even though participants were instructed to maintain their individual 






Similar results were obtained by Richardson, Marsh, and Schmidt (2005) who asked 
participants to swing pendulums while engaged in a puzzle-solving task. To rule out an 
intention-based explanation, pendulum-swinging was framed as a distraction task. Participants 
performed the experiment under three conditions: in visual contact condition, they were able 
to observe each other; in verbal interaction condition, they were allowed to converse while 
engaged in the task, but were told not to look at each other; in verbal and visual condition, they 
were able to both converse and observe each other. Importantly, when participants were able 
to see each other, they spontaneously synchronised aspects of their movements to a higher 
extent than when they did not have visual contact. Further studies have demonstrated that 
unintended sensorimotor synchronisation occurs also in other joint rhythmic actions, e.g., 
musical performance (Clayton 2007; Lucas, Clayton, & Leante, 2011), joint finger tapping 
(Konvalinka et al., 2010; Oullier, de Guzman, Jantzen, Lagarde, & Kelso, 2008), and rocking 
in rocking chairs (Richardson et al., 2007). 
9.3 Two Perspectives on the Mechanisms of Unintentional Synchronisation 
The research on sensorimotor synchronisation has been guided by two distinct theoretical 
views, each following different assumptions, using different methodologies, and interested in 
different types of actions, i.e. the information-processing perspective and the dynamical 
systems perspective. Importantly, accounts informed by these perspectives have proposed 
mechanisms to explain sensorimotor synchronisation in general, and unintentional 
synchronisation with others in particular (for reviews, see Pressing, 1999; Schmidt, 
Fitzpatrick, Caron, & Mergeche, 2011; Repp, 2005).  
First, a vast body of research has been guided by the information-processing perspective. 
Studies following this perspective tend to focus on rhythmic actions that are organised into 
discrete time series (e.g., finger tapping). In this view, sensorimotor synchronisation can be 
explained by certain cognitive mechanisms that allow agents to represent and integrate one’s 
own actions with the actions of others (e.g., Keller, Novembre, & Hove, 2014). For example, 
van der Steen & Keller (2013) proposed two such mechanisms: adaptation and anticipation. 
Here I focus on the former, because of the large body of research suggesting its causal role in 






In the information-processing perspective, temporal adaptation is a mechanism of error 
correction which compares the rhythm of a perceived action with an internal timekeeper, and 
makes relevant adjustments to the rhythm produced by the timekeeper (van der Steen & Keller, 
2013). The timekeeper is an internal process that generates pulses used to initiate motor 
commands for one’s own actions (Wing & Kristofferson, 1973). By making corrections to the 
timekeeper, agents are able to temporally adapt their actions to the actions of others. 
Adaptation can be achieved by two types of error correction: first, agents might intentionally 
adjust the period of the timekeeper to match the period of the perceived actions; second, agents 
may adjust the intervals between the pulses of the timekeeper, effectively correcting its phase 
(Repp, 2005). Critically, such phase correction has been demonstrated to occur outside of 
intentional control, and to lead to instances of unintentional synchronisation. For example, 
Repp (2002) asked participants to synchronise with an allegedly isosynchronous rhythm to 
which either subliminal or supraliminal phase changes were introduced. Participants heard the 
rhythm in their headphones and were instructed to tap along using one of the keys on a MIDI 
keyboard. Crucially, they were explicitly instructed to ignore any perturbances in the rhythm. 
The study found that where phase shifts were introduced in the sequence, participants 
corrected the phase of their subsequent tap in response to the shift. Strikingly, they did so 
despite the instructions to ignore perturbances, and both when the shift was subliminal and 
supraliminal, suggesting that the phase correction was automatic. These and other findings 
from research in the information-processing perspective suggest that unintentional 
synchronisation results from a temporal adaptation mechanism, which involves an automatic 
correction of the phase of one’s own actions in response to the perceived rhythm (for further 
evidence for automatic phase correction, see the reviews by Repp, 2005; Repp & Su, 2013). 
The second theoretical perspective considers the processes of sensorimotor synchronisation 
from the point of view of dynamical systems theory. Studies in this perspective are concerned 
primarily with continuous rhythmic actions (e.g., swinging pendulums). This approach 
assumes that social interactions involve activation of biological subsystems within and 
between the interacting agents. Crucially, these subsystems become synchronised as a result 
of universal principles of dynamic self-organisation that regulate the activity of oscillating 






proposes that this synchronisation is achieved by an automatic mechanism that leads agents to 
temporally adapt to each other, i.e. entrainment.  
Entrainment is hypothesised to be an instance of the coupling of rhythmic oscillators that is 
routinely observed in some mechanical and biological systems (Haken, Kelso, & Bunz, 1985). 
For example, two clocks hanging next to each other tend to synchronize because they are 
mechanically connected (Huygens, 1673/1986), and large groups of fireflies synchronize their 
flashing because each individual the perceive the behaviour of others (Hanson, 1978). 
According to the principles of dynamic self-organisation, mechanical coupling or perceptual 
information uptake is sufficient to allow for a gradual synchronisation of the activity of two 
oscillating systems. Thus, two interacting agents who are able to perceive the actions of each 
other should mutually adapt merely due to the dynamic self-organisation. Importantly, this 
should happen particularly for actions that are performed in a continuous, oscillatory manner.  
In a study by Richardson and colleagues (2007), pairs of participants rocked in rocking chairs 
while either facing each other (focal condition), sitting side by side (peripheral condition), or 
facing the other way (no information condition). Moreover, each participant was instructed to 
maintain their individually preferred tempo. Consistently with the assumption of the 
dynamical system perspective, participants who were able to observe each other 
unintentionally entrained their actions. Moreover, their entrained movement dynamics 
resembled a coupled oscillator system, i.e. they locked either on performing the movements 
in-phase or antiphase. Entrainment has been evidenced in multiple other studies (for reviews, 
see Marsh et al., 2009; Schmidt & Richardson, 2008; Schmidt et al., 2011). Together, research 
in the dynamical systems perspective suggests that interacting agents might automatically 
adapt some temporal aspects of their actions due to universal principles of dynamic self-
organisation. 
To sum up, findings from studies following both the information-processing and the dynamical 
systems perspective consistently show that (some form of) an automatic adaptation mechanism 
guides the behaviour of interacting agents and promotes unintentional synchronisation 
between them. Although these two perspectives are currently associated with different 
theoretical assumptions, methodological approaches and somewhat different types of actions, 






Moreover, findings from both have been integrated in common theoretical frameworks of 
social coordination (e.g., Knoblich et al., 2011). In the following sections, I adopt this view 
and consider entrainment and phase correction to both be forms of an automatic temporal 
adaptation mechanism. 
9.4 Temporal Adaptation in Non-Rhythmic Actions 
Note that research on sensorimotor synchronisation has investigated adaptation mostly with 
regards to rhythmic actions (see Schmidt & Richardson, 2008; Repp, 2005, Repp & Su, 2013). 
But what constitutes a rhythmic action? In a sense, all recurrent motor actions can be 
conceptualised as rhythmic because they are describable in terms of time-series. Yet, some 
actions are considered to be rhythmic, whereas others are not, despite the fact that such actions 
might sometimes be very similar to each other. For example, finger tapping is commonly used 
to investigate synchronisation and is assumed to be a rhythmic action, but button pressing is 
used to investigate motor action as a discrete event and its rhythmic organisation across trials 
is often ignored (as I will argue in the following sections). Arguably, the criteria used in the 
literature for categorising an action as rhythmic can be generally unclear (e.g., scratching and 
feeding behaviour are sometimes considered to be rhythmic; Pearson, 2000). To clarify the 
difference between rhythmic and non-rhythmic actions for the needs of this thesis, I propose 
to distinguish such actions based on the criterion of the action goal (cf. Keller et al., 2014).  
According to this distinction, rhythmic actions are engaged in order to produce a rhythmic 
pattern, and their temporal structure is necessitated by this goal. For example, in finger tapping 
the recurrent taps are organised in time so that they form a certain rhythmic group or constitute 
a tempo. Conversely, non-rhythmic actions are not concerned with producing a rhythm. 
Although they may also be organised in time in a regular manner, their temporal structure is 
not of primary importance to the action goal. For example, walking is repetitive motor action 
that often shows a high degree of regularity (i.e. people tend to walk in a certain pace and 
maintain a similar distance between steps). But crucially, the goal of walking is to move to a 
given location, and not to produce a rhythm with one’s steps. Thus, according to the distinction 
proposed here, walking is a non-rhythmic action in a sense that its rhythmic self-organisation 






Studies on sensorimotor synchronisation have somewhat neglected the possibility that 
temporal adaptation might occur in non-rhythmic actions. In particular, phase correction 
response has been evidenced mostly for finger tapping tasks where the participant was 
instructed to synchronise with the pacing sequence (e.g., Repp, 2002). Spontaneous temporal 
entrainment has also sometimes been investigated with tasks where participants were asked to 
maintain a given rhythm (e.g., Sofianidis, Hatzitaki, Grouios, Johannsen, & Wing, 2012; 
Richardson et al., 2007).  But interestingly, there is some evidence to suggest that interacting 
agents might entrain their actions also when engaged in non-rhythmic joint actions. 
For instance, Issartel, Marin, and Cadopi (2007) found that people unintentionally entrain the 
frequencies of improvised movements. In this study, participants were instructed to freely 
move their forearms while standing side by side. Importantly, they were explicitly asked to 
ignore the movements of the other person. Despite these instructions, participants preferred 
movement frequencies became partially entrained when they were able to see each other. 
Moreover, temporal aspects of walking might also be entrained. Van Ulzen, Lamoth, 
Daffertshofer, Semin, and Beek (2008) asked pairs of participants to walk next to each other 
on a treadmill. Participants were instructed either to walk in a comfortable pace, or to 
synchronise in-phase or antiphase with the other person. Importantly, evidence for phase 
locking was found in the free walking condition, suggesting that participants became 
unintentionally entrained even when they were not given a goal to maintain a rhythm (see also 
Van Ulzen, Lamoth, Daffertshofer, Semin, & Beek, 2010). Similar results were obtained by 
Zivotofsky and Hausdorff (2007) who found that participants spontaneously synchronised 
their steps simply when asked to walk down the hall together (see also Zivotofsky, 
Gruendlinger, & Hausdorff, 2012). 
10 CAN TEMPORAL ADAPTATION OCCUR IN DISCRETE NON-RHYTHMIC ACTIONS? 
Together, these findings suggest that some form of automatic temporal adaptation might occur 
when agents are engaged in non-rhythmic actions. However, note that the studies reviewed in 
the previous section focused on actions that are continuous (or can be conceptualised as such). 
Thus, temporal adaptation has been shown to regulate interactions where agents perform 






(i.e. entrainment). But could it also affect interactions involving non-rhythmic actions that are 
discrete? 
This question is important not only for basic scientific reasons. A number of controlled 
experimental paradigms employ discrete non-rhythmic actions to study the mechanisms of 
social coordination and joint action. However, researchers using these paradigms typically 
investigate high-level mechanisms, and tend to ignore simpler low-level explanations. For 
instance, a joint version of the classic Simon task has been used to argue that agents co-
represent each other’s actions (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003). But recently it has been 
suggested that the findings obtained from this task can be explained by much simpler 
attentional processes (Dolk, Hommel, Prinz, & Liepelt, 2013; Dolk, Hommel, Colzato, et al., 
2014; for a similar argument in relation to the joint Flanker task, see Dolk, Hommel, Prinz, & 
Liepelt, 2014). Thus, a recent debate opened up a possibility that some commonly used 
experimental paradigms may be affected by previously unconsidered low-level mechanisms. 
Importantly, automatic temporal adaptation could be one such mechanism, should it be found 
to affect the type of discrete non-rhythmic actions involved in these tasks. 
Furthermore, imitation research might also benefit from investigating whether automatic 
temporal adaptation is involved in discrete non-rhythmic actions. At times, automatic 
adaptation leads agents to spontaneously imitate various temporal features of the each other’s 
actions. Some forms of automatic temporal adaptation have been suggested to result in perfect 
synchrony where agents perform the same action at the same time as others (e.g., audiences 
clapping in unison; Neda et al., 2000). On other occasions, adaptation can promote partially 
synchronised interactions where similar actions become entrained to the same tempo, but are 
not performed at the same time (e.g., leg swinging in antiphase; Schmidt et al., 1990). 
Importantly, it is also possible that automatic temporal adaptation may lead agents to imitate 
some general temporal characteristic of each other’s actions (e.g., imitation of speech pace; 
Webb, 1969). 
10.1 Investigating the Role of Automatic Temporal Adaptation in Imitation  
To sum up, automatic temporal adaptation has been shown to affect motor actions independent 






the interacting agents to unintentionally imitate various temporal aspects of each other’s 
actions. Moreover, it has been demonstrated to occur in both rhythmic and non-rhythmic 
actions. However, it remains to be tested whether automatic temporal adaptation affects 
interactions that involve a specific type of non-rhythmic actions, i.e. movements performed in 
a discrete, non-continuous manner. 
In Chapter 3, I present three experiments that investigate this possibility in relation to a specific 
instance of imitation. In a recent study, Pfister, Dignath, Hommel, and Kunde (2013) asked 
pairs of participants to engage in a joint button pressing task. One participant acted as a leader 
and produced either a short or a long press in response to a cue, while the other participant 
acted as a follower and was instructed either to perform the same (e.g., short – short) or the 
opposite press as the leader (e.g., short – long). The study found that leaders initiated their 
actions faster in the condition where the followers responded with the same press, as compared 
to where they responded with the opposite press. The authors interpreted these findings as 
evidence for a high-level co-representation of partner’s actions, in line with the literature on 
compatibility effects and the ideomotor theory (e.g., Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & 
Prinz, 2001). They suggested that leaders anticipate the response of their partners, and that this 
facilitates action execution when the followers’ action is anticipated to be identical. 
However, the study did not control for the fact that participants were able to freely observe 
each other. Crucially, the study also found that the followers’ showed a temporal pattern that 
corresponded to that of the leaders’, i.e. followers were faster when responding with the same 
than the opposite type of press. Thus, these findings could be potentially explained by 
automatic temporal adaptation: the leaders might have adapted their response pace to the 
followers’, and become fast when the followers were fast. The experiments presented in 
Chapter 3 investigated this hypothesis by manipulating whether the leaders could observe the 
followers. If the temporal pattern of leaders’ actions was caused by temporal adaptation, it 
should no longer resemble the followers’ pattern in the conditions where the leaders could not 
observe the followers. Moreover, the experiments manipulated the followers’ response pace 
so that it would be effectively reversed. If leaders adapt to this new pattern (while being able 






adaptation might promote imitation in discrete non-rhythmic actions like the ones employed 
in this task. 
11 UNCONSCIOUS GOAL TO AFFILIATE 
Intentional goal-pursuit plays an important role in initiating and directing human behaviour. 
However, in some situations, and particularly during social interactions, we may find ourselves 
doing something that we did not quite intend. Do we shake somebody’s hand because we 
planned to? Do we laugh at a joke, or smile back at a smile because of conscious deliberation? 
Sometimes we may, but these and other social behaviours can also be initiated automatically. 
Over the last two decades, research in social psychology has amassed evidence that many of 
the behaviours that occur during social interactions do not require intention, and that the list 
of such behaviours is much longer than we used to think.  
Imitation is believed to be one of such behaviours. But if it is not intention, then what motivates 
people to imitate? In the following sections, I argue that imitation might emerge as a result of 
an unconscious pursuit of social goals. Previous research showed that imitators benefit from 
copying others: imitation makes them more likeable in the eyes of others, improves their social 
interactions, and encourages the ones with whom they interact to act in a cooperative way. In 
light of these findings, it has been suggested that imitation is a means of achieving a goal to 
have successful social interactions with others (Chartrand & Jeffers, 2003; Cheng & 
Chartrand, 2003; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). However, the evidence for this account comes 
predominately from research on spontaneous imitation of motor behaviour, i.e. behavioural 
mimicry. Could other types of imitation also be motivated by the unconscious goal to affiliate? 
I propose it might be so, and further argue that the unconscious pursuit of this goal could 
potentially explain some instances of linguistic imitation. 
11.1 Theories of Conscious and Unconscious Goal-Pursuit 
The idea that human behaviour is directed and regulated by a pursuit of goals is perhaps one 
of the most influential in psychology (for reviews, see Austin & Vancouver 1996; Elliot & 
Fryer 2008). In this view, actions are motivated by their results, or end-states. In other words, 






brought about by this behaviour (e.g., a change in their environment, a different internal state 
of their organism). A goal is a mental representation of this desired end-state and the 
behavioural routines that are needed to achieve it (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Dijksterhuis & 
Aarts, 2011; Hull, 1931; Fishbach & Ferguson 2007; Skinner, 1953). Thus, pursuing a goal 
increases the potentiality of the corresponding behavioural routine. Critically, this may lead to 
the execution of this behaviour, which in some cases might be engaged automatically. There 
are two types of theories of goal pursuit that are important with regard to their views on 
automaticity of behaviour. 
Traditionally, most theories assumed that behaviour is initiated and guided by a conscious 
choice of the individual (e.g., Bandura, 1986; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Deci & Ryan, 1985; 
Locke & Latham, 1990). In this view, people are aware of their desires, able to make a rational 
choice of whether to pursue a goal or not, and determined to act in order to bring about the 
desired end-state. Goal pursuit is intentional, and a conscious individual is capable of 
monitoring and controlling the behaviour at each stage, from action selection to completion. 
Simple motor actions, like reaching for a cup of coffee, can be conceptualised in terms of 
conscious goals. When an individual feels the desire to drink a sip of coffee, she might choose 
to extend her hand, grasp the cup, move it towards her mouth, and drink. In this example, the 
desired end-state is drinking coffee, and the preceding behavioural routine is engaged in order 
to achieve it. Importantly, both the goal and the execution of behaviour are monitored by 
conscious awareness, allowing the individual to alter or stop the action if she would wish to 
(e.g., the cup would be empty). 
But recently, a very different view on human behaviour started to gain momentum. According 
to the theories of unconscious goal pursuit, behaviour can be triggered and executed 
independently of intention, and outside of conscious awareness (e.g., Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-
Chai, Barndollar, & Trotschel, 2001; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999; for 
reviews, see Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2011; Huang & Bargh, 2014). In this view, the individual 
is unaware of the goal and is unable to detect or report its influence on her behaviour. Despite 
lacking the intentional component, unconscious goals function similarly to conscious ones, i.e. 
they organise attention, information processing, and behaviour so that they help to achieve the 






and no intervention from the conscious individual is required. In this sense, the behaviour 
might be engaged automatically. For example, a desire to make friends could lead an 
individual to exhibit behaviours associated with a positive attitude towards others: smiling, 
keeping a short personal distance, being active in a conversation, etc. Crucially, these 
behaviours would occur unintentionally, as a result of the unconscious goal to affiliate with 
other people.  
The two views on the nature of goal pursuit are not impossible to reconcile (Baumeister & 
Bargh, 2014). In fact, most of the accounts of unconscious goal pursuit acknowledge that many 
behaviours are guided by intentions (e.g., Bargh et al., 2001). Even the particularly strong 
formulations of these accounts do not claim that all is unconscious, although they may give 
primacy to the automatic production of behaviour (e.g., Huang & Bargh, 2014). However, 
given that the aim of this review is to discuss the automatic mechanisms of emergent imitation, 
in the next sections I will focus on the evidence that social behaviour is at times caused by the 
unconscious goal pursuit, and as such may be automatic. 
11.2 Automatic Behaviours in Social Interactions 
An automatic behaviour is one that is executed, and sometimes also selected and initiated, 
without intentional control (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh, Schwader, Hailey, Dyer, & 
Boothby, 2012). Many well-rehearsed motor routines (e.g., walking, shaking hands with 
others), skills (e.g., writing, skiing), and simple repetitive actions (e.g., pumping a bicycle tire, 
screwing in a screw) are commonly believed to be at least to some extent automatic (see 
Anderson, 1982). What is more surprising, perhaps, is that higher-order, complex social 
behaviours can also be engaged automatically. Many researchers in social psychology believe 
that automatic social behaviours include mating, aggressive behaviour, cooperation, helping, 
and most importantly, imitation (for reviews, see Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; 
Bargh et al., 2012; Huang & Bargh, 2014; Strack & Deutsch, 2004).  
Besides anecdotal (e.g., Allport, 1937) and observational evidence (e.g., LaFrance, 1979), a 
considerable number of experimental studies demonstrated that people automatically imitate 
others during social interactions (for a review, see Chartrand & Lakin, 2013). For example, 






with a confederate who posed as another participant. The confederate was instructed to either 
rub her nose or shake her foot during the interaction. The session was video-recorded, and the 
recordings were later analysed to see if participants imitated the target behaviour exhibited by 
the confederate. It turned out that they did: participants shook their foot more often when the 
confederate shook their foot than when she rubbed her nose, and vice versa. Crucially, they 
did not report being aware of the fact that they imitated the confederate or the behaviour they 
imitated. This suggests that participants did not intend to imitate and that they might have 
copied the behaviour of the confederate entirely unconsciously. Other experiments found that 
in a similar manner people imitate yawning (e.g., Platek, Critton, Myers, & Gallup, 2003), 
laughter (e.g., Provine, 2001), and specific mannerisms like pen-playing (e.g., van Baaren, 
Fockenberg, Holland, Janssen, & van Knippenberg, 2006). Together, these findings suggest 
that imitation might sometimes occur automatically during interactions with others. 
Evidence for the automaticity of other social behaviours comes mostly from social priming 
studies (see Molden, 2014). In a typical social priming paradigm, participants are first 
presented with a stimulus designed to activate a mental construct related to the behaviour in 
question. Then, they engage in an interaction during which the behaviour is being measured. 
The final phase of a social priming study usually involves some measure of intentional control, 
in order to determine whether the observed behaviour was executed automatically. For 
example, Bargh et al. (2001) asked participants to construct sentences from words that were 
either related to the idea of cooperativeness (e.g., cooperative, fair, friendly) or neutral (e.g., 
salad, umbrella, city). Thus, participants were either primed to cooperate or not. Next, they 
played an economic game where they could share resources with the other person or keep the 
resources to themselves to maximise their own earnings. The study found that the group that 
was primed behaved in a more cooperative way (i.e. shared more of their resources) than the 
group that was not primed. Crucially, there was no difference in groups’ self-reported intention 






of the study. The authors interpreted this as evidence that the primed group engaged in 
cooperative behaviour without intentional control, i.e. automatically.6 
11.3 What Elicits Automatic Social Behaviours? 
The findings of the study described above are certainly fascinating and suggest that people 
might unintentionally engage in various social behaviours, including imitation. But if it is not 
the individual’s intention to act, then what mechanism could elicit these behaviours? 
In an early attempt to address this question, Dijksterhuis and Bargh (2001) proposed a direct 
“perception-behaviour expressway” that operates outside of conscious awareness, and leads 
to the production of automatic behaviours. They argued that automatic imitation of social 
behaviours might stem directly from the organisation of the cognitive system, rather than being 
a result of behavioural conditioning, or intention. According to this account, the overlap 
between perceptual and behavioural representations means that activation of the former 
spreads to the latter, resulting in an automatic tendency to engage in the perceived actions. 
Furthermore, a behavioural representation for an action can also be activated merely by 
thinking about performing this action, or through a concept that is related to it.  
Dijksterhuis and Bargh argued that this account could explain cases of behavioural contagion 
that occur in social settings. For instance, yawning seems to be induced both by direct 
observation and by thinking about it. In one study, one group of participants watched a short 
video of other people yawning, whereas another group watched a video of people smiling 
(Provine, 1986). The percentage of participants who started yawning during the video was 
greater in the condition that involved watching yawns than smiles. Moreover, yawning was 
also induced by reading about it: another group of participants read an article about yawning, 
whereas a further group read about hiccupping. Similarly as with watching videos, reading 
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about yawning led to a higher percentage of participants who yawned than reading about 
hiccups. Therefore, social behaviours can be elicited by perceiving them or by activating the 
related concept. For example, reading adjectives related to the idea of cooperativeness 
activates the mental representations of behavioural routines associated with cooperation, 
which in turn leads to automatic execution of overt cooperative behaviour (Bargh et al., 2001). 
Dijksterhuis and Bargh’s (2001) account (and some other early accounts, e.g., Bargh et al., 
2001) somewhat neglected the fact that people do not always behave as the situation dictates 
them. The selective nature of social behaviours, including those that are automatic, is better 
addressed by some more recent accounts. In Strack and Deutsch’s (2004) dual-system model, 
social behaviours are directed by mental processes organised into the reflective and the 
impulsive system. The reflective system involves conscious awareness and intentional control, 
and therefore will not be discussed here. However, the impulsive system is more interesting 
from the point of explaining automatic imitation.  
According to Strack and Deutsch, a behaviour may be automatically produced as a result of 
activating the relevant behavioural schema stored in the impulsive system. A behavioural 
schema is a mental construct comprising of three associated elements, i.e. a representation of 
the situational condition, a representation of the behavioural routine, and a representation of 
the consequences of behaviour. To activate a schema, it is sufficient to activate one of its 
elements, which can be achieved by the perceptual input from the environment. Thus, the 
representation of the routine for a given behaviour can be activated by observing this behaviour 
being performed by another person. Moreover, it can also be activated by observing the 
consequences of this behaviour, or by perceiving environmental cues that would activate the 
representation of a situational condition associated with this behaviour. For example, 
observing a conversational partner smile is likely to activate the behavioural routine for 
smiling, and particularly so if it occurs in a social setting associated with smiling (e.g., an 






always lead to the production of the behaviour – the individual will engage in overt behaviour 
only if the schema is activated above a certain threshold.7 But how is this threshold exceeded?  
One possibility is that the activation threshold is lowered for behaviours that are compatible 
with the overall motivational orientation of the system, i.e. the motivation to avoid or to 
approach others. Imitation is likely to be compatible with the motivation to approach, because 
it has been shown to create liking, empathy, and affiliation, as well as increase interdependence 
and feelings of closeness between people (see Chartrand & Lakin, 2013). According to Strack 
and Deutsch, this orientation can be switched on by processing positive information or affect, 
and by perceiving or executing approach behaviours. Thus, people should engage in automatic 
imitation in the presence of factors that promote the more prosocial motivation to approach. 
This is consistent with findings such as that being prosocially oriented (e.g., van Baaren, 
Maddux, Chartrand, DeBouter, & van Knippenberg, 2003), and experiencing a positive affect 
(e.g., van Baaren et al., 2006) leads to imitation.  
11.4 Imitation and the Unconscious Goal to Affiliate 
The idea that a prosocial motivation might trigger automatic social behaviours is in agreement 
with studies suggesting that imitation might serve the unconscious goal to affiliate with others. 
For example, Lakin and Chartrand (2003) in two experiments showed that an active affiliation 
goal may elicit imitation during a social interaction. In the first experiment, participants were 
assigned to one of the three groups: a group that was primed with an unconscious goal to 
affiliate by reading words related to affiliation (e.g., friend, affiliate, together), a group that 
was given a conscious goal to affiliate by instructing them to get along well with the interaction 
partner, and a control group that was given no goal. Participants in each group watched a video 
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mental representation of a behaviour might be activated by the perception of relevant 
environmental cues. However, the activation threshold suggested by the former helps to 






of another person who occasionally touched her face while doing clerical tasks (e.g., filing 
papers, answering the phone), and were secretly filmed to determine whether they would also 
touch their face. Importantly, the groups that were given a goal to affiliate imitated the face-
touching behaviour to a greater extent than the control group, regardless of whether the goal 
was conscious or unconscious. When asked about the behaviour of the person in the video 
participants did not mention face-touching, which could suggest that they imitated it 
unconsciously. Thus, an active goal to affiliate encouraged participants to automatically 
imitate the behaviour they observed in their interaction partner. 
The second experiment tested whether deactivating the goal to affiliate decreases its potential 
to elicit imitation. Participants were assigned to a group primed with an unconscious goal to 
affiliate or to a control group, and then interacted via a text-based computer chat with a person 
who behaved either in friendly or unfriendly manner. Chatting with a friendly partner was 
meant to satisfy the desire to affiliate with others, and thus deactivate the previously primed 
goal. Next, participants spoke face-to-face with another person who shook their foot during 
the conversation, and were covertly filmed to determine if they would imitate foot-shaking. 
Consistent with the hypothesis that an active affiliative goal elicits imitation, participants in 
the primed group engaged in more imitation than the control group, but not if the goal was 
deactivated by chatting with a friendly partner.  
These findings have been interpreted as evidence that imitation in social interactions is driven 
by an unconscious goal to affiliate with other people (Chartrand & Jeffers, 2003; Lakin et al., 
2003). Because humans evolved to be highly social animals, they have a strong basal need to 
belong and to seek positive relations with others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Brewer, 1991). 
This desire is represented in the motivational system by the goal to affiliate with other people. 
Although the affiliative goal might at times be pursued consciously, in most situations it 
remains unconscious, similarly to many other motivational impulses (cf. McClelland et al., 
1989). The possible evolutionary origins of the affiliative goal would suggest that it is 
routinely activated in human social interactions (Lakin et al., 2003). However, its activation 
might be increased or decreased in certain types of social environments and in case of 
particular individuals (Chartrand & Jeffers, 2003). Various social behaviours might serve the 






Crucially, imitation has been suggested to be one of such behaviours, and this is for three 
reasons: first, imitation may be elicited automatically, which is consistent with the idea that it 
is driven by an unconscious goal; second, imitation has been shown to bring about positive 
social consequences for the imitator; third, the amount of imitative behaviour is increased 
during interaction where the goal to affiliate is likely to be highly activated.  
11.5 Evidence that Imitation Is Elicited by the Goal to Affiliate 
There is now considerable evidence for each of these claims. Imitation may be engaged 
automatically in social interactions, as demonstrated by studies where participants were probed 
for their awareness of the behaviour they imitated. For example, Chartrand and Bargh (1999) 
used a “funnelled” post-test interview asking increasingly specific questions about the 
experiment and the social interaction it involved. Importantly, in this and other similar studies 
participants did not report an intention to imitate, awareness that they engaged in imitation, or 
even of the partner’s behaviour that they imitated (e.g., Stel & Vonk, 2010; Stel et al., 2010). 
Further evidence for the automaticity of social imitation comes from studies that it can be 
induced by subliminally priming the affiliative goal (e.g., Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). In these 
studies, the stimuli that activated the goal to affiliate were presented outside of participants’ 
conscious awareness, suggesting that imitation was engaged automatically.  
Furthermore, imitation is likely to serve the affiliative goal because it can bring various social 
benefits for the imitator (for reviews, see Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Hove & Risen, 2009). 
Previous research found that imitators are liked by others. For example, early studies have 
observed that the amount of postural imitation is positively correlated with self-reported 
rapport between the interacting partners (e.g., Charney, 1966; LaFrance, 1979). In a more 
recent study, participants interacted either with a partner who imitated their posture and 
movements or with a partner who sat still and did not imitate. The imitator was rated by the 
participants as more likeable as compared to the non-imitating partner (Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999).  
Imitation also encourages people to engage in positive behaviours that can directly benefit the 
imitator. For example, participants in one study more often helped a confederate to pick up 






Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 2004). In another study, passers-by on a street more readily 
helped a confederate who imitated them as compared to a confederate who did not (Guéguen, 
Martin, & Meineri, 2011). Similar results have been obtained with typically developing 
children who were more likely to help an experimenter who imitated them (Carpenter, Uebel, 
& Tomasello, 2013), and with children diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder who 
responded more positively to imitators than to non-imitating adults (Nadel, 2002; Field, Nadel, 
& Ezell, 2011; for a review, see Contaldo, Colombi, Narzisi, & Muratori, 2016). 
Further evidence that imitation is elicited by the goal to affiliate comes from studies showing 
that people engage in more imitation when they have a strong desire to get along well with 
others. This desire might stem from individual differences. For instance, Chen and Chartrand 
(2003) demonstrated that people who are strongly motivated to maintain a positive social 
image engaged in more imitation than those who did not have this motivation, and that they 
did so particularly in situations where it was important to leave a good impression. Similarly, 
in another study participants with a strong sense of connection to others tended to imitate more, 
both when this attitude was induced by the experimenter and warranted by their cultural 
background (van Baaren et al., 2003).  
However, the desire to affiliate is also stronger when interacting with members of one’s social 
group, as opposed to out-group individuals. Yabar, Johnston, Miles, and Peace (2006) found 
that non-Christian participants imitated the face-touching behaviour of a confederate to a 
greater extent when the confederate was identified as non-Christian than Christian. Strikingly, 
the tendency to selectively imitate in-group members is already observable in very young 
children. For example, there is some evidence that 14-month-old infants more often imitate a 
model who speaks their native language than of a model who speaks a foreign language 
(Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, & Carpenter, 2013). Other studies suggest that the tendency to 
imitate in-group members emerges at the age of 3-years-old (Howard, Henderson, Carrazza, 
& Woodward, 2015; van Schaik & Hunnius, 2016; cf. Krieger, Möller, Zmyj, & Aschersleben, 
2016). Finally, the goal to affiliate might also be temporarily activated by being socially 
excluded. Lakin, Chartrand and Arkin (2008) showed that participants who were ignored by 
other players during a brief computer-based game engaged in more imitation in a subsequent 






12 LINGUISTIC IMITATION AND THE DESIRE TO AFFILIATE 
Together, these findings suggest that the tendency to imitate one’s interaction partner is 
dictated by an unconscious goal to affiliate. However, the evidence for this idea comes almost 
exclusively from studies involving motor behaviour (e.g., mannerisms, facial expressions, 
motor actions). And yet, imitation is not limited to motor behaviour, but also occurs in 
language. Could the desire to affiliate with others be responsible for linguistic imitation? 
According to Communication Accommodation Theory (CAT), convergence in language may 
indeed be guided by a motivation to affiliate with the conversational partner (Giles & 
Coupland, 1991; Giles, Mulac, Bradac, & Johnson, 1987). This theory assumes that 
accommodating to the verbal and non-verbal patterns used by another speaker is a sign of a 
positive attitude towards them, and that linguistic imitation is one of the strategies that helps 
to create liking and decrease social distance between speakers. There is a number of different 
factors that modulate the degree to which people imitate each other’s language, ranging from 
personality traits (e.g., Natale, 1973) to in-group versus out-group identity (e.g., Giles, 1973). 
Crucially, these factors might interact in a complex way and be further affected by the 
communicative intention and various other goals. For example, the degree of phonetic 
imitation might be simultaneously affected by speaker’s gender, conversational role, and 
intention to imitate (Pardo, 2006; Pardo, Jay, & Krauss, 2010). Most importantly, many of the 
predictions derived from CAT are consistent with the idea that imitation is driven by the 
unconscious goal to affiliate. 
First, both CAT and the affiliative goal account predict that people who have a strong 
motivation to be positively evaluated by others will imitate more. In support of this, Natale 
(1973) showed that participants in an interview imitated the interviewer's vocal intensity. 
However, more imitation was associated with participants’ self-reported need for social 
approval (measured by their tendency to report that they are similar to social norms).  
Second, both accounts predict that people will imitate more when interacting with partners 
who belong to a desirable social group. This is supported by evidence from studies 
investigating the role of social status for linguistic imitation. For example, an analysis of the 
recordings from a television talk-show found that the degree of phonetic convergence between 






Webster, 1996). One possible interpretation of this finding is that the desire to affiliate is 
particularly strong towards members of a desirable high-status social group, which encouraged 
more imitation of the phonetic aspect of language.  
Other studies found that a positive attitude towards a social group leads to more linguistic 
imitation when interacting with a member of this group. For instance, Babel (2010) asked 
participants who spoke a New Zealand English dialect to shadow a speaker of Australian 
English. Participants who had a more positive implicit attitude towards Australians (as 
measured by an Implicit Association Test; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) were more 
likely to accommodate to the other speaker. Importantly, the fact that the attitudes were 
implicit and that participants were not explicitly instructed to imitate suggests that imitation 
was engaged automatically, which gives credence to the idea that it was elicited by an 
unconscious goal to affiliate. Similar results have been obtained from studies where 
participants interacted with an attractive (e.g., Babel, 2012), desirable (e.g., Lev-Ari, 2015), 
or likable speaker (e.g., Balcetis & Dale, 2005). 
Third, more imitation should be observed between people belonging to the same, as opposed 
to different social groups. Indeed, there is evidence that linguistic imitation is affected by the 
accent-indexed social identity of the interacting speakers. For example, Kim, Horton, and 
Bradlow (2011) measured phonetic convergence within pairs comprising two native speakers 
of American English, and mixed pairs comprising a native speaker and a non-native speaker. 
Pairs of native speakers converged more than mixed pairs. However, this was true only if both 
speakers in the native pair used the same accent of American English. If speakers used 
different accents, they did not show higher convergence than mixed pairs. This suggests that 
people engage in more imitation when interacting with a speaker that can be identified as 
belonging to the same social group. Conversely, the amount of linguistic imitation might be 
decreased when interacting with a speaker who distances themselves from one’s own social 
group (e.g., Bourhis & Giles, 1977). 
12.1 Investigating the Social Consequences of Linguistic Imitation 
As shown, there is considerable evidence that people engage in more linguistic imitation when 






(e.g., Natale, 1973). Moreover, several studies have found that people might imitate language 
without any intention to do so (e.g., Pardo, 2006), and for reasons that slip their conscious 
awareness (e.g., Babel, 2010). Together, these findings suggest that imitation of language, 
similarly to imitation of motor behaviour, might be elicited by an unconscious goal to affiliate. 
However, one crucial assumption of this account remains to be demonstrated: if linguistic 
imitation does indeed serve the affiliative goal, then engaging in imitation should help 
imitators to improve their relations with others. 
To this date, the evidence in support of this hypothesis does not allow inferences about the 
causal relationship between linguistic imitation and the quality of the relation with the other 
speaker. For example, correlational studies have found that high language style matching is 
related to relationship stability (Ireland & Pennebaker, 2010), and that people who use similar 
language more often cooperate with other (Scissors, Gill, & Gergle, 2008). But unfortunately, 
these studies did not manipulate, but merely observed the amount of linguistic imitation 
between speakers. Thus, the causal relationship between imitation and the other variables 
remains undetermined. Although some other studies did attempt to manipulate the amount of 
linguistic imitation, they did not properly control for other factors that might have affected the 
relation between the imitator and the imitated partner. For example, in one famous study a 
waitress was asked to either repeat the order back to her customer or to simply acknowledge 
it (van Baaren, Holland, Steenaert, & van Knippenberg, 2003). The amount of money she 
received in tips was greater in the imitation (repetition) condition, as compared to the other 
one. Importantly, this paradigm did not control for the vast differences between these two 
conditions that could be the true source of the observed effect (e.g., more words spoken when 
repeating vs. acknowledging, possible differences in motor behaviour). Other existing 
experiments suffer from similar methodological shortcomings (e.g., Müller, Maaskant, van 
Baaren, & Dijksterhuis, 2012). 
In Chapter 4 of this thesis I therefore present three controlled experiments that investigated 
this assumption with regard to imitation of lexical choices. In the experiments, pairs of 
participants engaged in text-based picture-naming task, during which their conversation was 
manipulated so that their partner appeared either to imitate (i.e. use the same words for 






partner they interacted with and the interaction itself. Finally, to complement the self-report 
evaluation with a behavioural measure of the relation with the partner, participants engaged in 
a short decision making game where they could cooperate or compete with their partner. If 
people engage in linguistic imitation in order to foster their relationships with others, 
participants who were imitated during the task should more positively evaluate their partner 
and the interaction, as well as exhibit a more cooperative behaviour in the game than those 
who were counter-imitated. 
13 A CASE FOR CROSS-EXAMINING THE MECHANISMS OF EMERGENT IMITATION 
In the preceding sections of this review, I argued that imitation might emerge as a result of 
several automatic mechanisms that are involuntarily engaged when interacting with others. I 
discussed three such mechanisms, i.e. simulation, temporal adaptation, and the unconscious 
goal to affiliate. Moreover, I presented the existing evidence for the engagement of these 
mechanisms during social interactions and for their role in promoting imitative behaviours. 
Crucially, note that in case of each mechanism, the evidence tends to focus on studies into a 
single imitative behaviour. More specifically, the simulation mechanism has been widely 
investigated with regards to simple motor movements, and the attempts to link it to language 
are relatively rare and recent. Temporal adaptation has been evidenced for continuous actions, 
while the possibility that it might lead to imitation in discrete non-rhythmic actions has been 
neglected. Similarly, social psychology investigated the affiliative goal account in relation to 
behavioural mimicry, but some key assumptions of this account remain unexplored with 
regard to linguistic imitation. As a result, each of these mechanisms is often considered to be 
confined to a single type of imitative behaviour.  
However, to convincingly argue that a given mechanism explains only one type of imitation, 
there would need to be negative evidence showing that this mechanism is not involved in other 
imitative behaviours. The current literature does not provide such evidence. I propose that this 
situation should be addressed by cross-examining the mechanisms of emergent imitation, i.e. 
conducting empirical studies to test whether each mechanism could be capable of explaining 
the types of imitation that are currently considered to be unrelated to it. In support of this 






suggest that some of these mechanisms might be responsible for more than one imitative 
behaviour. 
To begin, some theoretical arguments are convergent with the idea that the simulation 
mechanism might play a causal role in multiple imitative behaviours. Specifically, the 
perception-action link, which constitutes an important part of the simulation mechanism, has 
been proposed to extend beyond automatic imitation of simple motor movements. Heyes 
(2011) suggested that the perception-action link might have a more general cognitive 
application, and that the controlled experimental paradigm used to investigate automatic 
imitation could be treated as a laboratory model for other forms of imitation, including the 
imitative behaviours that can be observed in natural social interactions. Consistent with this 
are some earlier claims made by the researchers in the field of behavioural mimicry. For 
example, Chartrand and Van Baaren (2009) proposed that mimicry and automatic imitation 
are emanations of the same phenomenon, but detected under different conditions. Similarly to 
Heyes, they suggested that in both cases imitation is caused by the perception-action link, and 
that it may also be responsible for other imitative behaviours (see also Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001).  
Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that the goal to affiliate with others might be another 
mechanism involved in multiple imitative behaviours. Several studies have shown that the 
affiliative goal can be extended beyond behavioural mimicry, and that automatic imitation is 
modulated by social factors that appear to be related to this goal.8 Leighton, Bird, Orsini, and 
Heyes (2010) primed their participants either with a pro-social, neutral or antisocial attitude, 
and asked them to engage in an automatic imitation task. In this task, participants acted on a 
cue to open or close their hand while watching a video of an opening or closing hand. The 
hand movements were initiated faster if the video showed the same than a different movement. 
                                                   
 
8 Note that temporal adaptation may also be affected by various social factors, although in this 
case the exact casual mechanism is difficult to identify (for reviews, see Hove & Risen, 2009; 






But importantly, the facilitative effect of imitation was stronger in participants primed with a 
pro-social attitude, as compared to participants primed with either the neutral or anti-social 
attitude. One interpretation of this finding is that the pro-social priming activated the goal to 
affiliate with others, which in turn increased the tendency to imitate. Similar results were 
obtained by Maister and Tsakiris (2016) who showed that automatic imitation is enhanced 
when interacting with one’s romantic partner, as compared to interacting with a friend. This 
suggests that interaction partners with whom we are more likely to affiliate elicit a stronger 
automatic imitation effect. 
Aragón, Sharer, Bargh, and Pineda (2014) observed this tendency on a neural level: in their 
study, participants first played an economic game either with a fair partner who shared the 
resources or an unfair partner who kept the resources for himself. Next, imitative activation of 
the motor system (indexed by mu rhythm activity) was measured while participants observed 
the partner perform a simple or a goal-directed hand movement. Participants who interacted 
with an unfair partner activated their motor system (mu rhythm suppression) only when 
observing goal-directed actions, whereas participants who interacted with a fair partner 
showed the activation for both simple and goal-directed actions. Thus, the neural activity 
related to automatic imitation was modulated by whether prior behaviour of the interaction 
partner encouraged them to affiliate or not. 
Finally, evidence convergent with the idea that automatic imitation is regulated by the 
affiliative goal comes also from studies exploring the role of individual differences. Obhi, 
Hogeveen, Giacomin, and Jordan (2014) asked participants to engage in an automatic imitation 
task, and subsequently to fill out a questionnaire measuring narcissism as a personality 
dimension. Interestingly, a reduced tendency to imitate was observed in participants scoring 
high on narcissism, arguably because such individuals might be less motivated to affiliate with 
others. 
To summarise, some recent accounts and findings support the notion that emergent imitation 
might be caused by multiple mechanisms. Specifically, the perception-action link involved in 
the simulation mechanism has been suggested to contribute to various imitative behaviours 
observed both in natural social interactions and in controlled laboratory conditions. Similarly, 






simple motor movements and more complex social behaviours. Therefore, it is likely that at 
least these two mechanisms are capable of explaining imitation beyond the behaviour to which 
they have been so far confined.  
Thus, I argue that psychological research on imitation should be advanced by conducting 
studies that further explore the possible overlap between the causal mechanisms of emergent 
imitation. Current candidate mechanisms should be not be assumed to be confined to a specific 
imitative behaviour, unless future experiments will prove otherwise. Instead, studies should 
test whether each mechanism could be involved in each of the currently known imitative 
behaviours, i.e. synchrony, emotional contagion, imitative learning, overimitation, mimicry, 
linguistic imitation, and automatic imitation. This way, better models of imitation could be 
constructed. 
14 AIMS OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis contributes to the effort of cross-examining the causal mechanisms of emergent 
imitation. In the following empirical chapters, I discuss three sets of experiments that aim to 
investigate whether simulation, temporal adaptation, and the unconscious goal to affiliate 
could be extended to explain imitative behaviours that are currently underexplored by their 
respective research fields.  
In Chapter 2, I present three experiments that contribute to the exploration of the role of the 
simulation mechanism in linguistic imitation. Although simulation has been so far considered 
to be related to imitation of motor movements, a recent account proposed that it might promote 
imitation also in language (Gambi & Pickering, 2013). However, a critical assumption of the 
language simulation account remains to be tested, i.e. that in the process of simulation, 
comprehenders engage their language production system to predict (Pickering & Garrod, 
2013). The three experiments presented in this chapter tested this by manipulating the 
engagement of the production system during comprehension and measuring its effects on 
prediction. 
Chapter 3 explores the possibility that the temporal adaptation mechanism leads to imitation 
in discrete non-rhythmic motor actions. Studies investigating this mechanism previously 






imitation in discrete non-rhythmic actions, and to favour other explanations instead (e.g., 
Pfister, Dignath, Hommel, & Kunde, 2013). In Chapter 3, I present three further experiments 
that tested whether spontaneous imitation of partner’s response speed that occurs in a joint 
leader-follower button pressing task can be explained by temporal adaptation. This hypothesis 
was investigated by manipulating the partner’s response speed and the audio-visual cues about 
partner’s responses. The experiments asked whether observing fast responses leads to 
performing fast responses, and vice versa. 
In Chapter 4, I present three additional experiments that investigate if the unconscious goal to 
affiliate is involved in linguistic imitation. More specifically, if people engage in imitation of 
language to create affiliation and improve their relation with their conversational partner, then 
linguistic imitation should have observable positive consequences convergent with the 
affiliative goal (cf. Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003). The experiments tested this 
prediction by manipulating whether participants were lexically imitated or counter-imitated 
by their conversational partner, and measuring the effects of imitation, i.e. participants’ 
evaluation of the conversational partner and of the interaction with the partner, and 
participants’ tendency to cooperate with the partner.  







Investigating the Role of Production System 
in Simulation 
Note: This chapter has been modified and submitted for publication as a paper [Lelonkiewicz, 
J. R., Pickering, M. J., & Rabagliati, H. (under review). The role of language production in 
making predictions during comprehension.]. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
When reading or listening, people can predict the next word that they will see or hear (e.g., 
Altmann & Kamide, 1999; DeLong, Urbach, & Kutas, 2005). But what mechanisms do they 
use to do this? Recently, a number of researchers have proposed that comprehenders predict 
using aspects of the language production system (prediction-by-production: Dell & Chang, 
2014; Federmeier, 2007; Pickering & Garrod, 2013; cf. Hickok, 2012). More specifically, 
comprehenders may covertly imitate the utterance that they are currently perceiving, and use 
this as the basis for determining what they would say next if they were speaking. 
However, the evidence that production is used for prediction is quite indirect. Thus, brain 
regions that are active during speaking are also active during listening. For instance, motor 
regions that are implicated in the production of tongue-articulated sounds are also active when 
comprehenders hear a tongue-articulated, but not a lip-articulated sound (Fadiga, Craighero, 
Buccino, & Rizzolatti, 2002; Pulvermüller et al., 2006; Watkins & Paus, 2004). However, 
these findings do not demonstrate that such activation is causally involved in prediction. More 
importantly, there is some evidence for activation of regions associated when those sounds are 
predicted (D’Ausilio, Jarmolowska, Busan, Bufalari, & Craighero, 2011). But even this study 
provides evidence about the prediction of specific sounds, rather than larger units of language 
such as words. There is some correlational evidence that people with better production skills 






2012), but these studies do not unambiguously demonstrate a causal role of prediction in 
production. 
The current lack of empirical clarity has led to a number of suggestions as to exactly how 
prediction-by-production might be used for language processing. Some accounts propose that 
production is used for generating all predictions (Dell & Chang, 2014), whereas others suggest 
that it is used especially for predictions that help subsequent production (e.g., responding to a 
question; Scott, McGettigan, & Eisner, 2009; or engaging in dialogue; Garrod & Pickering, 
2015).  
In this paper, we report a causal test of prediction-by-production, and investigate the 
conditions under which it might occur. In our experiments, participants read sentence contexts 
that either were (1a), or were not (1b), highly predictive of a final word, and we measured how 
quickly participants recognised that final word (Experiments 1 and 2) or named a picture 
showing that word (Experiment 3). To increase reliance on top-down prediction, stimuli were 
presented against a white-noise background and using a text colour that was individually-
selected to ensure participants’ word recognition was impaired but about chance.  
(1a) It was windy enough to fly a… kite. 
(1b) They went to see the famous… show. 
Crucially, we also manipulated the engagement of the production system: participants read the 
contexts aloud on half the trials, and silently on the remainder. We considered reading silently 
to be representative of normal comprehension where some aspects of production are used by 
a forward model to generate predictions. But since in reading aloud the production system is 
highly activated for the purpose of producing speech, the forward model should be more 
engaged, so any effect of the production system on prediction should be greater in the read-
aloud than the read-silently condition. And because the possibility of (accurate) prediction is 
of course greater for the predictive (1a) than the non-predictive sentences (1b), reading aloud 
should facilitate comprehension to a greater extent for (1a) than (1b). 
Experiment 1 used a lexical decision task: after reading the sentence contexts, participants 






between predictability and reading type in this experiment would implicate prediction-by-
production when the task involves comprehension but not production. Experiment 2 used a 
go/no-go task in which participants were instructed to read aloud a sentence-final word but not 
nonword. An interaction would implicate prediction-by-production when the task involves 
comprehension and some aspects of production. Experiment 3 used a picture naming task, in 
which participants were instructed to name a sentence-final picture (whose name was a 
predictable or unpredictable word). An interaction would implicate prediction-by-production 
when the task involves production but need not involve comprehension. 
2 EXPERIMENT 1 
2.1 Methods 
2.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-four participants, who were Edinburgh University students and native speakers of 
British English, were paid £6. They had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and reported no 
language disorders. 
2.1.2 Design 
We used a 2 (Predictability: high- vs low-cloze) X 2 (Reading Type: aloud vs silent) X 2 (Item 
Type: word vs nonword) within-subjects design. The order of reading aloud/silently was a 
between-subjects participants manipulation (Reading Type Order: aloud first vs silent first). 
Prior to the task, we carried out an individual pretest to determine the text colour for the final 
words. 
2.1.3 Materials 
In preparation of the stimuli, 24 additional participants produced a final word of 291 different 
sentences. We selected 120 high-cloze sentences whose final word was highly predictable 
(produced by 87% of participants) and 120 low-cloze sentences (produced by 20% of 






vs   = 7.28; t(238) = 1.20, p = .232). We then created a word and a nonword item version 
of each context sentence by pairing it with either its most-frequent continuation (or selected 
one in case of a tie), or a pronounceable nonword matched to that continuation in length, first 
letter, and last letter (Table 1). 
Each participant saw 240 items in total. Each context sentence was shown only once, either as 
a word or nonword item (item type determined randomly for each participant). Trial order was 
individually randomized.  
To ensure participants paid attention, forty trials were followed by a simple yes/no question 
(e.g., Was it the boat that easily passed under the bridge?). For the text colour pretest, we 
prepared additional 250 words and 250 nonwords. 
Table 1. An example of the stimuli used in Experiment 1. 
 context word / non-word 
high-cloze It was windy enough to fly a kite / kile 
low-cloze They went to see the famous show / spow 
2.1.4 Procedure 
Trials in the text colour pretest started with a central fixation cross displayed against a square 
of white noise (150 X 150 pixels, black and white; fixation cross shown for 500-1000ms, 
randomly varied). Then, a single word or a nonword was randomly displayed in one of five 
colours, anchored on the neutral axis in the RGB colour space and different in lightness level 
(#414141, #474747, #4D4D4D, #515151, #565656; word/nonword shown for 300ms). 
Participant pressed a key to signal whether they saw a word or a nonword (‘Z’ and ‘/’; key 
assignment randomized). Each participant saw 250 trials (half words, half nonwords). We 
identified the text colour at which the participant was closest to 60% accuracy. 
Trials in the main experiment began with a central fixation cross, displayed against a square 
of white noise, surrounded by a white background (1000-1500ms, randomly varied). Sentence 
contexts were then shown word by word (300ms ON, 200ms OFF), in the same text colour for 
all participants (#393939). On the blank screen before the final word, the background switched 






word was based on the pretest. Participants were instructed to read the words on the white 
background aloud or silently and then to press a key to indicate whether they thought the 
yellow screen showed a word or a nonword (‘Z’ or ‘/’; key assignment varied across 
participants). They were told never to read this final word aloud. Trials ended after the 
participant had responded (Figure 1) or after the question. 
The main experiment was divided into two blocks of 120 trials, each of which was preceded 
by 8 practice trials of the same type (silent or aloud) as the subsequent block. Each experiment 
lasted about 30 minutes. 
 
Figure 1. An example of procedure for a trial (nonword item) in Experiment 1. 
2.2 Results 
To test whether engaging production increased the effect of prediction on lexical decisions, 
we calculated the likelihood of responding that the final word was an existing word 
(henceforth: “word” response). We ran a binomial Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) 
with Predictability (high vs low), Reading Type (aloud vs silent), Item Type (word vs 
nonword), and Reading Type Order9 (aloud first vs second) as fixed effects, by-subjects 
                                                   
 
9 In the models used in Experiments 1-3, we included Reading Type Order to determine 






random intercepts and slopes, and by-items random intercepts. The maximal model structure 
did not converge, so we removed correlations between random effects, and all three- and four-
way interactions between random effects (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013; see Appendix 
A for model description). 
If prediction-by-production improves accuracy, the likelihood of correctly making a “word” 
response (i.e., making a “word” response to a word item) should be higher after reading high- 
than low-cloze contexts, and this effect should increase when participants read the contexts 
aloud. Thus, there should be a three-way interaction between Item Type, Predictability, and 
Reading Type. However, this interaction was not present (Table 3). Alternatively, if 
prediction-by-production biases participants towards responding the final word is an existing 
word, there should be a two-way interaction between Predictability and Reading Type, such 
as the likelihood of making a “word” response should be higher after reading high- than low-
cloze contexts and this effect should be enhanced when reading aloud. Crucially, this 
interaction was also not present. 
Instead, we found an effect of Item Type: the likelihood of a “word” response was higher for 
word than nonword items, reflecting the fact that participants tended to correctly make a 
“word” response to items that were existing words (Table 2). Moreover, this effect interacted 
with Predictability: the likelihood of a “word” response was higher for word than nonword 
items, and this effect was bigger for high- than low-cloze contexts. 
                                                   
 
could continue to engage their production system in some way also in reading silently (e.g., 
by imagining hearing themselves read). This could lead to a situation where reading aloud 
would increase the effect of Predictability, but only for participants who read aloud first. 
Because of that we could observe a reliable three-way interaction between Predictability, 
Reading Type, and Reading Type Order, whereas the interaction between Predictability and 
Reading Type could come out as not reliable. Thus, omitting Reading Type Order in the 






Next, we analysed key-press reaction times (RT). For to the analyses, we excluded outliers 
deviating more than 2.5 SD from each participant’s cell mean (2.83%) and retained only the 
trials where participants gave a correct response to a word item (37.63% of all observations). 
We then ran a maximal-structure Linear Mixed Effect (LME) model with Predictability, 
Reading Type, and Reading Type Order as predictors and with by-subject random intercepts 
and slopes for all the predictors. 
If engaging production increases the effect of prediction on key-press RT, there should be an 
interaction between Predictability and Reading Type. There was an effect of Predictability, 
such that participants responded faster after high- than low-cloze sentence contexts, and an 
effect of Reading Type, indicating that participants’ responded slower after they had read the 
context aloud than silently (Table 4). However, again there was no interaction between these 
effects, suggesting that engaging production did not influence the effects of prediction (Table 
5).10 
We also found an additional interaction between Reading Type and Reading Type Order, such 
that the effect of Reading Type was greater in participants who read aloud in the first block 
(	
  = 1167ms [±72],  = 676ms [±42]) than those who read aloud in the second 
block (	
  = 1011ms [±58],  = 853ms [±51]; means are henceforth reported with 
95% CI). Participants responded correctly to the questions on 90% of trials and there were no 
differences across conditions (Appendix A). 
 
  
                                                   
 






Table 2. Percentages of “word” responses in Experiments 1 and 2. Table shows mean 
percentages and 95% CI for each design cell. Note that this table can also be used to calculate 
the percentages of correct responses: For word items, percentages correct are the same as the 
percentages currently shown; for nonword items, subtract the values shown in the table from 
100%. 
Experiment 1 
 word item nonword item 
 low cloze high cloze  low cloze high cloze  
reading silently 69% (±6) 79% (±5) 28% (±6) 34% (±7) 
reading aloud 69% (±6) 82% (±4) 25% (±6) 29% (±7) 
Experiment 2 
 word item nonword item 
 low cloze high cloze  low cloze high cloze  
reading silently 65% (±6) 83% (±6) 26% (±5) 40% (±6) 
reading aloud 72% (±6) 82% (±7) 31% (±6) 51% (±8) 
 
 
Table 3. GLMM analyses of the likelihood of a “word” response in Experiments 1 and 2. Table 
shows results from the fixed effects structure. 
Experiment 1 
 B SE z p 
Intercept .12    .12    1.05   > .250    
Predictability .24    .06    4.14 < .001 
Item Type 1.16    .07   15.87   < .001 
Reading Type -.03    .03   -.92   > .250    
Reading Type Order -.07 .12 -.62 >.250 
Predictability * Item Type .10    .04    2.25   .024   
Predictability * Reading Type .02    .04    .46    > .250    
Item Type * Reading Type .08    .04    1.81   .070   
Predictability * Reading Type Order .00 .05 -.09 >.250 
Item Type * Reading Type Order .05 .07 .76 >.250 






Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type .03    .03    1.08    > .250    
Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type 
Order 
.05 .04 1.44 .150 
Predictability * Reading Type * Reading Type 
Order 
-.04 .04 -1.23 .222 
Item Type * Reading Type * Reading Type 
Order 
.00 .04 .18 >.250 
Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type * 
Reading Type Order 
.00 .03 .08 >.250 
Experiment 2 
 B SE z p 
Intercept .40    .10    3.83 < .001 
Predictability .46    .04   10.63   < .001 
Item Type 1.03    .08   12.39  < .001 
Reading Type .19   .05    3.71 < .001 
Reading Type Order .11 .11 1.12 > .250    
Predictability * Item Type -.03    .05   -.66 > .250    
Predictability * Reading Type .01   .03    .36 > .250    
Item Type * Reading Type -.03    .03   -.94 > .250    
Predictability * Reading Type Order -.03 .03 -1.04 > .250    
Item Type * Reading Type Order .12 .07 1.59 .111 
Reading Type * Reading Type Order .00 .05 -.12 > .250    
Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type -.02    .03   -.77 > .250    
Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type 
Order 
-.02 .04 -.67 > .250    
Predictability * Reading Type * Reading Type 
Order 
-.02 .03 -.57 > .250    
Item Type * Reading Type * Reading Type 
Order 
-.09 .03 -2.89 .004 
Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type * 
Reading Type Order 









Table 4. Participants’ RT in Experiments 1, 2, and 3. Table shows means with 95% confidence 
intervals (ms). 
Experiment 1 
 low cloze high cloze  
reading silently 858 (±52) 679 (±41) 
reading aloud 1209 (±68) 987 (±63) 
Experiment 2 
 low cloze high cloze 
reading silently 918 (±29) 868 (±24) 
reading aloud 725 (±30) 604 (±33) 
Experiment 3 
 low cloze high cloze 
reading silently 598 (±18) 489 (±19) 
reading aloud 501 (±22) 320 (±23) 
 
 
Table 5. LME analyses of RT in Experiments 1, 2, and 3. Table shows results for the fixed 
effects structure. 
Experiment 1 
 B SE t 
Intercept 957.70     68.12   14.06 
Predictability 207.21     35.30   5.87 
Reading Type -345.16     72.38   -4.77 
Reading Type Order -4.13     135.48   -.03 
Predictability * Reading Type -62.05     55.73   -1.11 
Predictability * Reading Type Order -29.59     64.47   -.46 
Reading Type * Reading Type Order 335.38     144.78    2.32 
Predictability * Reading Type * Reading Type Order 60.71     111.56    .54 
Experiment 2 
 B SE t 
Intercept 776.68      13.16    59.03 






Reading Type 230.85      25.06     9.21 
Reading Type Order 73.56      26.31     2.80 
Predictability * Reading Type -74.72      29.76    -2.51 
Predictability * Reading Type Order -4.53      33.13    -.14 
Reading Type * Reading Type Order 24.63      50.12     .49 
Predictability * Reading Type * Reading Type Order 50.04      59.52     .84 
Experiment 3 
 B SE t 
Intercept 487.02      25.27   19.28 
Predictability 143.00      27.41    5.22 
Reading Type 126.83      19.84    6.39 
Reading Type Order 9.88       45.16    .22 
Predictability * Reading Type -70.71      20.97   -3.37 
Predictability * Reading Type Order 36.81      30.80    1.19 
Reading Type * Reading Type Order 103.42      39.53    2.62 
Predictability * Reading Type * Reading Type Order -40.37      41.63   -.97 
 
3 EXPERIMENT 2 
While Experiment 1 showed that participants can predict the final word of a sentence, we 
found no evidence that production enhanced the aspect of prediction needed for 
comprehension, as indicated by the lack of an interaction between predictability and reading 
type. 
Experiment 2 investigated whether it enhanced the aspect of prediction needed for production. 
In a spoken go/no-go task, participants read high- and low-cloze contexts either aloud or 
silently, and then read aloud the final word if it was a word, but not otherwise. In this 
experiment, participants’ accuracy reflects their ability to comprehend the final word, as in 
Experiment 1, but the time to articulate the final word reflects the facilitation of their 
production system. If prediction-by-production helps subsequent production, then participants 
should take less time to articulate the final word after reading high- than low-cloze contexts, 








We recruited 32 further participants from the same population and on the same terms as in 
Experiment 1.  
3.1.2 Materials, Procedure, and Design 
The experiment was identical to Experiment 1, except that participants were instructed to read 
the final word out loud if it was a word and not read it otherwise. Responses were recorded for 
3000ms from the onset of the final word, using a microphone positioned in front of the 
participant. 
3.2 Results 
Two trained coders analysed the recordings from the experiment. They identified the trials 
when participants read out the final word and calculated participants’ RT on these trials (i.e., 
time from recording onset until participants started reading the final word). The inter-rater 
reliability between coders for RT (two-way random, consistency ICC = .99; calculated on 
6.25% data) was in the excellent range (Cicchetti, 1994). 
To test whether prediction-by-production affects comprehension, we calculated the likelihood 
of a “word” response (i.e., reading the final word aloud) using a binomial GLMM with 
Predictability, Reading Type, Item Type, and Reading Type Order as fixed effects, by-subjects 
random intercepts and slopes, and by-items random intercepts. We removed correlations 
between random effects to help convergence (see Appendix A for model description). 
We replicated the results of Experiment 1: engaging the production system did not increase 
the effect of prediction on participants’ spoken lexical decisions. As before, there was an effect 
of Predictability, reflecting the fact that participants more often made a “word” response after 
high-cloze contexts, and an effect of Item Type, indicating that participants more often made 






there was no interaction between Predictability and Reading Type, and no further interactions 
involving both of these predictors (Table 3).  
We also found an additional effect of Reading Type, such that participants more often made a 
“word” response after they had read the context sentence aloud than silently, most likely due 
to the fact that after reading the contexts aloud it was easier to carry on and read the final word 
aloud as well, rather than inhibit speech. Moreover, there was a three-way interaction of 
Reading Type Order with Reading Type and Item Type, reflecting the fact that participants 
who read aloud in the first block made a “word” response to a word item slightly less often 
after reading aloud than silently (17% [±2] vs 18% [±1]), but the opposite was true for 
participants who read aloud in the second block silently (17% [±1] vs 16% [±1]). 
To test whether prediction-by-production facilitates subsequent production, we analysed 
participants’ RT on trials where they read aloud the final word (58.13% of the full dataset). 
Prior to the analyses, we excluded outliers (.58% of trials where they read the final word) and 
error trials (i.e., trials where participants read the final word when in fact it was a nonword; 
further 33.60%). Moreover, we removed trials where in reading aloud participants were still 
reading the context after the onset of the final word (further 17.82%). We then ran a maximal-
structure LME model with Predictability, Reading Type and Reading Type Order as fixed 
effects, by-subjects random intercepts and slopes, and by-items random intercepts.  
Unsurprisingly, we found effects of Predictability and Reading Type: participants were faster 
to read the final word after a high-cloze context, and were also faster after they had read the 
context aloud (Table 4). Crucially, however, we found an interaction between these factors: 
the effect of Predictability on reaction times was greater when participants had read the 
sentence contexts aloud (Table 5). That is to say, the effect of prediction on response time was 
greater when using production.11 
                                                   
 






Participants correctly responded to the questions on 85% of trials. Participants were slightly 
more likely to produce a correct response in reading aloud, but the effect of Reading Type did 
not interact with Predictability (Appendix A). 
4 EXPERIMENT 3 
Experiment 2 found that prediction-by-production affected production in a spoken lexical 
decision task. Predictive contexts facilitated participants’ utterances to greater extent if 
participants had read those contexts aloud than otherwise. Experiment 3 aimed to replicate this 
finding in a task that involved the production system, but not lexical judgment. We employed 
a picture naming task that has been previously used to investigate facilitation of the production 
system (cf. Drake & Corley, 2015): participants read high- or low-cloze contexts either aloud 
or silently, and named a picture that appeared as an illustration of the final word. If prediction-
by-production facilitates subsequent production, then participants’ response times should be 
more affected by prediction if they had read the contexts aloud. 
4.1 Methods 
4.1.1 Participants 
We recruited 32 further participants from the same population and on the same terms. 
4.1.2 Design 
In Experiment 3, we employed a 2 (Predictability: high- vs low-cloze) X 2 (Reading Type: 
aloud vs silently) within-subjects design. Participants read high- and low-cloze sentence 
contexts, half of the time aloud, and half of the time silently (Reading Type Order was counter-
balanced between participants). The sentence contexts were followed by a picture and 







Stimuli were 60 high-cloze and 60 low-cloze sentence contexts (length-matched:  = 8.10 
vs   = 7.83; t(118) = -1.17, p = .244), each paired with a picture.
12  Cloze values were 
determined by 24 additional participants, who guessed the final word of 206 different 
sentences. The most frequent continuation was used, on average, by 92% of participants for 
high-cloze contexts, and 16% for low-cloze contexts. Each high-cloze context was paired with 
a picture showing its most frequent continuation, and each low-cloze context with a picture 
showing a possible, but not the most frequent continuation (Table 6). Pictures were nameable 
with a single word, had high name agreement (M = .89) and high name frequency (M = 4.16).  
Each participant saw two lists each comprising 30 high- and 30 low-cloze items. Lists were 
matched for context length (M = 8.08 vs M = 7.85; t(118) = 1.02, p > .250), picture name 
agreement (M = .86 vs M = .91; t(113) = -1.62, p = .108), name frequency (M = 4.20 vs M = 
4.12; t(117) =.88, p > .250), and name length in syllables (M = 1.53 vs M = 1.73; t(111) = -
1.39, p = .165). Item order was randomized within each list for each participant. The order of 
lists was counterbalanced between-participants. Twelve items were followed with a question. 
Pictures and norms for picture name agreement were taken from the Bank of Standardized 
Stimuli (BOSS v.2; Brodeur, Guérard, & Bouras, 2014). Norms for picture name frequency 
and length were taken from SUBTLEX-UK (Van Heuven, Mandera, Keuleers, & Brysbaert, 
2014) 
Table 6. An example of the stimuli used in Experiment 3. 
 context picture 
high-cloze It was windy enough to fly a 
 
low-cloze They went to see the famous 
 
 
                                                   
 







Trials began with a fixation cross, followed by a sentence context presented as in Experiments 
1-2. Each context was followed by a picture and participants were instructed to name it with a 
single word, as fast as possible. Responses were recorded for 3000ms from picture onset by a 
microphone positioned in front of the participant. Trials ended after the timeout of the 
recording (Figure 2) or the question response. 
 
Figure 2. An example of a trial in Experiment 3. 
4.2 Results 
Three trained coders calculated participants’ RT (i.e. time from picture onset until naming 
onset). The inter-rater reliability was excellent (two-way random, consistency ICC = .99; 
calculated on 6.25% data). Prior to the analyses we removed outliers (3.31%), and trials where 
in reading aloud participants were still reading the sentence context after the onset of the 
picture (16.30%). As a result of this, two participants lost most observations in some design 
cells. We excluded their data from further analyses. 
To test whether reading the context aloud enhanced the facilitative effect of prediction, we ran 
a maximal-structure LME model with Predictability, Reading Type, and Reading Type Order 
as fixed effects, by-subjects random intercepts and slopes, and by-items intercepts. We 






and Reading Type (Table 5). Participants named the pictures faster after high-cloze sentence 
contexts, and this effect was larger if they had read the contexts aloud (Table 4).13 
There was also an additional interaction between Reading Type and Reading Type Order, such 
that the effect of reading aloud was greater in participants who read aloud in the second 
(	
  = 397ms [±24],  = 571ms [±21]) than those who read aloud in the first block 
(	
  = 425ms [±23],   = 516ms [±16]). However, this did not further interact with 
predictability. There were no other effects or interactions.  
As in Experiments 1-2, participants almost always responded correctly to the questions (84%). 
However, they gave more correct answers after high- than low-cloze contexts (Appendix A). 
5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Across three experiments, we found evidence that engaging the production system during 
comprehension increases the effects of linguistic prediction. In tasks that involved speaking 
the final word of a sentence (Experiments 2-3), participants spoke sooner if they had read a 
high- than low-cloze sentence, indicating that highly constraining contexts allowed for 
stronger predictions about the sentence-final word. Crucially, this effect was enhanced when 
participants had read the sentence aloud than silently. This suggests that engaging production 
during comprehension helps to predict the next upcoming word in the sentence, and that such 
predictions are useful for subsequent spoken production. However, we did not find evidence 
that predictions generated by the production system aid comprehension, at least when 
comprehension is indexed by lexical decision. In tasks that involved lexical decision 
(Experiments 1-2), participants more often responded that the final word was an existing 
English word after reading high- than low-cloze contexts, but this tendency was not affected 
by the engagement of production. 
                                                   
 







We now interpret our findings in relation to Pickering and Garrod’s (2013) account, and then 
discuss how they might accommodate the differences between Experiment 1 and 2-3. 
Pickering and Garrod (PG) argued that comprehenders use a particular form of prediction-by-
production that they call prediction-by-simulation, which is derived from processes involved 
in language production. When people produce utterances, they learn the relationship between 
their intention (or production command) and linguistic (and non-linguistic) properties of the 
utterance, such as the sounds of the words that they utter. Over time, they can learn to predict 
aspects of their experience of producing an utterance, as soon as they have the intention to 
produce that utterance, using so-called forward models. For example, they might develop the 
intention to say kite, and then rapidly predict that they will experience themselves saying /kaIt/ 
(or perhaps just the initial /k/). When they hear someone else speaking, they covertly imitate 
that person and (making allowances for differences between that person and themselves) use 
their forward models to predict their upcoming experience of what the speaker will say next. 
So if they covertly imitate someone saying It was windy enough to fly a …, they would then 
predict the experience of hearing /kaIt/ (or /k/). 
Any prediction of /kaIt/ will facilitate comprehension or production of that word. Thus our 
evidence that comprehension and production is facilitated in high-cloze contexts is compatible 
with prediction. But our finding that prediction is enhanced by production provides support 
for PG account. Specifically, reading aloud turns covert imitation into overt imitation – 
participants now engage the production system directly, as well as the comprehension system, 
and therefore facilitate the construction of forward models associated with the context.   
PG’s account, however, does not explicitly suggest that prediction-by-production should affect 
production but not comprehension. But of course producing the target word (whether in 
reading it aloud or naming a picture) leads to further activation of the production system, and 
does so while the participant is preparing the act of production – in other words, when 
prediction is likely to be effective. Put another way, production of the sentential context 
activates the forward model under all circumstances, but the forward model is more effective 
in shaping the upcoming act of production rather than the act of comprehension. This is 






recordings) that production of a target word is affected by articulatory movements associated 
with a different highly predicted word. 
We found no evidence of prediction-by-production when the target word was merely 
comprehended (Experiment 1). This did not accord with our hypotheses, and there are two 
possible explanations. One is that the lexical decision task does not sufficiently engage with 
prediction-by-production, perhaps because its focus is on form acceptability rather than 
meaning. Alternatively, prediction-by-production may only be used or used strongly when the 
comprehender is about to speak. This would accord with the possibility that activation of the 
production system during comprehension is partly used to help their subsequent production 
(Scott et al., 2009; Garrod & Pickering, 2015). And it would imply that prediction-by-
production would be particularly effective in dialogue – something which is probably 
necessary given the problem that interlocutors face in taking turns with delays that are 
regularly shorter than the time it takes to prepare even a single word (see Levinson, 2016). 
Finally, we made our task difficult by making the context somewhat hard to read. By doing 
so, we required more top-down processing than might be required under clear conditions. 
Assuming that such top-down processing makes use of the production system, the use of 
adverse conditions might have enhanced any effects. Future work could determine if this is 








Investigating the Role of Automatic 
Temporal Adaptation in Imitation 
Note: This chapter has been published as a paper in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 
[Lelonkiewicz, J. R., & Gambi, C. (in press). Spontaneous adaptation explains why people act 
faster when being imitated. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. doi:10.3758/s13423-016-1141-
3]. 
1 ABSTRACT 
The human ability to perform joint actions is often attributed to high-level cognitive processes. 
For example, the finding that action leaders act faster when imitated by their partners is 
interpreted as evidence for anticipation of other’s actions [Pfister, R., Dignath, D., Hommel, 
B., & Kunde, W. (2013). It takes two to imitate: anticipation and imitation in social interaction. 
Psychological Science, 24, 2117–2121.]. In two experiments, we showed that a low-level 
mechanism can account for this finding. Action leaders were faster when imitated than 
counter-imitated, but only if they could observe their partners’ actions (Experiment 1). 
Crucially, when due to our manipulation partner’s imitative actions became slower than 
counter-imitative actions, leaders also became slower when imitated and faster when counter-
imitated (Experiment 2). Our results suggest that spontaneous temporal adaptation is a key 
mechanism in joint action tasks. We argue for a reconsideration of other phenomena 
traditionally attributed solely to high-level processes. 
2 INTRODUCTION 
When people engage in a joint activity, they tend to closely coordinate their actions. For 
example, a couple enjoying a night stroll on the beach might walk in synchrony, holding hands 






coordination – one that results from shared representations of the desired outcome and the 
actions necessary to achieve it. However, coordination can also emerge spontaneously, 
independent of complex representations and high-level cognitive processes (Knoblich, 
Butterfill, & Sebanz, 2011). For example, the couple on the beach might coordinate their 
footsteps as a result of low-level automatic mechanisms present in both agents. In this paper, 
we focus on one such mechanism, i.e. temporal adaptation. We propose that spontaneous 
temporal adaptation can account for some findings that have previously been taken as evidence 
that agents represent and anticipate each other’s actions. 
A great deal of research supports the notion that agents successfully coordinate their actions 
via high-level processes. For instance, people acting together form and pursue joint goals 
(Loehr & Vesper, 2016), are aware of each other’s focus of attention (Böckler, Knoblich, & 
Sebanz, 2012), mentalize about their co-actors’ perspective (Ryskin, Benjamin, Tullis, & 
Brown-Schmidt, 2015) and beliefs (van der Wel, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2014), and form precise 
representations of each other’s actions (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006) and their 
anticipated outcomes (Pfister, Dolk, Prinz, & Kunde, 2014).  
However, there is also clear evidence that people coordinate by engaging simpler mechanisms. 
Temporal adaptation is a low-level mechanism that is particularly important for interpersonal 
coordination (Konvalinka, Vuust, Roepstorff, & Frith, 2010) and has been shown to often 
occur automatically (Keller, 2008; Mills, van der Steen, Schultz, & Keller, 2015). Many forms 
of human interaction are shaped by the tendency to adapt to each other’s actions. For example, 
musicians playing a duet adjust their subsequent performance to correct for asynchronies 
(Goebl & Palmer, 2009), audiences fall into one clapping rhythm (Neda, Ravasz, Brechte, 
Vicsek, & Barabasi, 2000), interlocutors align on patterns of body sway (Fowler, Richardson, 
Marsh, & Shockley, 2008), and people rocking in rocking chairs spontaneously synchronize 
the frequencies of their movements (Richardson, Marsh, Isenhower, Goodman, & Schmidt, 
2007).  
We believe that adopting a more low-level perspective can inform the efforts to create a 
comprehensive framework of joint action. Importantly, it can help to address the criticisms 
that have been moved against some of the high-level accounts. For instance, mental inferences 






consuming and effortful in terms of cognitive resources, suggesting their widespread use is 
unlikely. Furthermore, it has been argued that some aspects of joint action (e.g., 
synchronization in time) are best explained via low-level mechanisms rather than via common 
coding and other representational theories (Schmidt, Fitzpatrick, Caron, & Mergeche, 2011). 
Most importantly, recent studies suggest that phenomena that have traditionally been 
interpreted in terms of complex high-level processes can in fact be explained by much simpler 
mechanisms (see Dolk et al., 2014 for review). Here we show that the apparent effect of 
anticipation of a co-actor’s action on one’s own action is one such phenomenon. 
Anticipation has been advanced as key for successful coordination between agents (Knoblich 
& Jordan, 2003; Kourtis, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2013). It has been suggested that anticipating 
the sensory consequences of one’s own action can activate the motor programme that normally 
produces this action (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Hommel, 2013). For 
example, in one classic study the button presses of a participant were followed by a light effect 
whose location was either compatible or incompatible with the location of the presses. Actions 
were initiated faster in the compatible effect condition, suggesting that participants anticipated 
the location of the effect and used it as a cue to activate the motor programme for a spatially-
corresponding press (Kunde, 2001). In joint action, anticipating the partner’s response could 
cue the agent to activate the action that typically causes this response (Müller, 2015; Pfister, 
Dolk, Prinz, & Kunde, 2014). Such anticipation could prime the execution of complementary 
movements, ultimately benefiting any activity that requires two people to coordinate their 
actions. 
One striking demonstration of this process comes from a recent study by Pfister, Dignath, 
Hommel and Kunde (2013). In this study, one participant acted as a leader and performed a 
short or long button press in response to a cue on the computer screen. Her partner acted as a 
follower and was instructed to perform either the same (imitation) or the opposite type of press 
(counter-imitation). The study found that the leader initiated her actions faster when she was 
imitated. The authors interpreted this as evidence for anticipation of the follower’s movements, 
in line with the literature on compatibility effects and the ideomotor theory (Hommel et al., 
2001). However, follower's actions were not just compatible in the imitation condition and 






faster in the former than the latter condition. In fact, there is a large body of research showing 
that action execution is facilitated for imitative movements (see Heyes, 2011 for review). 
We propose that a much simpler temporal adaptation mechanism can account for this finding: 
The leader adapted her response speed to the follower’s, i.e., speeding up when her partner 
performed the faster imitative movements and slowing down when he performed the slower 
counter-imitative movements. Although most of the evidence for temporal adaptation comes 
from research on rhythmic, continuous movements (e.g., Repp, 2005; Repp & Su, 2013), some 
studies suggest it can also occur in non-rhythmic, discrete tasks (Jung, Holländer, Müller, & 
Prinz, 2011). We hypothesised temporal adaptation may play a key role in our task, although 
this task has been previously used to investigate high-level processes. 
We investigated this hypothesis in two experiments. In Experiment 1, we cancelled out visual 
and auditory feedback about the followers’ performance. We hypothesised that if the effect in 
leaders’ response times (RT) is due to temporal adaptation, then it should disappear after 
removing the perceptual information about the follower’s behaviour. In Experiment 2, we 
manipulated followers’ responses to elicit a reversed RT pattern, i.e., faster in counter-
imitation, slower in imitation. If leaders accommodate their response speed to this atypical 
pattern this would be strong evidence in favour of the adaptation hypothesis. 
3 EXPERIMENT 1 
3.1 Methods 
We invited 24 previously unacquainted participants (20 female, 4 male; all right-handed) to 
form same-gender pairs. This sample size was chosen based on Pfister et al. (2013). 
Participants were Edinburgh University students with no reported motor disorders and were 
paid £6 for their time. The study was approved by the Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
at Edinburgh University and informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
Participants were randomly assigned the roles of leader and follower and seated across a table. 
In each trial, the leader watched the computer screen change colour from black to either red or 
green, indicating a short (1-150 ms) or long response (200-600 ms). Colour-response mapping 






action and perform the same (compatible; imitation condition) or the opposite type of button 
press (incompatible; counter-imitation condition). After the follower’s response the screen 
turned black for 1000 ms and then the next trial started. The participants were instructed to 
perform their action as quickly as possible. The total duration of a trial was 4000 ms: initial 
black screen (500 ms) + colour cue (2500 ms) + end trial black screen (1000 ms). 
There were 14 practice trials at the beginning of each session to familiarise participants with 
the two press types. After practice, participants completed one imitation and one counter-
imitation block. Then they switched roles and completed two more blocks, so that each person 
completed the task both as leader and as follower. Each block consisted of 120 trials and the 
order of blocks was counter-balanced between pairs. 
In order to remove visual and auditory feedback about the follower’s performance, we placed 
a divider between participants. This set up allowed the follower to see the leader’s hand and 
the button box, while the leader could not see the follower at all (Figure 3). Furthermore, the 
leader wore earplugs, as well as noise cancelling headphones (Sony MDR-NC60). To make 
sure that participants knew what type of response would be performed by their partner in each 
condition, instructions were carefully explained to them at the beginning of the session and 
then repeated before the start of each block (i.e., leaders were told the colour-response 
mapping, informed whether it was an imitation or counter-imitation block, and explained how 
the follower would respond to their actions). At the end of the session, participants were paid 
and debriefed.
 
Figure 3. The set-up of Experiments 1 and 2. The photograph on the left shows Experiment 1: 
The leader is seated on the right-hand side of the divider. The diagonal positioning of the 






see only her own hand. The photograph on the right shows Experiment 2: The participants can 
freely observe each other. 
3.2 Results 
Following Pfister et al. (2013), we discarded the first 24 trials from each block (warm-up 
trials). Prior to the analyses of the leader’s responses, we excluded all trials where the leader 
performed the wrong type of press (3.03%). We also excluded outliers deviating more than 
2.5 SD from each participant’s condition mean (2.02%). For the follower’s analyses, we 
excluded trials where either participant made an error (8.87%) and further trimmed the data 
removing follower’s outliers (1.91%)14. Below we focus on the effect of imitation vs. counter-
imitation overall, and separately for each type of leader’s press; see Appendix B for full 
ANOVA results. 
We replicated the well-established imitation facilitation effect: Followers’ RT were shorter in 
the imitation than in the counter-imitation condition (M = 318 ms vs M = 459 ms; t(23) = 5.79, 
p < .001, 95% CI = [92, 195]; all reported t-tests are two-tailed). To check whether this effect 
was independent of leaders’ response type, we ran follow-up pairwise comparisons for short 
and long leader presses (all subsequent analyses refer to leader’s press type). There was a 
significant difference (Bonferroni: p = .025) between the imitation and counter-imitation 
condition for both long (M = 308 ms vs M = 392 ms; t(23) = 2.82, p = .010, r = .51, 95% CI = 
[24, 154]) and short presses (M = 328 ms vs M = 526 ms; t(23) = 7.64, p < .001, r = .85, 95% 
CI = [148, 258]). This shows that in imitation followers initiated their actions faster, regardless 
of the type of response performed by the leaders.  
Importantly, however, leaders were not faster when they were imitated than when they were 
counter-imitated, suggesting that removing perceptual feedback considerably attenuated any 
influence of partner’s performance (M = 434 ms vs M = 441 ms; t(23) = 1.20, p = .241, r = 
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.24, 95% CI = [-5, 19]) (Figure 4). Follow-up pairwise comparisons showed there was no 
difference between imitation and counter-imitation for long presses (M = 444 ms vs M = 443 
ms; t(23) = -.15, p > .250, r = .03, 95% CI =[-16, 13]). For short presses, the p-value for the 
condition effect was just below the conventional alpha threshold, but not below the threshold 
corrected for multiple comparisons (M = 425 ms vs M = 440 ms; t(23) = 2.10, p = .047, r = 
.40, 95% CI = [0, 29]; Bonferroni: p = .025). 
3.3 Discussion 
Our results suggest that the effect on leaders’ RT reported by Pfister et al. (2013) is not due to 
anticipation. If it were, then we should have observed a reliable difference between the 
conditions even when leaders were unable to observe followers’ actions. There is evidence 
that co-actors seated in separate rooms can represent each other’s actions (Atmaca, Sebanz, & 
Knoblich, 2011; Gambi, Van de Cavey, & Pickering, 2015). Therefore, a strong version of the 
anticipation account would predict that merely knowing whether the partner will respond with 
a compatible or an incompatible action should influence leader’s action execution (Pfister, 
Pfeuffer, & Kunde, 2014). 
However, it is possible that by cancelling perceptual feedback we made it impossible for the 
leader to represent the follower’s response as a consequence of their action. Under a weaker 
version of the anticipation account, leaders integrate the followers’ actions into representations 
of the outcomes of their own actions only if they can directly observe the followers. Therefore, 
in Experiment 2 we reintroduced feedback and manipulated followers’ response speed so that 
they initiated their button presses faster in counter-imitation than in imitation. If the weak 
version of the anticipation account is correct, we would expect leaders to still show an 
imitation facilitation effect. But if leaders simply adapt to the speed with which followers 






4 EXPERIMENT 2 
4.1 Methods 
We recruited 48 further previously unacquainted participants (36 female, 12 male; all right-
handed with no motor disorders; participants formed same-gender pairs). Participants were 
Edinburgh University students and were paid £6. An additional pair of participants was tested, 
but excluded from the study prior to data analysis (one participant from that pair reported to 
be left-handed after completing the task). Ethical approval and participants’ consent were 
obtained as in Experiment 1. 
We used the same set up and stimuli as in Experiment 1, although this time participants could 
see and hear each other, i.e., there was no divider and the leader did not wear earplugs or 
headphones (Figure 3). As previously, we asked followers to observe the leaders and produce 
either the same (imitation) or the opposite (counter-imitation) type of press. In addition, 
followers were now asked to wear headphones (Sony MDR-NC60) and explained that they 
would hear some auditory cues. In the imitation block, followers heard a single tone “GO 
signal” (160 ms, 800 Hz), played 800-1075 ms after the onset of the trial. They were instructed 
to withhold their response until they had heard the tone. In counter-imitation, followers heard 
either a short (80 ms) or a long single tone (240 ms, 800 Hz), played at trial onset. We told 
them that the short tone indicated they would need to perform a short press, and conversely 
the long tone indicated a long press. The followers were instructed to use these cues to prepare 
their response to the upcoming leader’s action. 
The instructions were given to the follower separately so that the leader was unware of the 
purpose of the auditory cues. However, each participant acted in both roles throughout the 
experiment. Half of the participants started as a leader and then swapped roles to perform the 
task again as a follower. Hence, they were unaware of the auditory cue instructions while 
acting as a leader. The other half of participants started as a follower and then carried on to be 
a leader. This group was therefore aware of the follower’s instructions while acting as a leader. 
To accommodate for this new between-participants factor, we increased the sample size as 







Similarly to Experiment 1, warm-up trials, error trials (3.59%) and outliers (2.13%) were 
removed prior to analysing the leader’s responses. Error trials for both participants (18.04%), 
as well as further outliers (1.33%) were excluded for the follower’s analyses.  
With regards to the follower’s behaviour, we successfully reversed the typical RT pattern 
(Figure 4). Followers were now significantly slower in the imitation than in the counter-
imitation condition (M = 654 ms vs M = 298 ms; t(47) = -16.23, p < .001, r = .92, 95% CI = 
[-402, -314]), and pairwise comparisons showed this was the case for both long (M = 533 ms 
vs M = 286 ms; t(47) = -10.45, p < .001, r = .84, 95% CI = [-302, -204]) and short leader 
presses (M = 781 ms vs M = 310 ms; t(47) = -21.06, p < .001, r = .95, 95% CI = [-512, -423]). 
See Appendix B for full ANOVA results. 
Crucially, we observed the same pattern in leader’s RT: Leaders were significantly slower in 
imitation than counter-imitation (M = 470 ms vs M = 450 ms; t(47) = -3.06, p = .004, r = .41, 
95% CI = [-31, -6]) (Figure 4). Again, this difference was significant both for long (M = 481 
ms vs M = 462 ms; t(47) = -2.78, p = .008, r = .38, 95% CI = [-31, -5]) and short presses (M 
= 459 ms vs M = 439 ms; t(47) = -2.87, p = .006, r = .39, 95% CI = [-33, -6]). Furthermore, it 
was not affected by whether leaders were aware of the followers’ instructions. A 2 (Condition: 
imitation vs counter-imitation) X 2 (Leader Press Type: short vs long) X 2 (Leader Awareness: 
aware vs unaware) mixed ANOVA found that the interaction between Condition and Leader 
Awareness was not significant (F(1,46) = 2.90, p = .095, 
  < .01). All other interactions were 
also non-significant (F’s < 1).
 
Figure 4. Mean leaders’ and followers’ response times (RTs) in imitation and counterimitation. 
Error bars represent 95 % confidence intervals. The graph on the left shows results from 
Experiment 1, the graph on the right results from Experiment 2. 
These results may indicate that leaders adapted their response speed to their partners’. To 
further test this, we calculated the mean difference between the imitation and the counter-
imitation condition for each participant acting as follower and leader and then correlated these 
differences within participant pairs. There was a positive correlation between the difference in 
the follower and in the leader within the same pair (r(48) = .36, p = .011), suggesting that 
leaders showed larger differences between conditions when their partners did too. Further 
corroborating our predictions, we found a similar correlation in a separate experiment which 
was a direct replication of Pfister et al. (2013) (r(24) = .53, p = .008; see Appendix B for details 
about the replication experiment). Interestingly, such correlation was not significant in 
Experiment 1, where leaders could not see the followers (r(24) = .04, p > .250).  
Moreover, we investigated whether the leader’s RT on the current trial could be predicted by 
her partner’s RT on the preceding trial. We ran a Linear Mixed-Effect model with by-
participants random intercepts and slopes, and with no correlations between the random effects 
(the maximal structure model did not converge). We specified the follower’s RT on the 
preceding trial as a predictor of leader’s RT on the current trial, and found that the leader’s 
action was faster, the faster her partner’s action on the preceding trial (B = 4.60, t = 2.65). This 
effect was qualified by a significant interaction with condition (B = -8.50, t = -2.53; Figure S2, 
panel b). In counter-imitation, there was a positive relationship (B = 8.91, t = 3.23) indicating 






most likely because followers acted in response to a randomly-timed GO-signal, which 
rendered adaptation not possible. Finally, a significant association between follower’s RT on 
previous trial and leader’s RT on the current trial was also present in our replication of Pfister 
et al. (2013) (B = 7.91, t = 2.14; Figure S2, panel c). To the contrary, there was no such 
association in Experiment 1, indicating that local temporal adaptation was not possible without 
perceptual feedback (B = -1.38, t = -.68; Figure S2, panel a).15 
5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Taken together, our findings demonstrate that spontaneous adaptation of response speed, and 
not high-level anticipation of partners’ actions, is the key mechanism at play in this task. The 
response facilitation in leaders (Pfister et al., 2013) disappeared once we removed auditory 
and visual information about their partners’ behaviour, suggesting that perceptual feedback 
was necessary for the emergence of this effect (Experiment 1). Crucially, we showed that the 
effect in leaders can be reversed by manipulating the followers’ RT pattern (Experiment 2). 
When followers responded faster in counter-imitation than in imitation, leaders were also 
faster in the former than in the latter condition. This occurred despite the fact that followers’ 
responses were still incompatible in counter-imitation and compatible in imitation. 
Therefore, our results are not consistent with the high-level anticipation account. Leaders’ 
behaviour was influenced by the temporal features of the followers’ responses and we found 
no evidence that leaders formed abstract representations of their partners’ actions (i.e., 
represented those actions as being short or long). We propose that our findings are better 
explained by a low-level mechanism of spontaneous temporal adaptation. In support of this, 
the magnitude of the condition difference for the leader was correlated with the magnitude of 
the condition difference for the follower in the same pair only if they could observe each other 
                                                   
 
15 We found a corresponding pattern of results in an additional cross-correlation analysis: 
leader’s RT on the current trial was positively correlated with follower’s RT on the previous 







(i.e., in Experiment 2 and our replication of Pfister et al., but not in Experiment 1). This is in 
line with previous studies, showing that temporal adaptation is contingent on perceptual 
information uptake (Richardson, Marsh, & Schmidt, 2005; Nowicki, Prinz, Grosjean, Repp, 
& Keller, 2013). Moreover, when leaders could observe followers, leaders’ RT on the current 
trial was predicted by the followers’ RT on the preceding trial. This indicates that the 
adaptation occurred locally, on trial-by-trial basis. Similarly, a recent study found that dyads 
engaged in a joint tapping task showed mutual temporal adaptation on a tap-to-tap basis 
(Konvalinka et al., 2010). 
In light of our findings, we argue for a reconsideration of other phenomena traditionally 
explained by appealing solely to high-level processes. There is already evidence that agents 
do not form representations of their partner’s actions when the partner is outside their 
peripersonal space (Guagnano, Rusconi, & Umiltà, 2010), which is consistent with an 
important role for perceptual feedback. More importantly, apparent evidence for action co-
representation (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003) can be obtained when the partner is inactive 
or replaced with an attention-grabbing object (Dolk, Hommel, Prinz, & Liepelt, 2013). Recent, 
more parsimonious accounts of joint action posit that agents do not always need to represent 
and anticipate each other’s actions (Vesper, Butterfill, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2010; Wenke et 
al., 2011). We suggest that low-level mechanisms like temporal adaptation should be 
considered whenever investigating human coordination (cf. Richardson, Campbell, & 
Schmidt, 2009; Vesper & Richardson, 2014).  
Finally, it is important to note that we do not argue that anticipation plays no role in joint 
action. Agents flexibly switch between different coordination processes given the task 
constraints (e.g., Skewes, Skewes, Michael, & Konvalinka, 2015; Vesper, Schmitz, Safra, 
Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2016), and so anticipation of co-actor’s actions may be involved in some 
instances of coordination. Moreover, recent accounts of rhythmic joint action suggest that 
agents anticipate temporal features of their co-actor’s action and that coordination depends 
both on temporal anticipation and adaptation (Keller et al., 2014; Konvalinka et al., 2010; van 
der Steen & Keller, 2013). Future research should aim to uncover the relationship between 
anticipation and adaptation, and further investigate the role of task structure in eliciting 






both the high- and low-level perspective when building and testing theoretical frameworks of 
joint action. Only then will these models offer robust explanations and reflect the rich interplay 
between different mechanisms shaping human coordination. 
Chapter 4 
Investigating the Social Consequences of 
Linguistic Imitation 
Note: This chapter has been modified and submitted for publication as a paper [Lelonkiewicz, 
J. R., Pickering, M. J., & Branigan, H. P. (under review). The benefits of being a conversational 
chameleon: Lexical imitation boosts evaluation of an interaction and encourages cooperation.]. 
1 ABSTRACT 
When in conversation, people imitate various characteristics of each other’s language, 
including the choice of words. This fascinating phenomenon has been explained by appealing 
to automatic priming mechanisms of the language processing system. However, people can 
also imitate motor behaviour and such imitation is motivated by the social gains it brings to 
the imitator: partners who are imitated favorably evaluate the interaction, affiliate with the 
imitator, and show an increased willingness to help and cooperate. In three experiments, we 
investigated whether lexical imitation benefits the imitator in the same way. Pairs of 
participants engaged in a picture naming task. We manipulated whether participants’ choices 
of names for objects were copied or not by their conversational partner. We asked whether 
being lexically imitated led participants to give a positive evaluation of the interaction and 
their partner, and encouraged them to cooperate in a subsequent interaction. Experiments 1 
and 2 investigated these effects in a constrained single-word exchange between participants 
and found that imitated participants evaluated the interaction more favorably than counter-
imitated participants. Experiment 3 involved a version of the task where participants were 
allowed to converse more freely and found that imitated participants showed a greater 
willingness to cooperate in a subsequent Public Goods game. These results suggest that 
imitation of language can bring social gains for the imitator. We interpret this as evidence that 







Imitation is an ability to copy the behaviour of others, and is pervasive in our social 
interactions. Look around you – two colleagues chatting in the corridor lean against the wall 
like reflections of each other, a passer-by talking on the phone is picking up a foreign accent, 
friends over lunch keep using the same words over and over again, and in the hip café around 
the corner everyone looks and talks much alike. While interacting, people tend to copy each 
other’s motor behaviour (e.g., gestures, posture; henceforth, behavioural imitation) and 
language (e.g., word choice, accent; henceforth, linguistic imitation). But why do we imitate? 
One explanation that has been put forward to account for behavioural imitation is that imitation 
fosters social interactions and helps us to bond, therefore serving the goal of affiliating with 
others (Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003). According to this account, being imitated 
induces a feeling of rapport with the imitator and encourages a favorable evaluation of the 
interaction. 
Could linguistic imitation serve the same purpose? If people imitate each other’s language in 
order to affiliate, we would expect linguistic imitation to bring about similar benefits as 
behavioural imitation. In three experiments, we manipulated whether participants’ choices of 
names for objects were copied or not by their conversational partner. We asked whether being 
imitated in this way led participants to give a positive evaluation of the interaction, a positive 
evaluation of their partner, and encouraged them to cooperate in a subsequent interaction. 
2.1 Imitating Language 
People tend to imitate each other from a very early age. New-born babies can already imitate 
a wide range of behaviours, including tongue protrusion, head movements and facial 
expressions (Meltzoff & Moore, 1983; Meltzoff, 2002; Termine & Izard, 1988; cf. Ray & 
Heyes, 2011). Imitation manifests itself in how children learn (Bandura, 1977; Paulus, 2014), 
and in daily interactions with adults and peers (Meltzoff & Williamson, 2013). Importantly, 
the tendency to copy others remains pervasive throughout the lifespan. For example, adults 
imitate the body posture (LaFrance, 1982; Tia, Saimpont, Paizis, Mourey, & Fadiga, 2011), 
handshake angle and speed (Bailenson & Yee 2007), mannerisms (Chartrand & Bargh 1999; 






interaction partners (Bavelas, Black, Lemery, & Mullett, 1986; Dimberg, Thunberg, & 
Elmehed, 2000). 
In this paper we focus on the tendency to imitate language. In conversation, people 
spontaneously imitate various characteristics of each other’s language, including speech rate 
(Webb, 1969), timing and duration of pauses (Cappella & Planalp, 1981), tone of voice (Smith-
Genthôs, Reich, Lakin, & de Calvo, 2015), voice pitch (Gregory & Webster, 1996), 
pronunciation (Pardo, 2006), and accent (Giles, Coupland, & Coupland 1991). Moreover, 
psycholinguistic experiments have shown that interlocutors imitate each other’s sentence 
structure. For example, Branigan, Pickering, and Cleland (2000) found that participants 
spontaneously reproduced the grammatical structure that their partner had previously used in 
speech. Importantly, participants did so even though there was an alternative structure they 
could have used without affecting the meaning of their utterance. Similar results have been 
obtained when participants responded to a recording of somebody speaking (Bock, Dell, 
Chang, & Onishi, 2007) or to a written chat message (Hartsuiker, Bernolet, Schoonbaert, 
Speybroeck, & Vanderelst, 2008).  
But perhaps the most striking example of linguistic imitation comes from studies showing that 
people imitate each other’s word choice. For instance, Garrod and Anderson (1987) found that 
participants converged on the same words to name objects, while Brennan and Clark (1996) 
observed that participants consistently used the names they had previously converged on also 
in subsequent conversations with the same partner. Interestingly, people imitate their partner’s 
lexical choice across different circumstances, and even if it requires them to use a word that 
would not normally use. In another study, Branigan, Pickering, Pearson, McLean, and Brown 
(2011) showed that participants imitated their interlocutor both if they had used a strongly 
favored (e.g., bus) or a strongly disfavored name for a picture (e.g., coach). Moreover, this 
effect occurred for spoken and text-based interactions, and regardless of whether the partner 
was a human or a computer. The tendency to imitate a partner’s word choice is found in 
children’s as well as adults’ conversations (Branigan et al., 2016; Garrod & Clark, 1993). 
Researchers in the psychology of language have argued that the tendency to converge, or align, 
on language has a foundation in automatic priming processes that affect the accessibility of 






Importantly, this tendency is mediated by speakers’ beliefs about the partner. Thus, 
interlocutors have a general tendency to align on language, but they are even more likely to do 
so under certain conditions. For example, people imitate their partner more often if they 
perceive the partner to have low communicative competence (Branigan et al., 2011). Similarly, 
there is some evidence that interlocutors engage in more syntactic imitation when interacting 
with a likable conversational partner (Balcetis & Dale, 2005; Lev-Ari, 2015), or a partner who 
speaks with an accent perceived to be standard in a given speaker’s community (Weatherholtz, 
Campbell-Kibler, & Jaeger, 2014).  
There are different explanations for how beliefs might mediate the tendency to align on 
language. With regard to lexical alignment, it has been proposed that interlocutors pursue the 
goal of achieving communicative success, and that their beliefs about the partner serve as cues 
to select an utterance that is most likely to be understood. On this view, people engage in more 
imitation if they believe that it will help them achieve a shared representation of the situation 
with their partner (Branigan, Pickering, Pearson, & McLean, 2010). However, this explanation 
focuses on the role of the language processing system, and does not consider that linguistic 
imitation might have an impact on social interactions in which it occurs. 
2.2 Social Consequences of Imitation 
There is a long-standing hypothesis that imitation is linked to the ability to empathise and 
affiliate with others (Bavelas, Black, Lemery, & Mullett, 1987). Early evidence from 
correlational and field studies suggested a link between behavioural imitation and the level of 
affiliation and rapport with the interaction partner (see Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009 for 
review). For example, Charney (1966) observed that an increase in postural similarity between 
a psychotherapist and a client was correlated with an increase in rapport. Similarly, La France 
(1979) found that students reported greater rapport when interacting with a teacher who 
imitated them. 
More recently, experiments in social psychology have confirmed that behavioural imitation 
brings about positive consequences for the imitator (see Chartrand & Lakin, 2013). In 
Chartrand and Bargh (1999), participants interacted with a confederate who either imitated 






evaluated the confederate as more likable and the interaction as more smooth as compared to 
the participants that were not imitated. Numerous studies have shown similar results when 
imitation was performed by a confederate (Kouzakova, Karremans, van Baaren, & van 
Knippenberg, 2010a; Kouzakova, van Baaren, & van Knippenberg, 2010b; Sanchez-Burks, 
Bartel, & Blount, 2009; Stel, Rispens, Leliveld, & Lokhorst, 2011), but also when it was 
carried out by another participant (Stel & Vonk, 2010), a virtual agent (Bailenson & Yee, 
2005; Hasler, Hirschberger, Shani-Sherman, & Friedman, 2014; Verberne, Ham, Ponnada, & 
Midden, 2013) or a robot (Bailenson & Yee, 2007). 
Moreover, behavioural imitation encourages the imitated person to be helpful and to cooperate 
with others. Van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, and van Knippenberg (2004) found that 
participants were more likely to spontaneously help a confederate pick up pens from the floor 
if she imitated their body posture beforehand. Furthermore, they were more willing to help a 
stranger and donated more money to a charity than those who were not imitated. Similarly, 
imitated participants were more likely to respond to requests for help (Guéguen, Martin, & 
Meineri, 2011), and preschool children more often helped (Carpenter, Uebel, & Tomasello, 
2013) and trusted (Over, Carpenter, Spears, & Gattis, 2013) an experimenter who imitated 
them.  
2.3 Does Linguistic Imitation Benefit the Imitator? 
In this paper, we ask whether linguistic imitation can bring about similar benefits as 
behavioural imitation. Crucially, there is already some evidence that imitation of language has 
a positive effect on social interactions. For example, imitating the accent of an unfamiliar 
speaker leads to a more positive evaluation of this speaker (Adank, Stewart, Connell, & Wood, 
2013; Adank, 2015). In addition, correlational studies suggest that high language style 
matching between interlocutors is related to relationship stability (Ireland & Pennebaker, 
2010), high group cohesiveness (Gonzales, Hancock, & Pennebaker, 2010), and a more 
favorable evaluation of the conversational partner (Manson, Bryant, Gervais, & Kline, 2013), 
whereas the degree of phonetic convergence is related to self-reported closeness between 






Furthermore, copying the language of others can also have direct positive consequences for 
the imitator. In one study, a waitress received larger tips when she repeated her customer’s 
order as opposed to simply acknowledging it (van Baaren, Holland, Steenaert, van 
Knippenberg, 2003). Similarly, participants who were instructed to imitate the language of 
their partners obtained higher individual gains in a negotiation task than those in a control 
group (Swaab, Maddux, & Sinaceur, 2011). Further evidence from field studies showed that 
passers-by approached on a street were more likely to help a confederate who verbally imitated 
them than a confederate who was responsive but did not imitate (Fischer-Lokou, Martin, 
Gueguen, & Lamy, 2011; Müller, Maaskant, van Baaren, & Dijksterhuis, 2012).  
2.4 Why Do We Imitate Each Other? The Affiliative Goal Hypothesis 
Early findings showing the benefits of imitation have been interpreted as evidence that people 
engage in imitation to satisfy the goal to affiliate with others (Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & 
Chartrand, 2003). As social animals, humans have a strong need to seek positive relations with 
others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) and to maintain an optimal level of social belongingness 
(Brewer, 1991). Imitation has been advanced as an evolutionary adaptive behaviour that serves 
this need by smoothening interactions, promoting prosocial actions, and fostering bonds 
between people. According to this account, humans imitate others because it helps them to 
form and maintain positive social relationships (Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009; Kouzakova, 
van Baaren, & van Knippenberg, 2010b; Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003; Over & 
Carpenter, 2013; Yabar, Johnston, Miles, & Peace, 2006). 
To this date, evidence for this claim comes predominantly from research in social psychology 
and concerns behavioural imitation. Psycholinguistic studies investigating the affiliative goal 
hypothesis are scarce. Moreover, much of the work on linguistic imitation used paradigms that 
did not allow causal inferences. This poses difficulty for the interpretation of some of the 
relevant findings. For example, in one study participants who used similar language more often 
cooperated with each other in a coordination game (Scissors, Gill, & Gergle, 2008). However, 
this association was correlational and so we do not know whether cooperation was caused by 
imitation or vice versa. For the same reason, other correlational studies should be interpreted 






The hypothesis that linguistic imitation benefits the imitator has also been investigated using 
experimental manipulations. However, these experiments did not allow conclusions to be 
drawn about the exact locus of any effects. For example, in one of the studies that found being 
imitated encourages helping behaviour, a confederate was instructed to imitate both the 
language and the motor behaviour of passers-by or to refrain from imitating (Müller et al., 
2012). Importantly, we cannot be certain which type of imitation (or both) led to helping 
behaviour. Other studies manipulated specifically imitation of language, but the instructions 
for the imitator did not specify what aspect of language to imitate, or how often imitation 
should be performed. Such studies remain inconclusive with regards to whether the observed 
effects are driven by imitation of all or some aspects of language (e.g., Fischer-Lokou et al., 
2011; Swaab et al., 2011; cf. Scissors, Gill, Geraghty, & Gergle, 2009). 
2.5 Research Overview 
To our knowledge, there are no controlled experiments that demonstrate unambiguously that 
linguistic imitation fosters social interaction, cooperation, and bonding in the same way as 
behavioural imitation. In this paper, we present three studies that set out to bridge this gap. 
Combining methods used in psycholinguistics and social psychology, we created a novel 
experimental paradigm that allowed us to investigate the effects of linguistic imitation in a 
carefully controlled manner. We used a between-participants design to examine how being 
linguistically imitated versus not being linguistically imitated (henceforth, counter-imitated) 
by a conversational partner affected participants’ judgments of the quality of an interaction, 
their perceptions of their partner, and their cooperative behaviour in subsequent interactions 
with the partner. 
In contrast to much previous work that investigated the effects of imitating several different 
aspects of language at once, we focused on the interlocutor’s lexical choice. We manipulated 
this aspect because the choice between alternative words is salient for the interlocutors and 
therefore lexical imitation may be particularly likely to affect social-affective mechanisms, 
and because of the extensive psycholinguistic literature on lexical imitation (e.g., Brennan & 






previous studies that used paradigms involving a confederate or a participant who was 
instructed to imitate (see Kuhlen & Brennan, 2013, for a critique of confederate studies).  
In the experiments, pairs of naïve participants engaged in a computerized picture-naming task. 
Participants alternated naming a picture for their partner (e.g., mitten, where the partner had to 
choose between a mitten and a butterfly), and responding to their partner naming a picture 
(e.g., by matching a picture to the name provided by the partner). On some trials, their partner 
named a picture that the participant had already named on a previous turn. Crucially, the 
partner’s responses on these trials were manipulated by a computer so that the partner appeared 
to imitate or counter-imitate their partner’s earlier word choice. For participants in the 
imitation group, their partner appeared to use the same name as the participant used previously 
(e.g., mitten). But for participants in the counter-imitation group, their partner appeared to use 
a different (though appropriate) name for the picture (e.g., glove). Having completed the 
naming task, participants filled out a questionnaire evaluating the interaction and their partner. 
Finally, they played a short decision-making game to measure their willingness to cooperate 
with each other in subsequent interactions.  
If people engage in linguistic imitation in order to foster their relationships with others, we 
would expect clear social benefits to arise for the imitator as a result of imitating their 
interlocutor’s word choice. In accord with previous research and the affiliative goal account, 
we expected lexical imitation to affect both the participants’ self-reported evaluation of the 
interaction and the partner, and their behaviour in a subsequent unrelated interaction with the 
same partner. We predicted that participants who had been imitated should evaluate the 
interaction and their partner more positively than participants who had been counter-imitated. 
Furthermore, we expected that participants who had been imitated would show a greater 
willingness to cooperate with their partner in a subsequent decision-making game that had 
consequences for their earnings from the experiment. 
3 EXPERIMENT 1 
Experiment 1 investigated these predictions in a constrained context of single-word text 
exchanges. We used a computerized paradigm that allowed us to introduce our manipulation 






consistent across participants. Thus, it allowed us to focus precisely on the effects of imitating 
a lexical choice. 
Pairs of participants engaged in a picture naming task where they took turns typing a name for 
a picture into the computer screen, and matching a picture to a name. Participants were led to 
believe that they interacted with each other, but in fact their partner’s responses were generated 
by a computer program that made it seem that their partner either consistently imitated or 
consistently counter-imitated the participant’s previous lexical choice for the picture.  
Next, the participant evaluated the smoothness of the interaction and the likability of the 
partner. Finally, we recorded whether the participant made a cooperative or individualistic 
decision in a one-shot Stag Hunt game (Skyrms, 2004). Stag Hunt is a coordination game used 
in experimental economics to investigate factors that influence human decision-making and 
cooperation (Devetag & Ortmann, 2007; Rankin, Van Huyck, & Battalio, 2000). In a typical 
Stag Hunt, two players choose between making an individualistic decision that results in a low 
but certain gain for the individual (i.e., hunt for a hare), and a cooperative decision that might 
bring a high gain for both individuals, but only if both players decide to cooperate (i.e., hunt 
for a stag). Crucially, participants’ behaviour in Stag Hunt and other coordination games can 
be affected by social factors (e.g., Balliet, Wu, & Dreu, 2014). Coordination games have been 
previously used to measure cooperative behaviour in imitation research, although results are 
not always consistent (Manson et al., 2013; Scissors et al., 2008, 2009; Verberne et al., 2013). 
In Experiment 1, we predicted that the participants who were imitated would more often make 
a cooperative decision in the Stag Hunt game than those who were counter-imitated. We also 
expected imitated participants to evaluate their partner as more likable and their interaction 
with the other person as more smooth than counter-imitated participants. 
3.1 Methods 
3.1.1 Participants 
We recruited 48 (10 male, 38 female) native speakers of British English to take part in the 






a minimum payment of £5. Participants were all current or recent students at the university. 
We asked participants to sign up for a session with another previously unacquainted person 
and to form same-gender pairs. 
3.1.2 Materials 
For the picture naming task, we used pictures from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) set. 
All pictures depicted objects that could be named using a single word in British English. We 
selected 17 target pictures with two balanced names, such that the frequency with which each 
name was used for the picture was between 30% and 55% (e.g., mitten/glove). Name 
frequencies for 8 of these pictures were obtained from Barry, Morrison, and Ellis (1997). We 
conducted a pretest to obtain name frequencies for the other 9 target pictures. In our pretest, 
48 further native British English speakers provided names for twenty pictures from Snodgrass 
and Vanderwart. The pictures were printed on two sheets and handed to the participants 
individually. Participants were asked to name the pictures by writing a single word below each 
picture. We also selected 118 distractor pictures that had one dominant name which was used 
more than 80% of the time (e.g., apple). The distractors were selected based on the name 
agreement norms from Barry et al.  
We constructed 34 experimental items consisting of a target picture and a distractor, as well 
as 42 filler items consisting of two distractor pictures (34 fillers were used in the main task 
and 8 fillers were used in a practice session). During the picture naming task, each target 
picture appeared twice and each distractor picture appeared once. The picture naming task was 
implemented using OpenSesame 3.0 (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012). 
3.1.3 Procedure 
Participants came to the lab in pairs. They were greeted by the experimenter, taken into a room 
together, and given consent forms. The consent forms stated that participants would receive at 
least £5 for completing the study, with a possibility of obtaining an additional monetary reward 
if they choose to engage in a “bonus round” and play the Stag Hunt game. Next, the 
experimenter introduced himself briefly by mentioning his name and degree program, and 






name, degree, and year of studies. The purpose of this brief spoken introduction was to provide 
a minimal social context for the following interaction. After the introduction, participants were 
led to separate rooms where they remained until the end of the study.  
Participants sat in front of a computer screen and read the instructions for the picture naming 
task. The instructions explained they would take turns naming pictures and matching pictures 
to a name and that they would perform the task together with the other person over the network 
connection. Participants were instructed to name each picture with a single word. When the 
participants were ready to start, the experimenter closed the doors and the task began.  
The task consisted of 34 experimental and 34 filler trials, organised in a sequence where there 
were two filler trials between each experimental trial (e.g., [1] experimental trial, naming turn; 
[2] filler, matching turn; [3] filler, naming turn; [4] experimental trial, matching turn, etc.). On 
each trial, two pictures appeared on the screen. If it was a naming turn, participant saw a 
message asking them to name either the left or the right picture, and a text box appeared at the 
bottom of the screen. The participant typed the name for the indicated picture into the text box. 
If it was a matching turn, a name for one of the pictures appeared below the pictures, and the 
participant saw a message asking them to use the arrow keys to select the picture that matched 
the name. At the end of each trial they saw a feedback message indicating whether the correct 
picture had been selected.  
Participants were told that the name that they provided on a naming turn was sent to their 
partner in the other room. Similarly, they were told that the name that appeared below the 
pictures on the matching turn was provided by their partner. Thus, they were led to believe 
that they were carrying out the task interactively with their partner. In fact, there was no 
network connection between the two rooms and participants interacted with a preprogramed 
computer script. The response time on the partner’s matching turn varied between 3500 and 
4500ms and on the naming turn varied between 5000 and 6000ms (i.e., to make it appear that 
the responses were produced by the partner).  
Both participants in a pair were randomly assigned to either the imitation or counter-imitation 
condition. The experimenter was blind to condition during the session. In the imitation 






when it first appeared on participant’s naming turn (e.g., mitten). Then, when the target picture 
reappeared on a matching turn, the computer displayed this name (mitten). It therefore seemed 
as though the partner was responding with the same name. Importantly, the computer 
displayed the name as it had been spelled by the participant. Therefore, it also seemed that the 
partner used the same spelling as the participant. 
In the counter-imitation condition, the computer recorded the name entered by the participant 
and compared it with the names for the target picture stored in its memory. For each target 
picture, it stored two words that had been identified in the pre-test as alternative names for this 
picture (e.g., mitten/glove). The computer first checked if the name entered by the participant 
matched the word that had been identified in the pre-test as the more frequent of the alternative 
names (e.g., mitten). If it matched, then the computer displayed the other name as the partner’s 
response (e.g., glove). If it did not match, then the computer displayed the more frequent 
name.16 It therefore seemed as though the partner was responding with a different (though 
appropriate) name than the one previously used by the participant (Figure 5). The picture 
naming task was preceded by a practice session of 8 filler items. The task took approximately 
30 minutes. 
                                                   
 
16 Note that our manipulation was sensitive to the spelling of the word entered by the 
participant. For example, the faithful copying of the participant’s spelling in the imitation 
condition could lead the participant to believe that their partner was copying their accidental 
mistakes (e.g., miten instead of mitten). Furthermore, in the counter-imitation condition an 
unusual spelling (e.g., miten) could render it impossible for the computer to correctly identify 
the name used by the participant as an instance of the more frequent of the two names for the 
target picture (e.g., mitten). In such cases, the computer would display the more frequent name, 
effectively imitating the participant’s lexical choice. But crucially, spelling mistakes occurred 







Figure 5. Experiment 1: An example of the experimental procedure in the counter-imitation 
condition. 
After completing this task, participants saw a message asking them to fill out an anonymous 
questionnaire regarding their participation in the experiment. There were ten items in the 
questionnaire, two of which were the critical items that demonstrated effects of behavioural 
imitation in Chartrand and Bargh (1999). The critical items asked about the smoothness of the 
interaction (“How smoothly would you say your interaction went with the other participant?”) 
and the likability of the partner (“How likable was the other participant?”). As in Chartrand 
and Bargh, the remaining eight items were fillers asking about various aspects of the 
experiment (e.g., “How well did the network connection work?”; see Appendix C for a full list 
of items). All items were measured on a 1-9 Likert scale with anchors for the low and the high 
end (e.g., “extremely awkward” vs “extremely smooth”, “extremely dislikeable” vs “extremely 
likable”). Participants were instructed to fold the filled questionnaire and place it in a 
cardboard box nearby. 
Next, participants saw another message inviting them to play the Stag Hunt game together 
with their partner. They were reminded that it constituted an additional part of the study that 
could earn them some extra money. If they agreed, the participants would proceed to read the 
instructions for the game. The rules for the game were as follows. The participant and their 
partner were hunters in the forest and there were two types of animals they could shoot. A hare 
was worth £1 and if they chose to hunt it they were guaranteed to get the reward. A stag was 






would split the reward so that each received £2. However, in the event that one hunter decided 
to shoot the stag, but the other went for the hare, the first hunter would fail to hunt down the 
stag and get no reward, while the other one would still get £1 for the hare. Each hunter could 
shoot only once. Participants signalled their choice by typing “stag” or “hare” into a text box 
on the screen, and the game then ended. The questionnaire and the Stag Hunt game took about 
5 minutes each. 
At the end of the study, participants wrote their answers to three final questions, asking about 
the goals of the study (“What do you think was the purpose of the experiment?”) and probing 
what they noticed about their partner’s behaviour (“What happened during the 
naming/matching game?” and “Do you have any other comments regarding the experiment?”). 
Finally, they were all paid £7, thanked, and debriefed. Overall, the experimental session lasted 
approximately 45 minutes. 
3.2 Results 
The responses to the final questions indicated that one participant suspected their partner was 
in fact a disguised computer program. The data from this participant were excluded from 
further analyses. Moreover, 62% of participants in the remaining sample reported noticing that 
they were imitated/counter-imitated during the picture-naming task. The number of 
participants who noticed being imitated/counter-imitated was not significantly different 
between conditions (54% in imitation, 70% in counter-imitation; (1, 47) = .62, p > .250). 
We compared the evaluations produced by participants in the imitation and counter-imitation 
condition for the two critical items from the questionnaire (i.e., asking about the smoothness 
of the interaction, and partner’s likability). We treated the evaluations as being measured at an 
ordinal level. We carried out an ordinal regression with the evaluation of the interaction as the 
dependent variable, and condition (imitation vs counter-imitation) and noticing (participant 
noticed vs not noticed being imitated/counter-imitated) as predictors.  
Consistent with our predictions, participants evaluated the interaction as more smooth in the 
imitation than in the counter-imitation condition (β = 2.44, t = 2.48, p = .013). There were no 






.48, t = .58, p > .250; and no interaction between this predictor and condition: β = -1.79, t = -
1.50, p = .133). 
We carried out a similar ordinal regression model on the evaluations of partner’s likability. 
However, we found no significant difference in the evaluations of partner’s likability between 
conditions (β = .55, t = .63, p > .250) (Figure 6). In addition, there were no effects of whether 
participants noticed being imitated/counter-imitated (no simple effect: β = -.71, t = -.84, p > 
.250; and no interaction: β = -.09, t = -.08, p > .250).
 
Figure 6. Experiment 1: Histograms showing the spread of ratings produced by the 
participants. The graph on the left shows the data for the item measuring the smoothness of 
the interaction, the graph on the right for the item measuring the partner’s likability. 
Next, we looked at participants’ responses in the Stag Hunt game in order to investigate 
participants’ willingness to cooperate. We observed a high rate of missing data in both the 
imitation and counter-imitation conditions (7 and 6 missing observations, out of 24 in each 
condition). This may have occurred because the Stag Hunt game was framed as an additional 
task and so some participants chose not to engage in it. The remaining data were analysed 
using a Fisher’s exact test. We compared the frequency of each decision (stag/hare) between 
conditions. Numerically, more people chose to cooperate with the other person in the imitation 
condition (14 stag, 3 hare) than in the counter-imitation condition (11 stag, 6 hare). However, 






decision between the participants who noticed versus not noticed being imitated/counter-
imitated. More people chose to cooperate in the group that noticed (18 stag, 2 hare) than in the 
group that did not notice being imitated/counter-imitated (7 stag, 7 hare; p = .017). 
3.3 Discussion 
Experiment 1 provided some evidence that lexical imitation fosters social interactions between 
people. In line with one of our predictions, we found that participants who were lexically 
imitated evaluated their interaction with the other person as more smooth as compared to those 
who were counter-imitated. However, we found no effect of imitation on the evaluation of 
partner’s likability, or on the participants’ choice of a cooperative response in the Stag Hunt 
game.  
The conclusions that can be drawn from Experiment 1 are limited in important respects. First, 
the evaluations of the interaction and the partner were obtained by single-item measurement, 
following some previous studies on imitation (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Kouzakova et 
al. 2010a, 2010b). However, using single-item measures can have a negative impact on 
measurement reliability and lead to both type I and type II errors (Credé, Harms, Niehorster, 
& Gaye-Valentine, 2012). In Experiment 2, we therefore carried out the same 
imitation/counter-imitation manipulation using the same picture-naming and -matching task 
as in Experiment 1, but introduced a new multi-item questionnaire as a measure of participants’ 
evaluations of the interaction and the partner.  
Second, in Experiment 1 participants were briefly introduced to each other at the beginning of 
the session so there would have been variability in their impressions of their partner (i.e., some 
participants could have liked their partner more than others before engaging in picture naming 
task). Impressions about partner’s warmth and likeability form very early in interactions (e.g., 
Asch 1946; Willis & Todorov, 2006). Furthermore, implicit impressions about others are 
difficult to undo (see Mann & Ferguson, 2015). This might have led to the lack of an effect of 
the experimental manipulation on the evaluation of partner’s likeability, in contrast to its effect 






participants with the same type of information about their partner and, crucially, participants 
did not interact at the beginning of the experimental session (although they saw each other). 
Finally, in Experiment 2 we replaced the one-shot Stag Hunt game with a repeated Public 
Goods Game (PGG). PGG is widely used in research on human cooperation (Camerer, 2003; 
Rand, & Nowak, 2013), because it closely reflects the dynamics of everyday human 
interactions (Hardin, 1968; Rand, Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2009). Typically, 
PGG involves two or more players who on each turn decide how many credits to invest into a 
common pool. High payoff can be achieved by either cooperating with the other player (both 
players contribute to the pool) or by defaulting on the other player (keeping one’s credits, 
while the other player contributes). Thus, PGG allowed us to measure the participants’ 
willingness to cooperate with their partner on a continuous scale, with multiple observations. 
In addition, the instructions in Experiment 2 did not treat the PGG as an optional task, in order 
to reduce or eliminate missing data. 
4 EXPERIMENT 2 
In Experiment 2, we replaced the spoken introduction with a computer message that contained 
information about the other participant. Then, participants engaged in the same picture-naming 
task as in Experiment 1, during which the computer either imitated or counter-imitated their 
lexical choices. After the task, participants filled out two questionnaires: the short 
questionnaire from Experiment 1, and a new questionnaire that contained multiple items 
asking for an evaluation of the interaction and the partner. 
Next, participants played six turns of a Public Goods Game. We chose to keep the participants 
blind regarding the outcome of each turn to prevent their behaviour being affected by the 
outcome of the previous turn (e.g., Engelmann & Fischbacher, 2009), rather than reflecting 
the willingness to cooperate caused by imitation or counter-imitation in the picture-naming 
task. Blind set-ups have been shown to yield similar results to standard information set-ups 
(Burton-Chellew & West, 2013). 
In Experiment 2, we predicted that participants in the imitation group would provide more 






group. Additionally, we predicted that they would exhibit more cooperative behaviour in the 
PGG (by contributing more to the common pool). 
4.1 Methods 
4.1.1 Participants 
We recruited 64 (20 male, 44 female) further native English speakers (46 British English). 
Participants were recruited from the same population as in Experiment 1 and agreed to take 
part on a voluntary basis. Similarly to Experiment 1, participants were asked to sign-up with 
another previously unacquainted person of the same gender.  
4.1.2 Materials 
The materials in the picture naming task were the same as in Experiment 1. To measure the 
evaluations of the interaction and the partner, we used the short questionnaire from Experiment 
1. In addition, we introduced a new questionnaire to access the participants’ evaluations using 
multiple items. It consisted of 6 items developed to evaluate the interaction and 11 items taken 
from the Reysen Likability Scale (RLS). The RLS was designed specifically to measure liking 
of the other person and has good psychometric characteristics (Reysen, 2005). The RLS items 
and items measuring the evaluation of the interaction were intermixed. All items were 
measured on a 1-9 Likert scale with anchors for the low and the high end (“very strongly 
disagree” vs “very strongly agree”). The full list of items can be found in Appendix C. 
4.1.3 Procedure 
Two participants were scheduled for each session. Participants were met by the experimenter 
at two distinct locations so that they did not interact before the beginning of the session. They 
were then led to the lab together. During this time, they listened to the experimenter telling 
them about the facilities in the lab and did not talk with each other. On arrival, participants 
were seated in front of a computer screen in separate rooms and signed the consent forms 






participants would play a decision game and that they might earn between £1-4 as a result of 
the game. 
Participants answered demographic questions by typing their responses into the computer and 
then saw a message about the partner they would be interacting with. The message contained 
the same type of information that the participant gave in response to the demographic questions 
(i.e., the other person’s name, gender, dialect, year and course of studies). Next, participants 
engaged in the picture naming task from Experiment 1. After the task, they saw a message 
asking to fill out a questionnaire about their participation in the study. First they answered the 
short questionnaire from Experiment 1, followed by the new multi-item questionnaire asking 
about the partner and the interaction. The questionnaires were computerized and the answers 
were saved automatically after completion. 
Participants then read the instructions for the Public Goods game. The instructions explained 
they would play several turns of an investment game together with the other person. 
Participants were not told how many turns there would be. On each turn, each player would 
be given 40 credits that they could invest into a common pool. The amount in the pool would 
be multiplied by some factor and then divided between the two players at the end of the turn. 
The instructions did not specify the size of the multiplication factor. The payoff from each turn 
consisted of the earnings from the pool plus the credits the participant decided to keep. The 
participants were told that each credit was worth 5p and at the end of the game the payoff from 
one turn would be picked at random and paid to them. In order to make sure that the 
participants considered different outcomes, they were asked to spend some time thinking about 
the possible decisions and their outcomes before starting the game. 
Participants played six turns of the game. The multiplication factor varied between turns. For 
turn one, we used a factor of 1.9. The factors for the remaining five turns were: 1.5, 1.7, 1.9, 
2.1, 2.3, presented in a randomised order.17 We used a fixed factor on turn one, but randomised 
                                                   
 
17 Each participant in a pair had a different order of the multiplication factors. Each of these 






the order of the factors on turns two to six, so that we could analyse turn one on its own and 
also analyse all six turns together. We did so in case the effect of the imitation/counter-
imitation manipulation would turn out to be highly transient. On each turn, the multiplication 
factor was shown on top of the screen and a text box appeared below. Participants typed the 
number of credits they wished to invest into the text box. After they had done so, the next turn 
started. Participants were not informed about the outcome of a turn. Moreover, they were not 
informed about their payoff from the game until the end of the experiment. After the PGG, 
participants answered the same three final questions as in Experiment 1. They were then 
thanked, debriefed, and paid £4 (regardless of their decisions in the PGG). 
4.2 Results 
We excluded four participants who reported suspecting that the partner’s responses in the 
picture naming task were generated by a computer program. In addition, 52% of the remaining 
participants reported they were imitated or counter-imitated during the picture naming task. 
The number of participants who reported being imitated/counter-imitated did not significantly 
differ between conditions (42% in imitation, 59% in counter-imitation; (1, 60) = 1.02, p > 
.250). 
In order to obtain composite measures of the evaluation of the interaction and the partner, we 
first subjected all items from the new questionnaire (17 items) and the likability and 
smoothness items from the old questionnaire (2 items) to a confirmatory Principal Component 
Analysis (with varimax rotation). We extracted two components that together accounted for 
63% of variance. Next, we dropped two items with very similar loadings on both components 
(<.10 difference). Such items do not introduce any distinctive information to the component 
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scores and it is a common practice to exclude them (e.g., Mõttus et al., 2012). The remaining 
seventeen items had high component loadings (>.50). 
Table 7 





This interaction was satisfying  0.51 0.62 0.64 
This interaction was pleasant  0.53 0.72 0.80 
I would rate the level of rapport we had as 
high 
 0.29 0.78 0.70 
This interaction made me feel at ease  0.23 0.78 0.66 
How smoothly would you say your 
interaction went with the other participant 
-0.03 0.79 0.63 
I would ask this person for advice  0.73 0.07 0.54 
This person is knowledgeable  0.65 0.09 0.43 
This person is warm  0.80 0.37 0.77 
This person is likeable  0.81 0.38 0.80 
This person is approachable  0.59 0.45 0.55 
I would like this person as a coworker  0.75 0.34 0.69 
I would like this person as a flatmate  0.79 0.17 0.65 
This person is friendly  0.80 0.36 0.77 
I would like to be friends with this person  0.79 0.35 0.75 
This person is physically attractive  0.54 0.14 0.32 
I would like to have interactions like this 
on daily basis 
 0.74 0.18 0.57 
I would enjoy having other interactions 
like this 
 0.60 0.42 0.54 
Variance explained  41% 23%  
Note. h = communality. Loadings on the predominant component are shown in bold. 
 
The analysis resulted in a final two-component solution that explained 64% of variance (Table 
7). The first component consisted mostly of items related to the evaluation of the partner, 
whereas the second component consisted of items asking about the evaluation of the current 
interaction with the other person. We interpreted them as the Partner and the Current 
Interaction component, respectively. For each participant, we calculated the evaluation of the 
partner by averaging the scores for the items loading on the Partner component. In the same 
manner, we calculated the evaluation of the interaction by averaging scores for the items on 
the Current Interaction component. 
First, we compared the evaluation of the interaction between conditions. We carried out a 2 X 






with Condition (imitation vs counter-imitation) and Noticing (participant reported vs did not 
report being imitated/counter-imitated) as factors. Importantly, we found a main effect of 
Condition, suggesting that participants evaluated the interaction with the other person more 
positively in the imitation than in the counter-imitation condition (M = 7.11 vs M = 5.90; F(1, 
56) = 8.92, p = .004, 
 	= .14). There were no effects of Noticing (no main effect: F(1, 56) = 
3.41, p = .070, 
  = .06; and no interaction between Noticing and Condition: F(1, 56) = .62, p 
> .250, 
  = .01).  
We also compared the evaluation of partner between conditions. We carried out a similar 2 X 
2 ANOVA on the mean scores on the Partner component. However, we found no main effect 
of Condition, indicating that imitated participants did not evaluate their partner more positively 
than those who were counter-imitated (M = 5.89 vs M = 5.77; F(1, 56) = .08, p > .250, 
  < 
.01). There were also no effects of Noticing (no main effect: F(1, 56) = .15, p > .250, 
  < .01; 
and no interaction between Noticing and Condition: F(1, 56) = 1.93, p = .170, 
  = .03).18 
Next, we analysed the mean contributions to the common pool in the Public Goods game. We 
carried out a 2 X 2 between-subjects ANOVA on mean contributions across all turns, with 
Condition and Noticing as factors. We found no effect of Condition, suggesting that imitated 
participants did not contribute more than those who were counter-imitated (M = 23.61 vs M = 
23.56; F(1, 56) = .05, p > .250, 
  < .01). Both groups contributed approximately 59% of their 
total amount of credits. Moreover, mean contributions were not affected by whether 
participants noticed being imitated/counter-imitated (no main effect: F(1, 56) = 1.73, p = .194, 
                                                   
 
18 Note that, unlike in Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 we did not perform separate analyses for 
the likability and the smoothness item from the short questionnaire. This is because we 
expected these items to load on the same components as the items from the new multi-item 
questionnaire (i.e., we designed the new questionnaire to measure the evaluation of the partner 
and interaction). Therefore, in Experiment 2 we included the likability and the smoothness 
item in PCA together with the items from the new questionnaire and we report the analyses 







  = .03; and no interaction: F(1, 56) = 1.96, p = .167, 
  = .03). We found the same pattern 
of results for mean contributions on turn one only (see Appendix C). 
4.3 Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1: Participants whose lexical choices were 
imitated evaluated the interaction more positively as compared to those who were counter-
imitated. We did not find any effects of lexical imitation on the evaluation of the partner and 
the willingness to cooperate, despite using the multi-item questionnaire which we expected to 
improve the reliability of both measures (Credé et al., 2012). We can therefore be more 
confident that our manipulation of imitation does not affect the evaluation of partner’s 
likeability and the willingness to cooperate in subsequent interactions. 
An alternative possibility is that the constrained or limited nature of the interaction provided 
by picture naming prevented it from being treated as a socially relevant form of interaction, so 
that it affected ratings of the interaction itself but had no impact on social consequences of the 
interaction (relating to the assessment of one’s partner or to pro-social behaviour more 
generally). To bring about such effects, people might need to converse in a manner that was 
less constrained by the task than is the case when producing single-word responses, and which 
is much more similar to typical everyday conversation.  In such conversation, the interlocutors 
more clearly make a commitment to the minimization of communicative effort (Clark, 1996) 
and, of course, make extensive use of linguistic imitation (Pickering & Garrod, 2004). In 
Experiment 3, we therefore employed a more naturalistic set-up that allowed participants to 
converse freely while they performed a task. 
5 EXPERIMENT 3 
In Experiment 3, pairs of participants engaged in a modified version of the picture naming 
task. Participants communicated with each other via a text chat. They were allowed to converse 
freely, as long as they performed the task within the given time constraints. Their lexical 
choices were again manipulated by a computer program so that in the imitation condition 
participants would see their partner use the same words to name the pictures, and in the 






of their language use were manipulated (cf. Mills, 2014). After the task, we measured the 
evaluation of the interaction and the partner, and participants’ willingness to cooperate using 
the same measures as Experiment 2. 
5.1 Methods 
5.1.1 Participants 
We recruited 68 (26 male, 42 female) further native speakers of British English from the same 
population as in Experiments 1-2. Participants were promised a minimum payment of £4. 
Participants signed up for a session with another previously unacquainted person of the same 
gender.  
5.1.2 Materials 
For the picture naming task, we used 17 target pictures and 102 distractor pictures from 
Experiments 1-2. We constructed 34 experimental items consisting of a target picture and three 
distractors, as well as 51 filler items consisting of four distractors. Each target picture was used 
in two experimental items. Each distractor picture was used in three different items 
(experimental or filler). We constructed 4 further filler items for the practice run. The task was 
implemented using a custom-made mode of the DiET chat tool (Mills & Healey, submitted). 
We also used the Public Goods game and the two questionnaires from Experiment 2. 
5.1.3 Procedure 
Participants were met by the experimenter at distinct locations and led to the lab, as in 
Experiment 2. They were seated in separate rooms in front of a computer and signed the 
consent forms. The consent forms stated that participants would receive at least £4 for 
completing the study, with a possibility of obtaining additional £1-4 in a decision game. 
Participants then answered questions about their name, gender, and year and course of studies, 






Next, participants read the instructions and performed the picture naming task using a text-
based chat tool. Unlike in Experiments 1-2, they were connected over a network and actually 
interacted with each other. The chat tool allowed each participant to see their own and their 
partner’s last utterance on the display. Participants alternated between naming pictures and 
responding to their partner naming a picture. On each trial, they saw four pictures in a grid. 
They were told that their partner saw the same pictures, but arranged differently. The 
participant that was tasked with naming a picture on this turn saw one of the pictures 
highlighted by a thick yellow outline. Their task was to tell the other person the name of the 
highlighted picture and its location in the grid. The other participant then responded by 
describing the location of this picture in their grid. If the locations matched, the responding 
participant was instructed to type “snap”. There were no further constraints on participants’ 
utterances, but after 30 seconds the turn would time out and the next turn would start 
automatically.  
As in Experiments 1-2, the items in the picture naming task were organised so that the 
experimental items containing the same target picture appeared consecutively, separated by 
two filler items. There also was a filler item between the second of the two experimental trials 
and a following experimental item with a new target picture (Figure 7). Both participants in a 
pair were randomly assigned to either the imitation or the counter-imitation condition. 
 
Figure 7. Experiment 3: The sequence of trials. There are two filler items between each 
appearance of the target picture. There is one filler item before the next sequence containing a 
new target picture. 
Throughout the task, the chat tool scanned the participants’ utterances and identified the names 
for the target pictures by comparing the input from participants against the list of names stored 
in its memory. The program kept track of the most recent name for a target picture typed by 






manipulation.19 The manipulation was applied symmetrically so that each participant in a pair 
saw the other participant imitating (in the imitation condition) or counter-imitating their lexical 
choices (in the counter-imitation condition). However, for the sake of simplicity, in the 
following description we will adopt an asymmetric perspective and refer to one of the 
participants as participant, and the other as partner. 
In the imitation condition, the program manipulated the display so that the participant saw 
their partner use the same name for a target picture that the participant had had used before. 
The program did not intervene as long as the partner used the same name (e.g., participant: 
mitten → partner: mitten). However, if the partner used a different name than the participant 
had used before (participant: mitten → partner: glove), the program replaced the non-matching 
name (glove) with the name previously used by the participant (mitten) so that on their screen 
the participant would see their partner imitating their lexical choice (participant: mitten → 
partner: mitten). All other words in the utterance remained intact. Importantly, on their screen 
the partner saw their utterance unchanged (participant: mitten → partner: glove). This way, we 
hoped to keep both participants unaware of the substitution. 
In the counter-imitation condition, the program manipulated the display to ensure that the 
participant saw their partner use different names for the target pictures. The program did not 
intervene if the partner spontaneously used a different name for a target picture. But if the 
partner used the same name to refer to the target picture as the participant had used before, the 
program manipulated the display of the partner’s utterance and substituted the matching name 
actually used by the partner (mitten) with a non-matching name (glove), so that it would seem 
that the partner was counter-imitating the lexical choice of the participant. As in the imitation 
condition, the partner did not see the substitution on their screen (Figure 8). The picture naming 
task was preceded by 4 filler trials. The task took approximately 30 minutes. 
                                                   
 
19 Note that imitation/counter-imitation manipulation in Experiment 3 was sensitive to any 







Figure 8. Experiment 3: An example of counter-imitation procedure for an experimental trial 
on Turn 1 (target picture is being named by participant) and Turn 4 (target picture named by 
partner). 
After the task, participants filled out the questionnaires, and played the Public Goods game as 
in Experiment 2. Participants were promised a minimum of £4 for participating and up to £4 
of additional earnings from the game. For the Public Goods game, we used the same set-up, 
instructions, and procedure as in Experiment 2. Participants then answered the three final 
questions from Experiments 1-2, were debriefed, and were paid £8 (regardless of their 
decisions in the game). 
5.2 Results 
No participants reported a suspicion that their partner’s utterances were manipulated by the 






imitated/counter-imitated. We did not include noticing as a factor in the subsequent analyses 
due to this small number. 
We used confirmatory Principal Component Analysis (varimax rotation) to obtain composite 
measures of the evaluation of the interaction and the partner. We extracted two components 
that explained 64% of the variance. Next, we removed five items that had similar loadings on 
both components (difference < .10), and one item that did not have high loadings on either of 
the components (we used the conventional criterion of < .35; Grice, 2001). 
Table 8 









This interaction was satisfying  0.55 0.66 0.74 
This interaction was pleasant  0.50 0.75 0.81 
This person is warm  0.54 0.70 0.77 
This person is likeable  0.51 0.74 0.80 
How likable was the other participant  0.11 0.84 0.71 
How smoothly would you say your 
interaction went with the other participant 
-0.01 0.55 0.31 
I would like this person as a coworker  0.73 0.55 0.84 
I would like this person as a flatmate  0.81 0.13 0.68 
I would like to be friends with this person  0.83 0.29 0.76 
I would like to have interactions like this 
on daily basis 
 0.83 0.11 0.69 
I would enjoy having other interactions 
like this 
 0.79 0.34 0.74 
This person is similar to me  0.71 0.16 0.54 
This person is knowledgeable  0.60 0.48 0.59 
Variance explained  40% 29%  
Note. h = communality. Loadings on the predominant component are shown in bold. 
 
The final two-component solution accounted for 69% of the variance (Table 8). The first 
component consisted mostly of items asking whether the participant would like to have similar 
interactions in the future and items regarding the evaluation of the partner. We termed it the 
Future Interactions and Partner component. The other component consisted of items asking 
about the evaluation of the current interaction and the evaluation of the partner in terms of 






then calculated participants’ evaluation for each component in the same way                                          
as in Experiment 2. 
Although we observed a numerical trend, the imitated participants did not produce higher 
ratings in the Current Interaction and Likability component, as compared to those who were 
counter-imitated (M = 6.74 vs M = 6.32; t(66) = -1.27, p = .103, d = .31). Moreover, there was 
no difference between conditions with regards to the evaluations in the Future Interactions 
and Partner component (M = 5.13 vs M = 5.22; t(66) = .24, p > .250, d = .06).  
We analysed the mean contributions in the Public Goods game. Importantly, the imitated 
participants contributed more credits to the common pool than participants in the counter-
imitation condition (M = 28.22 vs M = 21.59; t(66) = -2.95, p = .002, d = .72). The imitated 
group contributed on average about 70% of their credits, whereas the counter-imitated group 
contributed 54%. This effect was present also when we removed the participants who reported 
noticing being imitated/counter-imitated during the task (t(52) = -2.49, p = .008, d = .68). We 
found the same pattern of results for mean contributions on turn one only (see Appendix C). 
5.3 Discussion 
In Experiment 3, we found that imitating lexical choices in an interactive text chat conversation 
affected participants’ behaviour in the Public Goods game: Participants who were imitated 
contributed more credits to the common pool, and therefore demonstrated a greater willingness 
to cooperate with their partner, than participants who were not imitated. However, participants 
who were imitated did not evaluate their interaction or their partner more positively than those 
who were counter-imitated. 
6 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
According to the affiliative goal account of imitation, people imitate each other because it 
helps them to bond, smoothens their social interactions, and encourages others to cooperate. 
We investigated whether this is true for linguistic imitation. We asked whether people who 
were lexically imitated by their conversational partner would produce a more positive 






than those who were counter-imitated. Across three experiments, we found converging 
evidence that lexical imitation subserves the affiliative goal. 
Experiments 1 and 2 provided evidence that when people were lexically imitated, they 
evaluated the interaction with the imitator more positively. Participants who were imitated 
during the single word picture-naming task rated the interaction as more smooth (Experiment 
1) and produced a more positive evaluation of the current interaction than those who were 
counter-imitated (Experiment 2). In such a constrained context of a single word exchange, 
where there was little other information that the participants could use to assess the interaction, 
our manipulation affected participants’ evaluations of the interaction. 
Moreover, Experiment 3 provided evidence that lexical imitation can also affect willingness 
to engage in cooperative behaviour in a subsequent interaction with the same partner. We 
found that the imitated participants contributed more credits to the common pool in the Public 
Goods game as compared to those who were counter-imitated. Thus in the much less 
constrained context of Experiment 3, where participants were allowed to jointly manage their 
conversational exchange, lexical imitation affected their willingness to cooperate with their 
partner. 
However, our manipulation of lexical imitation did not lead to significant effects on all 
measures. Surprisingly, we did not find evidence that lexical imitation resulted in a more 
positive self-reported evaluation of the partner. The imitated participants did not rate their 
partner as more likeable (Experiment 1) and they did not produce a more positive general 
evaluation of their partner as compared to the counter-imitated participants (Experiments 2-
3). This is in contrast with research in social psychology suggesting that people who imitate 
the motor behaviour of their partners are rated as more likeable (see Chatrand & Lakin, 2013). 
However, this effect has not been evidenced equally well with regards to linguistic imitation. 
Although some researchers have reported similar findings (Manson et al., 2013), other studies 
have not find a consistent effect on liking (Schoot, Heyselaar, Hagoort, & Segaert, 2016). Our 
results do not provide support for the hypothesis that interlocutors engage in linguistic 






In addition, we did not replicate the effect on the evaluation of the interaction in a version of 
our task where participants were allowed to converse more freely (Experiment 3). This might 
be due to the fact that when participants were allowed to produce longer utterances, the rich 
conversational context provided them with other information they could use to assess the 
interaction. Thus, being imitated or counter-imitated was no longer a salient cue with regards 
to this evaluation. 
Finally, we did not find an effect of imitation (or counter-imitation) during a single word 
picture-naming task on participants’ subsequent behaviour in the PGG (Experiment 2). Nor 
did we find any difference in the frequency of cooperative decisions in the Stag Hunt game 
between participants who were imitated and those who were counter-imitated during a single 
word task (Experiment 1). In previous research on imitation, coordination games have been 
used with similarly inconsistent results. For example, one study reported that the effect of 
behavioural imitation on cooperation was observable in only one out of two types of game 
used in the experiment, suggesting that the occurrence of this effect might depend on the 
particular type of coordination game used (Verberne et al., 2013). However, some of the 
studies investigating linguistic imitation failed to find a consistent pattern of results between 
studies even when using the same game (compare Scissors et al., 2008, with Scissors et al., 
2009). Interestingly, studies that demonstrated effects of linguistic imitation on cooperative 
behaviour used other measures of cooperation (e.g., a negotiation task). Moreover, they also 
used set-ups where the manipulation was applied during a relatively unconstrained 
conversation (Fischer-Lokou et al., 2011; Müller et al., 2012; Swaab, Maddux, & Sinaceur, 
2011). More work is needed to fully understand under what conditions language imitation 
increases willingness to cooperate by the person who has been imitated. 
The affiliative goal account posits that imitation has both social causes and social 
consequences. People engage in imitation because they seek positive relations with others, and 
imitation can help to achieve this goal by fostering social interactions, cooperation, and 
bonding (Lakin et al., 2003). In the three experiments reported here, we investigated the second 
part of this claim with regards to linguistic imitation: We tested whether imitating word choice 






in a more positive evaluation of the interaction and an increased willingness to cooperate with 
the partner. But what mechanisms could be responsible for these effects? 
Lexical imitation might lead to smoother linguistic interactions, because it helps to reduce the 
cognitive effort associated with the conversation. Psycholinguistic studies showed that words 
that had earlier been produced are processed more easily when encountered again. For 
example, Monsell (1987) found that participants recognised words they had earlier produced 
more quickly than words they had not seen before. More importantly, Ferreira, Kleinman, 
Kraljic, and Siu (2012) showed that participants in a collaborative picture naming task 
responded faster to a word used by their partner if it was the same word that they had produced 
before. Producing a word primes its representation in the speaker’s mental lexicon. This speeds 
up the subsequent retrieval of the representation and in turn aids language processing when 
the same word is encountered again (see Barry, Hirsh, Johnston, & Williams, 2001). Lexical 
imitation taps into this mechanism, and lifts some of the processing effort off the imitated 
speaker. Crucially, stimuli that are easily processed evoke positive evaluations (Winkielman, 
Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). Thus, a conversation with a partner who imitates one’s 
word choice is likely to be evaluated as more smooth than conversation with a partner who 
does not imitate. 
Consistent with the affiliative goal account, participants who were lexically imitated by their 
partner showed a greater willingness to cooperate with their partner. It has been proposed that 
behavioural imitation primes a general prosocial mindset, which in turn makes people more 
willing to engage in helping and altruistic behaviour towards the imitator, and also more 
broadly (Ashton-James, van Baaren, Chartrand, Decety, & Karremans, 2007; van Baaren, 
Holland, Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 2004). It is possible that linguistic imitation affects 
behaviour via a similar social priming route. In our experiment, cooperation was directed 
towards the imitator, but on the basis of previous evidence from imitation studies, we might 
expect to find such cooperation to be directed towards other people too (e.g., in an economic 
game involving a third person). 
Alternatively, an increased willingness to cooperate in the Public Goods game might have 






participants’ decisions in coordination games are based on the available cues about their 
interaction partner. For example, people contribute more in coordination games if they believe 
their partner is likely to cooperate (Dawes, 1980). Interpersonal similarity is another cue that 
encourages cooperation. People interacting with a partner who is similar to them make more 
prosocial decisions in a trust game (DeBruine, 2002) and contribute more money in a PGG 
(Krupp, DeBruine, & Barclay, 2008), as compared to those interacting with a partner that is 
not similar. Thus, participants who were lexically imitated might have treated the similarity in 
the word choice as a cue indicating that the other person was likely to cooperate, which in turn 
encouraged them to do the same (cf. Hommel & Colzato, 2015).  
It is not possible with our current design to be certain about whether the effect on cooperative 
behaviour was driven by the imitation or the counter-imitation condition. However, the former 
possibility may be more likely, given our results. In Experiment 3, participants in the counter-
imitation group contributed on average 54% of the total amount of their credits. This 
corresponds to a typical contribution in Public Goods games where participants contribute 40-
60% (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Ledyard, 1995). Importantly, participants in the imitation 
group contributed 70% of their credits, which is rather higher than the typical contribution. 
This pattern is consistent with the prediction that lexical imitation should lead to a greater 
willingness to cooperate in the imitated partner. 
The findings from our three experiments are consistent with the hypothesis that people engage 
in linguistic imitation to foster their relationships with others. In a design drawing both from 
psycholinguistics and social psychology, we tested an important assumption of the affiliative 
goal account: that imitation has positive social consequences for the imitator. We found that 
lexical imitation led in at least some circumstances to a more positive evaluation of the social 
interaction and an increased willingness to cooperate with the partner. More generally, our 
work therefore provides a step towards experimentally controlled investigations of the social 









1 THESIS SUMMARY 
In the opening review chapter, I discussed the current literature that suggests some imitative 
behaviours might emerge spontaneously, i.e. as a result of automatic mechanisms that operate 
without intentional control. Moreover, I proposed that such emergent imitation is achieved by 
some of the mechanisms that contribute to spontaneous interpersonal coordination. I focused 
on three such mechanisms: simulation, temporal adaptation, and the unconscious goal to 
affiliate with others. Next, I reviewed the evidence for the automatic involvement of these 
mechanisms during social interactions, and demonstrated that the research in support of each 
of these mechanisms tends to focus on a single type of behaviour. Specifically, simulation has 
been mostly evidenced with regards to simple motor movements, temporal adaptation with 
regards to continuous rhythmic actions, and the affiliative goal has been shown to regulate the 
motor behaviours naturally occurring in social interactions. I further argued that it would be 
fruitful for psychological research on imitation to cross-examine these mechanisms, i.e. 
investigate whether each could be extended to explain the instances of emergent imitation that 
are currently outside the scope of interest of its respective research field. I finished the review 
chapter by discussing some already existing studies that attempted to do that. 
In the following empirical chapters, I presented three sets of experiments that aimed to 
contribute to the effort of cross-examining the mechanisms of emergent imitation. Each 
chapter focused on a distinct candidate mechanism. In Chapter 2, I presented three experiments 
that investigated the role of the simulation mechanism in language processing. These studies 
tested whether the language production system is involved in linguistic prediction during 
comprehension, as suggested by Pickering and Garrod (2013). I found some evidence in 
support of this, which suggests that such a simulation mechanism might indeed be routinely 






test the relationship between simulation and the linguistic imitation that spontaneously 
emerges in natural conversations. 
In Chapter 3, I presented three further experiments investigating whether the mechanism of 
temporal adaptation could explain some instances of imitation that had been observed in joint 
motor actions. More specifically, these experiments were designed as a follow-up to a recent 
study by Pfister and colleagues (2013) who found that agents engaged in a discrete non-
rhythmic action act faster when imitated by their partner, as compared to counter-imitated. 
Although the authors interpreted this finding as evidence for a high-level anticipation 
mechanism, the results obtained from my experiments show that an automatic temporal 
mechanism is a better explanation: agents act faster when imitated because they adapt to the 
response pace of their partner (which is faster when the partner is imitating than counter-
imitating). This suggests that temporal adaptation might result in spontaneous imitation of 
some aspects of the observed behaviour also in discrete non-rhythmic actions, which have 
previously been considered within a framework of high-level representationalist explanations. 
Chapter 4 presented three final experiments which focused on exploring the role of the 
unconscious affiliative goal in emergent linguistic imitation. It has been proposed that 
behavioural mimicry might be used as a non-conscious tool to create liking and foster social 
relations between people (Lakin et al., 2003). This hypothesis relies on evidence that imitating 
the motor behaviour of others during interactions brings about various social benefits, i.e. 
partners who are imitated tend to positively evaluate the imitator and the interaction with them, 
and are more likely to cooperate. Thus, such imitation might serve the goal to affiliate with 
others. In my experiments, I investigated whether linguistic imitation could also be motivated 
by the affiliative goal. I tested this by manipulating whether people were lexically imitated or 
counter-imitated and measuring its social effects on the interaction. The results obtained from 
these experiments suggest that linguistic imitation might help to foster social interactions, and 
therefore lend some support to the hypothesis that people imitate various aspects of each 
other’s language in order to create affiliation. 
In this concluding chapter, I now turn to summarise the findings and discuss some limitations 






relate my findings to the case for cross-examination that I outlined in the review chapter, and 
briefly discuss the implications of my work for psychological research on imitation. 
2 CONCLUSIONS: INVESTIGATING THE ROLE OF PRODUCTION SYSTEM IN 
SIMULATION 
2.1 Summary of Findings 
The three experiments reported in Chapter 2 employed a psycholinguistic paradigm where 
participants read high- and low-cloze sentence contexts either silently or aloud and responded 
to a sentence-final stimulus. The type of response varied across the experiments. In 
Experiment 1, participants were asked to make a lexical decision with regard to the sentence-
final stimulus that was either an existing word or a non-word. The lexical decisions and the 
related response times were recorded. In Experiment 2, they were asked to name the sentence-
final stimulus when it was a word (and not name it otherwise). Participants’ decision to name 
(or not to name) was recorded, along with the response time. In Experiment 3, participants 
named the sentence-final stimulus which was an illustration of the final word of a sentence, 
and their naming time was recorded.  
I hypothesised that if the language production system is routinely used to generate predictions 
during comprehension, then increasing its engagement (reading aloud vs. silently) should 
enhance the effects of prediction (high- vs. low-cloze contexts) on language processing. I did 
not find evidence that engaging the production system influenced the effect of prediction on 
lexical decisions (Experiment 1) or on decisions to name the sentence-final stimulus 
(Experiment 2). But importantly, I demonstrated that it enhanced the effect of prediction on 
participants’ spoken response times (Experiments 2-3). This suggests that the production 
system is indeed involved in generating linguistic predictions, at least in the aspect that is used 
to facilitate subsequent spoken production. 
2.2 Implications 
The results obtained from my experiments have some important implications for current 






the moment, there are four unresolved questions related to the claim that people predict 
language (Huettig, 2015). I propose that my findings can contribute to the search for an answer 
in case of two of these questions, i.e. how is prediction achieved, and why do people predict. 
First, the results from my experiments are convergent with the idea that the simulation 
mechanism proposed by Pickering and Garrod (2013) is used for prediction. According to this 
account, speakers generate predictions by engaging aspects of their production system to 
simulate the perceived utterance. Such a production-based mechanism could account for the 
large body of research showing that brain areas and effectors responsible for language 
production are activated during language comprehension. Second, my results suggest that 
prediction might be used to prepare one’s own subsequent production act. I found that 
engaging the production system enhanced the effects of prediction only with regard to the 
fluency of participants’ spoken responses. This could be taken as evidence that prediction is 
particularly useful in natural conversation which requires speakers to quickly and smoothly 
coordinate their utterances (see Levinson, 2016). 
2.3 Limitations and Future Research 
Inevitably, the three experiments discussed here have some limitations. First, the engagement 
of the production system was manipulated by instructing the participants to either read the 
sentence contexts aloud or silently. In choosing this type of manipulation, I assumed that the 
activation of the production system could be increased from its default level. By demonstrating 
that reading aloud resulted in stronger effects of prediction as compared to reading silently, I 
showed that this assumption might have been correct. Moreover, these findings could be also 
taken as some evidence for the scalar nature of the activation related to linguistic prediction 
(cf. DeLong, Urbach, & Kutas, 2005).  
However, it could also be argued that reading aloud represents an unusual rather than a typical 
case of comprehension. If so, then the findings obtained from my experiments would not 
support the idea that production is routinely engaged to predict during comprehension, but 
instead demonstrate that it is engaged in this particular case. To address this, one could conduct 
a study using a different within-subjects manipulation: in the experimental condition, the 






magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the brain areas responsible for language production (left 
primary motor face area; Watkins et al., 2003), and the effects of prediction on a subsequent 
production act could be measured using the same task as in Experiment 3. If the effects of 
prediction were smaller in the experimental, as compared to the control condition (where TMS 
would be applied to areas responsible for non-linguistic motor action, e.g., left primary motor 
hand area), then such a study would provide further evidence for the engagement of production 
during comprehension. Crucially, in conjunction with my current results, it would make a 
strong case for the routine use of the production system for linguistic prediction. 
Future studies could also address the two remaining questions about linguistic prediction that 
my experiments did not tackle. Specifically, I found that engaging the production system while 
reading aloud enhanced the aspect of prediction that is useful for producing a subsequent 
spoken response. But what exactly was the content of this prediction? One likely possibility is 
that engaging overt production might help to generate phonological predictions about the 
upcoming word (or at least about its first phoneme). To investigate this, one could employ a 
similar design as in Experiment 3, but add an additional independent variable: participants 
could read high- and low-cloze sentence contexts either aloud or silently, and name the 
sentence-final pictures. Importantly, these pictures would depict either the word that is the 
most likely continuation of a given sentence, or another word that phonologically overlaps 
with the first sound of the most likely continuation (cf. Drake & Corley, 2015). This design 
could also be extended to include a condition where the picture is semantically, but not 
phonologically related to the most likely continuation. Such a study (or a similar one following 
this logic) would be able to tease apart the different aspects of the linguistic prediction 
generated using the simulation mechanism. 
Furthermore, future studies could also investigate when people engage this mechanism to 
predict. It is possible that the production system might be used for prediction especially when 
processing language in difficult conditions (cf. Adank et al., 2010). In my experiments, I 
followed this assumption and imposed a processing difficulty by degrading the visibility of 
the sentence contexts. Would engaging production enhance the effects of prediction also in 
normal processing? A simple follow-up study could address this question by attempting to 






3 CONCLUSIONS: INVESTIGATING THE ROLE OF TEMPORAL ADAPTATION IN 
IMITATION 
3.1 Summary of Findings 
In the three experiments presented in Chapter 3, I used a joint action paradigm in which pairs 
of participants engaged in a button-pressing task, where one participant took the role of the 
leader and another participant took the role of the follower. Participants were seated across a 
table and each operated a button-box. The leader performed short and long presses in response 
to cues appearing on a computer screen. The follower was instructed to observe the leader and 
either make the same (imitation condition) or the opposite press than the leader (counter-
imitation condition). In the Replication Experiment, the participants performed the task in this 
set-up (following the methods of Pfister et al., 2013). Experiment 1 used the same set-up, 
except there was a divider between the participants so that the leader did not see the follower, 
and the leader also wore headphones so they did not hear the follower. In Experiment 2, the 
leader was again able to see and hear the follower as in the Replication Experiment. However, 
the follower wore headphones and performed their task according to auditory cues that ensured 
they now acted slower when imitating than when counter-imitating. In all experiments, 
response times were measured. 
These experiments were designed as a follow-up of an original study by Pfister and colleagues 
(2013) which found that leaders act faster when imitated than counter-imitated by the follower. 
Across three experiments, I aimed to demonstrate that this finding can be explained by the 
automatic temporal adaptation mechanism, rather than the high-level co-representation 
account proposed by the authors. I first replicated this finding using the same methods as the 
original study (Replication Experiment), and then showed that leaders were no longer faster 
when imitated than counter-imitated if they were unable to see or hear the follower 
(Experiment 1). This was consistent with the hypothesis that in the original study leaders 
spontaneously adapted to their partner’s response pace. Finally, I provided even stronger 
evidence for the critical role of the temporal adaptation mechanism by showing that leaders 
became slower when imitated than counter-imitated, if their partner was also slower imitating 







The results obtained from these experiments support the idea that agents’ behaviour in social 
interactions is regulated by the automatic adaptation mechanism, even if agents are engaged 
in a task that involves discrete non-rhythmic actions. This has implications for research on 
sensorimotor synchronisation, because it demonstrates that people might attempt to 
synchronise with others also when engaged in this type of action. Thus, these findings suggest 
that sensorimotor synchronisation might be more prevalent than previously thought. More 
specifically, some form of automatic temporal adaptation may operate not only in actions 
where the goal is to produce a given rhythm or in continuous actions that are subject to the 
principles of self-organisation, but also in actions that are non-rhythmic and discrete. In turn, 
this is important for psychological studies that employ paradigms involving such actions, 
because adaptation is likely to influence the participants’ behaviour observed in these studies. 
For example, research on joint action often uses tasks where two agents perform actions in 
close proximity. In some of these paradigms, temporal adaptation might be a confounding 
factor, as I showed with regard to the study by Pfister and colleagues. It is therefore important 
that researchers wishing to investigate a phenomenon of their choosing in similar joint tasks 
always consider that the agents’ behaviour might be affected by temporal adaptation, or indeed 
other low-level mechanisms. 
3.3 Limitations and Future Research 
Although I was able to demonstrate that automatic temporal adaptation shaped the agents’ 
behaviour in this particular task, my experiments face some limitations. First, with the current 
design I cannot rule the possibility that some variance in participants’ behaviour is due to the 
mechanism proposed by Pfister and colleagues, i.e. that agents anticipate their partner’s 
actions and this facilitates their own actions in the imitation condition. The results obtained 
from my experiments only show that temporal adaptation plays a more important role in 
shaping the agents’ behaviour than this hypothetical anticipation mechanism. To investigate 
whether agents engage in anticipation, a follow-up study could manipulate the followers’ 






condition. If in this case leaders’ were significantly faster when imitated than counter-imitated, 
this could be attributed to anticipation. 
Second, using the current paradigm I was not able to show what form of temporal adaptation 
was at play in this task, i.e. whether the leaders adapted to their partner’s response pace due to 
the automatic phase correction or spontaneous entrainment. One way of discerning between 
these two possibilities would be to see whether the actions of the interacting agents became 
temporally coupled in a way consistent with the self-organisation principles (e.g., the Haken-
Kelso-Bunz model; Kelso, Delcolle, & Schoner, 1990), which would suggest adaptation was 
driven by entrainment. However, these principles can be meaningfully applied only to 
continuously oscillating systems, and therefore they do not lend themselves to the data 
collected from my experiments. Thus, the fact participants’ actions were discrete (i.e., there 
was an inter-trial interval between each button press) points towards the possibility that 
adaptation was driven by phase correction. A study using a somewhat similar task could 
attempt to empirically discern between entrainment and phase correction. For example, a joint 
continuous tapping paradigm could be used to investigate whether the dynamics of adaptation 
reflect self-organisation principles or the local phase shifts that are characteristic of phase 
correction (for a possible paradigm, see Ramenzoni, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2014). 
Future studies should aim to identify other types of social interactions that might be affected 
by the automatic temporal adaptation mechanism. For example, dialogue could be a fruitful 
area for such explorations. There is already evidence that some motor behaviours become 
entrained during conversation (e.g., Fowler et al., 2008). It is less clear, however, whether 
spoken language could also be affected by temporal adaptation. Speech rate (Webb, 1969) and 
turn-taking (Wilson & Wilson, 2005) have been suggested to be two possible aspects of speech 
where temporal adaptation could occur, but to my knowledge there are no controlled 
experiments that would provide evidence for these claims. One way to investigate whether 
speakers adapt to their partners’ inter-turn intervals (which could be taken as an index of turn-
taking, see Beňuš, Gravano, & Hirschberg, 2011) would be to ask two participants to engage 
in a computer-mediated picture naming task where they would alternate producing spoken 
utterances. The inter-turn intervals could be then manipulated by gradually adding a lag to the 






longer inter-turn intervals across turns (to provide a baseline, there could also be a control 
condition where the conversation is left intact). If automatic temporal adaptation regulates 
turn-taking in spoken dialogue, then both participants should produce longer inter-turn 
intervals towards the end of the task (and the average interval length should be greater in the 
manipulated than the intact conversation). 
4 CONCLUSIONS: INVESTIGATING THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF LINGUISTIC 
IMITATION 
4.1 Summary of Findings 
The experiments discussed in Chapter 4 used a paradigm drawing both from psycholinguistics 
and social psychology: pairs of participants engaged in a computerized task where they 
alternated naming a picture for their partner and responding to their partner naming a picture. 
Crucially, on some trials their partner named a picture that the participant had already named. 
The partner’s responses on these trials were manipulated between-subjects so that participants 
in one group saw their partner imitate their earlier word choice (imitation group), whereas 
participants in the other group saw their partner counter-imitate their word choice (counter-
imitation group). After the naming task, participants filled out a questionnaire asking for an 
evaluation of the interaction and the partner, and played a short decision-making game to 
measure their willingness to cooperate. Importantly, the picture naming task varied between 
experiments with regards to the constraints placed on the participants’ interaction. In 
Experiments 1 and 2, participants were instructed to only produce the names for the pictures, 
whereas in Experiment 3 they were allowed to freely converse over the task within the given 
time limit. 
These experiments set out to investigate the claim that linguistic imitation is motivated by the 
unconscious goal to affiliate with others, and tested an important assumption of this claim, i.e. 
that linguistic imitation has positive social consequences. I expected that participants who 
were lexically imitated by their partner should produce a more positive evaluation of the 
partner and the interaction, as compared to participants who were counter-imitated. Moreover, 






the decision-making game, as compared to those who were counter-imitated. Across three 
experiments, I found some evidence that was convergent with these predictions. Participants 
who were imitated produced a more positive evaluation of the interaction (Experiments 1-2) 
and showed a more cooperative behaviour in the decision-making game (Experiment 3), as 
compared to those who were counter-imitated. However, I found no evidence that being 
lexically imitated affected the self-reported evaluation of the imitator. 
4.2 Implications 
The results obtained from these experiments are convergent with the claim that linguistic 
imitation may be used by the imitators to foster their interaction with others. Participants who 
were lexically imitated evaluated the interaction more positively and were more willing to 
cooperate with the imitator, which is consistent with the claim that people use imitation as a 
“social glue” that helps them to foster their social relations (Lakin et al., 2003). Thus, these 
findings suggest that linguistic imitation might be motivated by the unconscious goal to 
affiliate. This is interesting, because it could potentially provide a complementary view to 
some of the mechanistic explanations that have been proposed to account for linguistic 
imitation (e.g., Branigan et al., 2000). Should future studies confirm that people imitate each 
other’s language to satisfy the affiliative goal, some of the currently existing psycholinguistic 
models of language processing would need to be revised. Furthermore, the findings from my 
experiments could also be used to illuminate the current accounts of imitation. The fact that 
the affiliative goal might be involved in imitation of language and of motor behaviours alike 
could be taken to suggest that it is a more general mechanism, contributing to emergent 
imitation across different situations and behaviours. Finally, these experiments have some 
methodological implications. Specifically, both the computerised method of introducing the 
manipulation (Experiment 3), and the use of the decision-making games to measure 
cooperative behaviour (Experiments 1-3) offer a more controlled alternative to the methods 






4.3 Limitations and Future Research 
Although the results obtained from these three experiments are generally consonant with the 
predictions made by the affiliative goal account, they are limited in several ways. First, the 
finding the imitated participants produced a more positive evaluation of the interaction (than 
the counter-imitated participants) do not fully replicate across experiments. It seems that when 
participants were allowed to converse more freely, the manipulation did not have a reliable 
effect on the self-reported evaluation of the interaction. One possibility is that in this rich 
conversational context being lexically imitated (or counter-imitated) was one of the many cues 
that participants could use as a basis for their evaluation, and therefore it was not salient 
enough to elicit the same effect as in the constrained context of single-word exchanges. This 
possibility could be explored in a study using the same paradigm and procedures as 
Experiment 3, but involving a greater number of trials on which the manipulation is applied. 
If such a study would replicate the findings from Experiments 1 and 2, this would suggest that 
absence of the effect in Experiment 3 can be attributed to the low salience of the manipulation. 
Another limitation concerns the findings from the decision-making games. Imitated 
participants showed a more cooperative behaviour in these games (as compared to counter-
imitated participants), but only in the rich conversational context of Experiment 3. It is possible 
that the difference in the constraints placed on communication is again to be blamed. One 
possibility is that the rich conversational context provided a naturalistic setting which 
encouraged participants to treat the observed instances of lexical imitation (or counter-
imitation) as a diagnostic cue for the future behaviour of the partner. However, it is unclear 
why would it encourage them to treat imitation (or counter-imitation) as a cue with regard to 
the partner’s behaviour in the game, but not with regard to their evaluation of the interaction.  
Perhaps then the next step should be to replicate these findings. This could be done in a study 
that would use the same design as Experiment 3, with the exception that it would include an 
additional baseline group. The procedure in the imitation and counter-imitation groups would 
be same as before, but in the baseline group the participants would not be subjected to the 
manipulation. Critically, they would also never see their partners naming the pictures they had 






spontaneously imitate or counter-imitate the lexical choices of their partner. Such a study 
would be interesting as a potential replication of Experiment 3. Moreover, it could help to 
clarify whether it was indeed imitation that led to more cooperative behaviour. If more 
cooperative behaviour would be observed in the imitation group than in the other two, this 
would suggest that imitation promotes cooperation. However, if less cooperative behaviour 
would be observed in the counter-imitation group as compared to both the baseline and the 
imitation group, then this would indicate that being lexically counter-imitated leads to a 
decrease in cooperation.  
Future research should also test the hypothesis that linguistic imitation is driven by the goal to 
affiliate by manipulating the activation of this goal. For example, pairs of participants could 
engage in a controlled conversational task that would provide them with multiple opportunities 
to imitate. Prior to the task, participants would be primed either with a goal to affiliate, a goal 
to disaffiliate, or given a neutral priming (see Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). Next, the amount of 
linguistic imitation produced in the task would be measured. If an active goal to affiliate does 
indeed motivate people to imitate the language of their conversational partners, then the 
highest degree of linguistic imitation should be observed in the group primed with the goal to 
affiliate, followed by the neutral group, and the lowest degree of imitation should be observed 
in the group primed to disaffiliate. Such a pattern of results would provide clear evidence for 
the causal role of the affiliative goal in linguistic imitation. 
5 CONCLUSION 
To conclude, my studies suggest that psychological research on imitation can be advanced by 
a systematic cross-examination of the mechanisms that are currently associated with distinct 
imitative behaviours. In the three sets of experiments presented in this thesis, I was able to 
show that simulation, temporal adaptation, and the unconscious goal to affiliate are all likely 
to contribute to emergent imitation. Overall, these findings illuminate our current 
understanding of imitation in at least three ways. 
First, my results are convergent with the idea that some of the mechanisms of emergent 
imitation contribute to more than one type of imitative behaviour. Specifically, I found 






processing, which in turn gives some credence to the idea that it contributes to linguistic 
imitation. In addition, previous studies suggest that simulation promotes automatic imitation 
of motor movements. It is therefore possible that the simulation mechanism might be 
responsible both for imitation of motor actions and language. Of course, the causal role of 
simulation for these two imitative behaviours remains to be directly tested. Future studies 
could investigate it by measuring automatic imitation effects while disrupting the brain areas 
used for simulation (note that this could be done both for motor movement and language). 
Should it be confirmed that simulation plays a causal role in imitation across the motor 
movements and language domains, this would clearly identify it as a domain-general 
mechanism responsible for emergent imitation. 
Second, my findings give some credence to the idea that certain instances of emergent 
imitation are caused by more than one mechanism. As I argued, linguistic imitation might 
result from the cognitive simulation mechanism. However, the results from my lexical 
imitation experiments suggest that it could also be motivated by the goal to affiliate with 
others. Should further studies confirm the causal involvement of these mechanisms, linguistic 
imitation could stem from an interplay between the cognitive mechanisms of language 
processing (i.e. simulation), and the motivational mechanisms that regulate human social life 
(i.e. the affiliative goal). Subject to future investigations, I propose that these mechanisms are 
complementary rather than mutually exclusive. One possibility is that the simulation 
mechanism is modulated by the goal to affiliate with others. This proposition is similar to some 
recent models of imitation (e.g., Wang & Hamilton, 2012), which I believe should be taken as 
an encouragement for further research in this direction.  
Third, the automatic temporal adaptation mechanism might also contribute to emergent 
imitation by helping to effortlessly coordinate actions in time. My results show that temporal 
adaptation can lead agents to adopt the response pace of their interaction partner. It is likely 
that the tendency to fall into the same rhythm with others provides a scaffolding for 
coordinating other aspects of actions. Moreover, it is possible that temporal adaptation works 
in conjunction with the simulation and the affiliative goal mechanism. With regards to 
linguistic imitation, temporal adaptation could be responsible for copying the temporal aspects 






aspects (e.g., lexical and syntactic choices, phonetic features). The level of engagement of 
these two cognitive mechanisms could be then modulated by the motivation to affiliate with 
the conversational partner. More work is needed to estimate whether such an account of 
emergent linguistic imitation could be true. 
Together, the empirical studies presented in this thesis support the view that agents might 
spontaneously imitate each other due to certain cognitive mechanisms, and that imitation 
might at times be motivated by its positive social consequences. Future research should 
continue to explore the overlap between the different cognitive and motivational mechanisms 
of emergent imitation. Only this way over a century of empirical efforts will eventually yield 








Appendix A: Investigating the Role of 
Production System in Simulation 
1 D-PRIME ANALYSES 
For Experiments 1 and 2, we also assessed variation in participants' sensitivity through a d-
prime analysis. We conducted a 2 (Predictability: high- vs low-cloze) X 2 (Reading Type: 
aloud vs silently) X 2 (Reading Type Order: aloud first vs silently first) mixed-ANOVA. 
1.1 Experiments 1 and 2 
See Table S1 for the d-prime means, and Table S2 for the ANOVA results from Experiments 
1 and 2. 
Table S1 
Experiments 1 and 2: Mean d-prime values by Predictability and Reading Type 
Experiment 1 
 Reading Type 
Predictability reading silently reading aloud 
high cloze 1.36 1.56 
low cloze 1.19 1.31 
Experiment 2 
 Reading Type 
Predictability reading silently reading aloud 
high cloze 1.31 1.21 








Experiments 1 and 2: ANOVA results 
Experiment 1 
 F(1,22) p 
  
Predictability 4.63 .043 .04 
Reading Type 2.44 .133 .02 
Reading Type Order .66 >.250 .01 
Predictability * Reading Type .24 >.250 <.01 
Predictability * Reading Type Order 1.80 .193 .01 
Reading Type * Reading Type Order <.01 >.250 <.01 
Predictability * Reading Type * Reading Type Order .07 >.250 <.01 
Experiment 2 
 F(1,30) p 
  
Predictability .15 >.250 <.01 
Reading Type .14 >.250 <.01 
Reading Type Order 3.20 .084 .06 
Predictability * Reading Type .49 >.250 <.01 
Predictability * Reading Type Order .10 >.250 <.01 
Reading Type * Reading Type Order 6.94 .013 <03 
Predictability * Reading Type * Reading Type Order .11 >.250 <.01 
 
2 LIKELIHOOD OF A “WORD” RESPONSE (GLMM) 
2.1 Model Description 
In Experiments 1-2, the measurement of whether participants made a “word” response or not 
yielded a binary variable. Following the good practices in the field, we therefore ran a binomial 
GLMM to calculate the likelihood of a “word” response across conditions (Jaeger, 2008). 
Models were computed using R v.3.0.3 (lme4 package v.1.1-5; Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & 
Walker, 2015). To help convergence, prior to running the model we centered and scaled the 
predictors, and specified an increased number of evaluations in the model syntax. The 






proceeded to simplify by removing interactions from the random-effects structure (starting 
from the highest-order interaction).  
2.2 Experiment 1 
For the final model reported in the paper, we retained the full fixed-effects structure and the 
two-way interactions in random structure, but removed the three-way interaction and forced 
independence between random effects. See the code below for the syntax of the model: 
glmer (WordResponse ~ 1 + Predictability * Reading Type * Item Type * Reading Type Order 
+ (1 + Item Type + Predictability + Reading Type + Item Type : Predictability + Item Type : 
Reading Type + Predictability : Reading Type || Participant) + (1 | Item), data = imi, family = 
binomial, control = glmerControl (optCtrl = list(maxfun = 1e5), optimizer = "bobyqa")) 
2.3 Experiment 2 
For the final model reported in the paper, we retained the full fixed-effects structure, but forced 
independence between random effects. Model syntax: 
glmer (WordResponse ~ 1 + Predictability * Reading Type * Item Type * Reading Type Order 
+ (1 + Predictability * Reading Type * Item Type || Participant) + (1 | Item), data = imi, family 
= binomial, control = glmerControl(optimizer = "bobyqa", optCtrl = list(maxfun = 1e5))) 
3 RESPONSE TIMES (LME) 
3.1 Model Description 
In Experiments 1-3, we applied contrasts to the predictors and ran a maximal version of the 
LME model with an increased number of evaluations (lme4 package v.1.1-5). The following 
sections present the syntax used for the models reported in the paper. Furthermore, they present 
the results from these models, including additional analyses carried out on different subsets of 






3.2 Experiment 1 
See Table S3 and S4 for results. Syntax for the LME model used in Experiment 1: 
lmer (RT ~ Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type * Reading Type Order + (1 + 
Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type | Participant) + (1 | Item), data=imi1a, control = 
lmerControl (optCtrl = list(maxfun = 1e5))) 
Table S3                   




 B SE t 
Intercept 1124.58      64.90   17.32 
Predictability 177.76 27.37    6.49 
Item Type -214.12      39.14   -5.47 
Reading Type -259.00      55.87   -4.64 
Reading Type Order 95.45      129.55    .74 
Predictability * Item Type 31.70      45.19    .70 
Predictability * Reading Type -30.14      40.73   -.74 
Item Type * Reading Type -95.29      50.80   -1.88 
Predictability * Reading Type Order 97.01      52.22    1.86 
Item Type * Reading Type Order -68.73      76.55   -.90 
Reading Type * Reading Type Order 287.81     111.73    2.58 
Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type -21.05      77.33   -.27 
Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type Order -114.36      84.20   -1.36 
Predictability * Reading Type * Reading Type Order -112.11      81.39   -1.38 
Item Type * Reading Type * Reading Type Order 23.53      101.54    .23 
Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type * 
Reading Type Order 










Experiment 1: Results from LME model on participants’ RT on the dataset excluding 
outliers and error trials 
 
Experiment 1 
 B SE t 
Intercept 1102.78      58.78   18.76 
Predictability 174.91      26.68    6.56 
Item Type -294.91      52.60   -5.61 
Reading Type -258.60      57.58   -4.49 
Reading Type Order 72.52      117.22    .619 
Predictability * Item Type 54.19      51.95    1.04 
Predictability * Reading Type -20.41      46.36   -.44 
Item Type * Reading Type -173.02      64.46   -2.68 
Predictability * Reading Type Order 57.72      50.27    1.15 
Item Type * Reading Type Order -151.99     103.67   -1.47 
Reading Type * Reading Type Order 328.05     115.15      2.85 
Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type -85.35      91.45   -.93 
Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type Order -174.10      97.55   -1.78 
Predictability * Reading Type * Reading Type Order -52.62      92.68   -.57 
Item Type * Reading Type * Reading Type Order 12.83      128.88    .10 
Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type * 
Reading Type Order 
228.46     182.84    1.25 
  
3.3 Experiment 2 
The syntax for the LME model reported in the paper: 
lmer (RT ~ Predictability * Reading Type * Reading Type Order + (1 + Predictability * 
Reading Type | Participant) + (1 | Item), data=imi4, control = lmerControl (optCtrl = 
list(maxfun = 1e5))) 
Tables S5 and S6 show results from additional LME models that were carried out on the 
dataset including both the word (where participants were supposed to speak) and non-word 






lmer (RT ~ Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type * Reading Type Order + (1 + 
Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type | Participant) + (1 | Item), data=imi4, control = 
lmerControl (optCtrl = list(maxfun = 1e5))) 
Table S5 




 B SE t 
Intercept 767.565     14.051    54.63 
Predictability 47.118     16.244     2.90 
Item Type 37.081     22.205     1.67 
Reading Type 110.367     24.737     4.46 
Reading Type Order 35.035     28.102     1.25 
Predictability * Item Type 27.639     27.812     0.99 
Predictability * Reading Type -92.187     26.913    -3.43 
Item Type * Reading Type 202.616     28.205     7.18 
Predictability * Reading Type Order -4.188     32.487    -0.13 
Item Type * Reading Type Order 52.147     44.410     1.17 
Reading Type * Reading Type Order 5.145      49.474     0.10 
Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type 126.477     56.552     2.24 
Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type Order -5.061     55.625    -.09 
Predictability * Reading Type * Reading Type Order 2.863      53.827     0.05 
Item Type * Reading Type * Reading Type Order 77.266     56.410     1.37 
Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type * 
Reading Type Order 









Experiment 2: Results from LME model on participants’ RT on the dataset excluding 




 B SE t 
Intercept 757.19    15.94   47.51 
Predictability 60.94     16.68     3.65 
Item Type 37.65     23.73     1.59 
Reading Type 131.16     26.72     4.91 
Reading Type Order 39.67     31.88     1.24 
Predictability * Item Type 47.11    33.37     1.41 
Predictability * Reading Type -119.25    29.81    -4.00 
Item Type * Reading Type 200.23     31.15     6.43 
Predictability * Reading Type Order -7.02     33.35    -.21 
Item Type * Reading Type Order 65.84     47.44     1.39 
Reading Type * Reading Type Order .80     53.44     .02 
Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type 87.05    60.92     1.43 
Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type Order .24    66.75     .00 
Predictability * Reading Type * Reading Type Order 22.14     59.61     .37 
Item Type * Reading Type * Reading Type Order 45.97     62.30     .74 
Predictability * Item Type * Reading Type * 
Reading Type Order 
51.3906    121.8415    0.42 
 
3.4 Experiment 3 
In addition to the analysis reported in the paper, another LME model was carried out on a 
bigger subset of the full dataset. See Table S7 for the results. See below for the syntax for the 
LME models in Experiment 3: 
lmer (RT ~ Predictability * Reading Type * Reading Type Order + (1 + Predictability * 
Reading Type | Participant) + (1 | Item), data=imi4, control = lmerControl (optCtrl = 








Experiment 3: Results from LME model on participants’ RT on the dataset excluding 
outliers, but with retained trials where participants were still reading the context after the 
onset of the recording 
 
Experiment 3 
 B SE t 
Intercept 504.32      24.68   20.43 
Predictability 125.58      26.20    4.79 
Reading Type 105.59      20.03    5.27 
Reading Type Order 16.81      44.18    .38 
Predictability * Reading Type -55.35      17.19   -3.22 
Predictability * Reading Type Order 16.31      28.41    .57 
Reading Type * Reading Type Order 68.70      40.06    1.71 
Predictability * Reading Type * Reading Type Order -13.73      34.35   -.40 
 
 
4 ATTENTION QUESTIONS (GLME) 
To probe whether participants attended to the sentence contexts, we analysed the likelihood of 
producing a correct answer in response to the yes/no questions. For Experiments 1-3, we ran 
a binomial Generalized Linear Mixed Model with Predictability, and Reading Type as fixed 
effects and by-subjects random intercepts and slopes to test the likelihood of giving a correct 
answer for each design cell. See Table S8 for the mean percentages of corrects responses, and 
Table S9 for the results from the models. 
4.1 Model Description  
Prior to running the models, we centered and scaled the predictors. We then ran GLMMs with 
an increased number of evaluations, and a non-default optimizer specified in the model syntax: 
glmer (correct ~ 1 + Predictability * Reading Type + (1 + Predictability * Reading Type | 
Participant), data = imi7, family = binomial, control=glmerControl (optCtrl = list(maxfun = 






4.2 Experiments 1, 2, and 3 
Table S8 
Experiments 1-3: Percentages of correct responses to the yes/no questions by 
Predictability and Reading Type 
Experiment 1 
 Reading Type 
Predictability reading silently reading aloud 
high cloze 26% 26% 
low cloze 24% 24% 
Experiment 2 
 Reading Type 
Predictability reading silently reading aloud 
high cloze 26% 27% 
low cloze 23% 24% 
Experiment 3 
 Reading Type 
Predictability reading silently reading aloud 
high cloze 27% 30% 
low cloze 20% 23% 
 
Table S9 
Experiments 1-3: GLMM analyses of the likelihood of a correct response to the yes/no 




 B SE z p 
Intercept 2.29    .15   14.76    < .001 
Predictability .24    .15    1.64     .101     
Reading Type .01    .13    .07     > .250 
Predictability * Reading Type .01    .14    .05     > .250 
Experiment 2 
 B SE z p 






Predictability .10    .09   1.15    > .250 
Reading Type .18    .09  1.97    .046 
Predictability * Reading Type -.02     .09   -.21    > .250 
Experiment 3 
 B SE z p 
Intercept   2.31     .35    6.63 < .001 
Predictability .74     .27    2.70   .007 
Reading Type .06     .28    .23   > .250 











Appendix B: Investigating the Role of 
Automatic Temporal Adaptation in 
Imitation 
1 REPLICATION EXPERIMENT 
1.1 Methods 
Based on the sample size chosen by Pfister et al. (2013), we invited 24 previously unacquainted 
participants (18 female, 6 male; right-handed; same-gender pairs). Participants were 
Edinburgh University students with no motor disorders and were paid £6. The study was 
approved by the local ethics committee and consent was obtained from all participants.We 
used the same procedure and materials as in our Experiment 1. However, similarly to the 
original study (Pfister et al., 2013), there was no divider and participants could see and hear 
each other while doing the task (Figure 3). 
1.2 Results 
Warm-up trials, error trials (4.31%) and outliers (2.25%) were removed prior to analysing the 
leader’s responses. Error trials for both participants (8.65%), as well as further outliers (1.45%) 
were removed prior to the follower’s analyses.  
We found that followers’ responses were facilitated in the imitation condition (Figure S1, 
panel c): Followers were significantly faster in imitation than counter-imitation (M = 325 ms 
vs M = 447 ms; t(23) = 6.71, p < .001, r = .81, 95% CI = [84, 159]). In follow-up pairwise 
comparisons, we then tested whether this effect was present for both long and short key 
presses. After excluding one follower who showed an extremely high error rate (48.94%) for 






long (M = 307 ms vs M = 370 ms; t(22) = 3.54, p = .002, r = .60, 95% CI = [26, 100]) and 
short leader presses (M = 333 ms vs M = 495 ms; t(22) = 6.20, p < .001, r = .80, 95% CI = 
[108, 216]). 
Importantly, we replicated the original finding that leaders were faster in imitation than 
counter-imitation (M = 415 ms vs M = 436 ms; t(23) = 3.22, p = .004, r = .56, 95% CI = [8, 
37]) (Figure S1, panel c). Pairwise comparisons showed this difference was significant both 
for long (M = 426 ms vs M = 444 ms; t(23) = 2.46, p = .022, r = .46, 95% CI = [3, 33]) and 










Figure S1. Mean leaders’ and followers’ RT in imitation and counter-imitation, in Experiment 
1, Experiment 2 and Replication. Error bars represent 95% CI. Panel a shows Experiment 1, 
panel b Experiment 2, and panel c Replication. Panels a and b correspond to Figure 3 and 4 
(respectively) in the main paper. 
2 ERROR RATE 
2.1 Experiment 1 
A 2 (Condition) X 2 (Leader’s Press Type) within-subjects ANOVA on arcsine-transformed 
percentage scores showed that leader’s error trials were equally distributed between conditions 
and press types, (Leader’s Press Type: F(1,23) = 1.42, p = .245, 
  = .03; Condition: F(1,23) 
= .38, p > .250, 
  < .01; interaction: F(1,23) = .40, p > .250, 
  < .01). Similarly, there were 
no significant effects on followers’ error rate (Leader’s Press Type: F(1,23) = 1.15, p > .250, 

  < .01; Condition: F(1,23) = 0.01, p > .250, 
  < .01; interaction: F(1,23) < .001, p > .250, 

   < .01). 
2.2 Experiment 2 
We found no significant effects on leaders’ error rate (Leader’s Press Type: F(1,47) = 3.45, p 
= .069, 
  = .03; Condition: F(1,47) = .06, p > .250, 
  < .01; interaction: F(1,47) = .94, p > 
.250, 
  < .01). However, there was a significant main effect of condition on followers’ error 
rate, indicating that followers made more errors in counter-imitation than imitation (16.97% 
vs 11.94%; F(1,47) = 5.69, p = .021, 
  = .02). No other effects were significant (Leader’s 
Press Type: F(1,47) = .22, p > .250, 
  < .01; interaction F(1,47) = .73, p > .250, 
  < .01). 
A possible worry is that leaders might have been affected by the followers’ error rate in 
counter-imitation. There are two reasons to dismiss this possibility: (a) leaders did not show a 
corresponding difference in the distribution of error rates and (b) had leaders experienced 
difficulties due to followers’ high error rate in counter-imitation, they would have slowed 






2.3 Replication Experiment 
Leaders’ error trials were equally distributed between conditions and press types (Leader’s 
Press Type: F(1,23) = .15, p > .250, 
  < .01; Condition: F(1,23) = .16, p > .250, 
  < .01; 
interaction: F(1,23) = .54, p > .250, 
  < .01). We found no significant effects for followers’ 
error rate (Leader’s Press Type: F(1,23) = .03, p > .250, 
  < .01; Condition: F(1,23) = 0.12, 
p > .250, 
  < .01; interaction: F(1,23) = .16, p > .250, 
  < .01). 
3 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES (ANOVA) 
3.1 Experiment 1 
Table S10 
Experiment 1: Followers’ and leaders’ average response times (RT) by Leader’s Press 
Type and Condition 
 Followers’ RT Leaders’ RT 
Condition 
Leader’s Press Type Leader’s Press Type 
short long short long 
imitation 328 308 425 444 
counter-imitation 526 392 440 443 
Note. Average RT were calculated for data excluding followers’ and leaders’ error trials 
and outliers (see the main paper for details). Response times are reported in ms. 
 
We ran a 2 (Condition: imitation vs counter-imitation) X 2 (Leader’s Press Type: short vs 
long) within-subjects ANOVA on followers’ RT. The analysis revealed main effects of 
Condition (F(1,23) = 34.21, p < .001, 
  = .27) and Leader’s Press Type (F(1,23) = 12.02, p 
= .002, 
  = .07), qualified by a significant interaction (F(1,23) = 14.42, p < .001, 
  = .05). 
Followers were faster in imitation than counter-imitation, and the difference between 
conditions was bigger for short than for long presses (Table S10). 
We conducted a similar analysis on leaders’ RT and found an interaction between Condition 
and Leader’s Press Type (F(1,23) = 5.67, p = .026, 
  < .01). Importantly, pairwise 






tests reported in the main paper). Instead, it appeared to be driven by a significant difference 
in leaders’ RT between short and long presses in the imitation condition (t(23) = 2.92, p = 
.008, r = .52, 95% CI = [6, 34]; Table S10). There was no such difference in counter-imitation 
(t(23) = 0.47, p > .250, r = .10, 95% CI = [-14, 23]). We found no main effects of Condition 
(F(1,23) = 1.32, p > .250, 
  < .01) or Leader’s Press Type (F(1,23) = 2.77, p = .109, 
  < 
.01).  
3.2 Experiment 2 
Table S11 
Experiment 2: Followers’ and leaders’ average response times (RT) by Leader’s Press 
Type and Condition 
 Followers’ RT Leaders’ RT 
Condition 
Leader’s Press Type Leader’s Press Type 
short long short long 
imitation 781 533 459 481 
counter-imitation 310 286 439 462 
Note. Average RT were calculated for data excluding followers’ and leaders’ error trials 
and outliers (see the main paper for details). Response times are reported in ms. 
 
A 2 (Condition: imitation vs counter-imitation) X 2 (Leader’s Press Type: short vs long) 
within-subjects ANOVA on followers’ RT found a main effect of Condition (F(1,47) = 298.11, 
p < .001, 
  = .61) and a main effect of Leader’s Press Type (F(1,47) = 132.57, p < .001, 
  
= .17). Furthermore, there was a significant interaction suggesting that followers were slower 
in imitation as compared to counter-imitation, and that this difference was greater for short 
than for long leader presses (F(1,47) = 110.64, p < .001, 
  = .12; Table S11). 
With regards to leaders’ RT, the analysis confirmed that leaders were slower in the imitation 
than in the counter-imitation condition (F(1,47) = 8.96, p = .004, 
  = .01). Moreover, there 
was a main effect of Leader’s Press Type on leaders’ RT, suggesting that leaders responded 
faster for short than long presses (F(1,47) = 21.70, p < .001, 
  = .02). The interaction was 
not significant (F(1,47) = 0.10, p > .250, 







3.3 Replication Experiment 
Table S12 
Replication experiment: Followers’ and leaders’ average response times (RT) by Leader’s 
Press Type and Condition 
 Followers’ RT Leaders’ RT 
Condition 
Leader’s Press Type Leader’s Press Type 
short long short long 
imitation 332 311 405 426 
counter-imitation 485 361 427 444 
Note. Average RT were calculated for data excluding followers’ and leaders’ error trials 
and outliers (see the main paper for details). In addition, followers’ RT were calculated on 
data excluding one participant who showed an extremely high error rate. Response times 
are reported in ms. 
 
The analysis on followers’ RT revealed main effects of Condition (F(1,22) = 42.26, p < .001, 

  = .16) and Leader’s Press Type (F(1,22) = 11.84, p = .002, 
  = .08), qualified by a 
significant interaction (F(1,22) = 12.30, p = .002, 
  = .03). Followers were faster in imitation 
than counter-imitation, and the difference between conditions was bigger for short than for 
long presses (Table S12).20 
Leaders’ RT were shorter in imitation than counter-imitation condition (F(1,23) = 9.35, p = 
.006, 
  = .01) and shorter for short than long leader presses (F(1,23) = 7.62, p = .011, 
  = 
.01; Table S12). The interaction between Condition and Leader’s Press Type was not 
significant (F(1,23) = 1.36, p = .250, 
  < .01).
                                                   
 
20 Prior to ANOVA on the follower’s RT’s, we removed data from one participant due to an 
extremely high error rate (see Results from the Replication experiment). 
4 CROSS-CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
In order to further investigate the relationship between the leader’s RT on the current trial and 
the follower’s RT on the preceding trial, we conducted a cross-correlation analysis (maximum 
lag of 1) on the data from all three experiments. We assumed that the time-series of participant 
responses obtained in our task had local stationarity and performed the analysis in non-
overlapping windows of 6 observations (cf. Konvalinka et al., 2010).  
For each dyad, we calculated average cross-correlation coefficient for lag = -1 (estimates a 
correlation between the leader’s RT on the current trial and the follower’s RT on the preceding 
trial), lag = 0 (leader’s RT on the current trial and the follower’s RT on the current trial) and 
lag = 1 (leader’s RT on the current trial and the follower’s RT on the following trial). Average 
coefficients were then transformed into Fischer Z-scores and entered into a one-way 
MANOVA with Experiment as a between-subjects factor (Experiment: Experiment 1 vs 
Experiment 2 vs Replication) and average coefficients for lags -1, 0, and 1 as the dependent 
variables.  
Table S13 
Experiments 1-2 and Replication experiment: Average Z-transformed cross-correlation 




-1 0 1 
Experiment 1 0.003 -0.083 0.023 
Experiment 2 0.057 -0.259 0.040 
Replication 0.064 -0.084 0.022 
 
If the condition effect on leaders’ RT is due to temporal anticipation (i.e., leaders anticipate 
followers’ response speed on the current trial), we would expect to see a positive correlation 
for lag 0. Instead, we observed negative correlations for lag 0 in all experiments, suggesting 
that temporal anticipation did not affect leader’s action execution on the current trial (Table 
S13). In addition, the correlation was stronger in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1 and the 
Replication experiment, as indicated by the MANOVA (main effect of Experiment: F(2,45) = 
9.68, p < .001) and follow-up pairwise comparisons (Experiment 2 vs 1: t(23.35) = 3.48, p = 






.99, 95% CI = [.08, 26]; Experiment 1 vs Replication: t(20.93) = .01, p > .250, d = .00, 95% 
CI = [-.11, .11]). A strong negative correlation in Experiment 2 is likely to be a consequence 
of the fact that the followers responded to the auditory cue and not directly to leaders’ actions. 
However, a negative relationship in Experiment 1 and in the Replication experiment could 
suggest that followers dynamically adapted to leader’s RT (e.g., if the leader was particular 
slow on a given trial, the follower could compensate by speeding up their own response).21 
If leaders adapt to followers’ RT on the preceding trial, we would expect a positive correlation 
for lag -1, but only in the experiments where participants could observe each other. 
Consistently with this prediction, there was a weak positive correlation in Experiment 2 and 
the Replication experiment, but a null correlation in Experiment 1 (Table S13). This numerical 
trend was reflected by a main effect of Experiment in MANOVA (F(2,45) = 3.74, p = .031). 
Furthermore, follow-up pairwise comparisons revealed that Experiment 2 differed 
significantly from Experiment 1 in terms of correlation strength for lag -1 (t(22.93) = -2.95, p 
= .007, d = .74, 95% CI = [-.09, -.02]. Similarly, there was a difference between the Replication 
experiment and Experiment 1, however it was only marginally significant (t(17.98) = -2.12, p 
= .048, d = .61, 95% CI = [-.12, .00]). Experiment 2 and Replication did not differ (t(15.41) = 
0.25, p > .250, d = .06, 95% CI = [-.05, .06]). We found no effect of Experiment with regards 
to correlation coefficients for lag 1 (F(2,45) =.34, p > .250). 
  
                                                   
 
21 Note that this argument is purely speculative, as our experiments were not designed to test 















Figure S2. Relationship between Follower’s RT on preceding trial and Leader’s RT on current 
trial. Lines represent regression lines for imitation (solid) and counter-imitation (dashed). 






6 MAIN ANALYSES ON DATA INCLUDING OUTLIERS 
We checked whether outlier rejection affected the key results in Experiments 1-2 and the 
Replication experiment. For each experiment, we ran the analyses on the data excluding the 
leader and follower error trials, but retaining the outliers. 
6.1 Experiment 1 
We obtained the same pattern of results as in the analyses on the data without outliers. 
Followers were significantly faster in imitation than counter-imitation (M = 188 ms vs M = 
384 ms; t(23) = 6.17, p < .001, r = .79, 95% CI = [139, 279]), and this effect was present both 
for long (M = 46 ms vs M = 235 ms; t(23) = 4.22, p < .001, r = .66, 95% CI = [94, 275]) and 
short leader presses (M = 333 ms vs M = 536 ms; t(23) = 7.70, p < .001, r = .85, 95% CI = 
[152, 264]). Leaders showed no difference in response speed between imitation and counter-
imitation (M = 442 ms vs M = 449 ms; t(23) = 1.07, p > .250, r = .22, 95% CI = [-6, 19]). 
Follow-up comparisons showed there was no difference between conditions both for long (M 
= 453 ms vs M = 452 ms; t(23) = -.03, p > .250, r = .01, 95% CI =[-13, 13]) and short presses 
(M = 431 ms vs M = 445 ms; t(23) = 1.61, p = .121, r = .32, 95% CI = [-4, 30]). 
6.2 Experiment 2 
Again, we obtained the same pattern of results as for the data without outliers. Followers 
responded slower in imitation than counter-imitation (M = 657 ms vs M = 307 ms; t(47) = -
16.10, p < .001, r = .92, 95% CI = [-397, -309]), both for long (M = 531 ms vs M = 290 ms; 
t(47) = -10.24, p < .001, r = .83, 95% CI = [-294, -198]) and short leader presses (M = 788 ms 
vs M = 322 ms; t(47) = -21.13, p < .001, r = .95, 95% CI = [-509,-420]). Similarly, leaders 
were significantly slower in imitation than counter-imitation (M = 478 ms vs M = 458 ms; 
t(47) = -3.11, p = .003, r = .41, 95% CI = [-32, -7]), and this difference was significant both 
for long (M = 490 ms vs M = 470 ms; t(47) = -3.01, p = .004, r = .40, 95% CI = [-32, -6]) and 






6.3 Replication Experiment 
As in the analyses on the data without outliers, followers were faster in imitation than counter-
imitation (M = 331 ms vs M = 439 ms; t(23) = 6.65, p < .001, r = .81, 95% CI = [83, 158]), 
and this effect was significant both for long (M = 315 ms vs M = 364 ms; t(22) = 3.28, p = 
.003, r = .57, 95% CI = [22, 100]) and short leader presses (M = 339 ms vs M = 490 ms; t(22) 
= 6.39, p < .001, r = .81, 95% CI = [109, 213]).22  
Consistently with the analyses on the data without outliers, leaders were significantly faster in 
imitation than counter-imitation (M = 421 ms vs M = 446 ms; t(23) = 3.54, p = .002, r = .59, 
95% CI = [10, 39]). However, pairwise comparisons found that this effect was significant only 
for short presses (M = 411 ms vs M = 439 ms; t(23) = 3.45, p = .002, r = .58, 95% CI = [-34, 
-6]), but not for long presses (M = 435 ms vs M = 452 ms; t(23) = 2.05, p = .052, r = .39, 95% 
CI = [-.12, 31]). 
 
  
                                                   
 
22 Prior to the pairwise comparisons for the follower’s RT’s, we removed data from the 







Appendix C: Investigating the Social 
Consequences of Linguistic Imitation 
1 CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE PGG ON TURN ONE 
Both in case of Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, the analysis of participants’ contributions on 
turn one yielded the same pattern of results as the analysis of participants’ contributions 
averaged across all six turns. In Experiment 2, we compared the mean contributions on turn 
one between the imitation and counter-imitation condition using a Mann-Whitney test (data 
were not normally distributed). There was no difference between contributions in imitation 
and counter-imitation (M = 22.81 vs M = 22.62; W = 444, p > .250, r = -.08). In Experiment 
3, participants in the imitation condition contributed significantly more than participants in the 
counter-imitation condition (M = 27.94 vs M = 21.44; W = 390, p = .009, r = -.31). 
2 MATERIALS 
2.1 Short Questionnaire 
Please complete this brief questionnaire regarding your participation in the experiment. This 
questionnaire is anonymous, so please do not sign this sheet. For each question circle the 
number that represents your answer most closely. Please don’t hesitate to use the whole 
scale (1-9). 
 
1. How clear would you say were the instructions in the experiment? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely obscure  extremely clear 
 
2. How difficult was the task? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely easy  extremely difficult 
 
3. How likable was the other participant? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  







4. How recognisable were the entities on the pictures? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely ambiguous  extremely recognisable  
 
5. How similar were the pictures to each other? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely dissimilar  extremely similar  
 
6. How familiar were the entities on the pictures? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely rare  extremely familiar  
 
7. How smoothly would you say your interaction went with the other 
participant? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely awkward  extremely smooth 
 
8. How interesting was the task? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely boring  extremely interesting 
 
9. How well did the network connection work? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely bad  extremely good 
 
10. How satisfied are you with your performance in the experiment? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely dissatisfied  extremely satisfied 
2.2 Multi-item Questionnaire: Full Item List 
1. I would ask this person for advice* 
2. This interaction was satisfying 
3. This person is knowledgeable* 
4. This person is warm* 
5. This interaction was pleasant 
6. This person is likeable* 
7. I would rate this level of rapport as high 
8. This person is approachable* 
9. I would like this person as a coworker* 
10. I would like to have interactions like this on daily basis 
11. I would like this person as a flatmate* 
12. This interaction made me feel at ease 
13. This person is friendly* 
14. I would enjoy having other interactions like this 
15. I would like to be friends with this person* 
16. This person is similar to me* 
17. This person is physically attractive* 






2.3 Instructions for the Picture Naming Task 
You will be playing an object naming and object matching game with a partner over a network 
connection. You will see pairs of pictures. You will take it in turns to name objects and match 
objects to a name. When it is your partner's turn to name, the programme will display the name 
they provided below the pictures. Your task is to select the appropriate picture using the arrow 
keys (LEFT or RIGHT). When it is your turn to name, you will see instructions telling you 
which picture to name. Your task then is to type the name of the object in the chat box 
provided. Please type in a single word whenever possible, e.g., "cat" instead of "a cat" or "a 
cute little cat". Please do your best to avoid any spelling mistakes. If you are ready to start the 
game, please call the experimenter. 
2.4 Instructions for the Picture Naming Task 
You will be playing an object naming and object matching game with a partner over a network 
connection. You will communicate using a simple chat client. You will each see a grid with 
four pictures. Both you and your partner will see the same pictures, but their positions in the 
grid will be random and therefore may be different for you and your partner. You will take it 
in turns to name pictures and match pictures to a name. When it is your partner's turn to name, 
the program will highlight one picture in their grid. Your partner then will tell you the name 
of the picture and where is it located in their grid. You will respond by telling your partner 
where this picture is located in your grid using the chat client. If it happens to be the same 
place as in your partner's grid, you will type in snap instead. 
When it is your turn to name, the program will highlight one picture in your grid. Your will 
use the chat client to tell your partner the name of the picture and where it is positioned in your 
grid, (e.g., I have a crocodile in cell 1). Your partner will respond by telling you where is it in 
their grid (or saying snap if it is in the same place as in yours). When typing, please take your 
time to type accurately and correct any spelling mistakes. The game will move on to the next 







2.5 Instructions for Stag Hunt Game 
This is almost the end of the study. You already earned your reward for participation. Now 
you have a chance to win some additional money. You will be playing the Forest Hunt game 
with the other participant. The rules are very simple: 
There are two hunters in the forest, you and the other player. There are two types of animals 
you can hunt: (1) hare - is worth £1, easy to hunt; you can do it on your own; (2) stag - is worth 
£4, very hard to hunt; two hunters are needed to shoot it. 
Each hunter can shoot only once. If you choose to hunt for the hare, you are guaranteed to hunt 
it down. You get £1 that will be added to your total earnings for the experiment. If you choose 
to hunt for the stag and the other player does so too, you successfully hunt it down and split 
£4 between you.  In this case £2 will be added to your earnings. However, if one hunter chooses 
to shoot the stag, but another hunter goes for the hare, the one that goes for the hare earns £1, 
but the one that goes for the stag is left with nothing. Press SPACEBAR whenever you are 
ready to play the game. 
2.6 Instructions for Public Goods Game 
“This is almost the end of the study. You already earned your reward for participation. Now 
you have a chance to win some additional money. You and the other player will be playing 
the Investment game. The rules are very simple: 
There are two investors, you and the other player. When the turn starts, each of you is given 
40 credits. You can use any amount of these credits to invest into a common pool. Whatever 
you decide to keep, stays with you. Whatever is invested into the pool gets multiplied by some 
factor (e.g., 1.5) and then divided between the two players. You will be told each turn what 
the multiplying factor is for that turn. For example, if player A keeps 20 credits and invests 
the other 20 and player B does the same, the outcome of the turn for player A will be: 
in the pool 20 (from player A) + 20 (from player B) = 40 credits 
40 X 1.5 = 60 
60/2 = 30 






at the end of the turn player A has 50 credits 
This example is just one of the many possible outcomes in this game. Please spend a minute 
thinking about other possible scenarios. There is one more thing you need to know: the 
decisions are blind, i.e., you won't know how much the other player invested until the end of 
the study. At the end of the study we will pick one turn at random, and you will be paid real 
money according to how many credits you had when that turn ended. Each credit is worth 5p. 
The maximum possible payoff in this game is £4.60. Please call the experimenter when you 
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